Under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, a successful war against Parthia resulted in an extension of Roman control along the Euphrates. This is reflected in a military presence below the confluence with the Khabur and also in increased power in northern Mesopotamia and Osrhoene in the second half of the second century ad. The changes that came about under Verus were later consolidated by Septimius Severus when he reorganized territory in Syria, Osrhoene and Mesopotamia.
The catalyst for Lucius Verus’ Parthian war, like Trajan’s war, was a development in Armenia. Taking advantage of the succession of the new Roman emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in 161, the Parthian king, Vologaeses III, placed a member of his own family on the Armenian throne without reference to Rome, again in contravention of the agreement under Nero.96 Fighting broke out between Roman and Parthian forces on the upper Euphrates soon after and Syria came under threat. The initial outcome for Rome was serious, with the death of the Roman governor of Cappadocia and the destruction of a Roman legion.97 Lucius Verus marched to Antioch to supervise the Roman military response. The eventual outcome of the fighting that followed saw significant Roman gains in 163. By 165 a Roman nominee occupied the Armenian throne, the Parthi-ans were expelled from Mesopotamia and Nisibis was occupied by Roman troops. Osrhoene became a dependent kingdom of Rome, while control along the Euphrates was considerably extended.98
The Roman successes against Parthia were achieved mostly under the leadership of the legatus of Legio III Gallica, Avidius Cassius, and they were clearly considerable. In Mesopotamia evidence of a military nature demonstrates that these victories had long-lasting outcomes. There is no clear evidence of a permanent Roman military presence in Mesopotamia as a result of Verus’ success over the Parthians, but it should not be ruled out as there was a Roman presence at Nisibis before the Parthian campaigns of Septimius Severus in the 190s.99 During the wars of Verus, the Romans succeeded in capturing the fortresses of Dausara, Nicephorium and Dura Europos, removing the more immediate Parthian threat to Antioch and the cities of Syria.100 Fronto’s claim that Dausara and Nicephorium were captured from the Parthians at this time indicates that the Parthians had previously been in control of the left bank of the Euphrates further west than Sura. The Parthians had probably not held them for long, but the claim that they were captured by the Romans indicates that the Parthians had probably garrisoned them.101
The status of Sura, which lay on the opposite bank of the river between Nicephorium and Dausara, is uncertain at this time. It is thought that Sura represented ‘the eastern limit of Roman power before the advance to the middle Euphrates’ under Verus, but, as discussed earlier, evidence for the fortification of Sura prior to the reign of Septimius Severus is problematic.102 We have already seen that a Roman milestone discovered near Palmyra is the only evidence of a Roman military road leading from Palmyra to the Euphrates at Sura and it is the only basis on which Sura is claimed to have been fortified by the reign of Vespasian.103 It is perhaps telling that Fronto referred to the capture of fortifications by the Romans on the Euphrates both upstream and downstream from Sura but not to Sura itself, perhaps indicating that Sura was not a significant fortification at this time. Lucian refers to a major battle between Roman and Parthian forces near Sura, but this need not indicate that it was fortified.
Further to the battle near Sura, Lucian also referred to a large battle at Europos on the Euphrates half way between Zeugma and Hierapolis.104
Figure 1.4 Remains of the fortification at Sura, base of Legio XVI Flavia Firma.
From the evidence of both Pronto and Lucian, the Euphrates, as it looped from Sura up to the vicinity of Zeugma, was the focus of intense fighting between the Romans and Parthians, and there were fortifications held by both Rome and Parthia on the river. This section of the Euphrates acted as a practical line for the defence of Roman Syria and Antioch at this time and as a means of the Parthians attempting to halt the Roman advance into Osrhoene and Mesopotamia. For the Romans the defence was successful and it was quickly turned to attack, which the Parthians were unable to resist. The archaeological evidence from Dura Europos shows that as a result of defeating the Parthians the Romans were able to extend their military power beyond the Khabur confluence, and it is probable that Roman military power extended even further down the Euphrates than Dura.
The evidence, as always, has its limitations. Lucian, a contemporary from Samosata, just upstream from where a majority of the fighting took place, complained of the limited knowledge of the war against the Parthi-ans under Verus. For Lucian, many contemporary accounts of the war were either embellished, too brief or even fictional.105 to Lucian and Fronto, however, there is enough evidence to show that a major war with the Parthians had exposed the vulnerability of Antioch to attacks directed from the Euphrates where it turned to the north above Sura. The Parthian concentration of troops on this section of the river may have occurred due to the considerable Roman fortification that had taken place further up the river from Zeugma during and after the reign of Vespasian. A potential Parthian attack on Roman territory had been effectively pushed south as a result, but this made Antioch and northern Syria vulnerable. As the situation in Armenia had again been the catalyst for conflict between Rome and Parthia, a Parthian attack on this section of the Euphrates may also have been designed to draw Roman troops away from their bases further up the Euphrates. Unfortunately for the Parthians, this seems to have demonstrated the defensive strength that the legions and fortifications on the upper and middle Euphrates provided. Troops located in garrisons further up the river could be moved south along the river to meet a Parthian threat to Syria and Antioch quickly. Following the Roman victories over the Parthian forces on the Euphrates, troops advanced down the river and took advantage of the Parthian retreat by extending Roman power further along the Euphrates. In this case, the Euphrates fortifications and their garrisons can be shown to have acted effectively in both a defensive and offensive capacity.
The outcome of the military campaigns of Lucius Verus changed the nature of the middle Euphrates from a Roman perspective. The now stronger Roman presence in Armenia and the new dependency of the kingdom of Osrhoene essentially brought both banks of a large section of the Euphrates under more direct Roman control.106 The extension of control and a military presence further along the middle Euphrates to Dura
Europos brought troops, probably Palmyrene auxiliaries, closer to Seleucia-Ctesiphon, and it also brought them closer to the desert kingdom of Hatra with which Rome would establish good relations in the third century. Closely connected with this is the increase in Roman power on the Khabur in the direction of Nisibis. While the extent and nature of the Roman military presence in Mesopotamia before the reign of Septimius Severus is not entirely clear, Roman control of the middle Euphrates and the lower Khabur came to play an important role in strengthening and supporting Roman power in Mesopotamia in the third century ad. The Khabur was also the means by which Mesopotamia and Syria were connected, and this becomes more evident following the formation of the Roman province of Mesopotamia under Septimius Severus.
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