The escalation of tensions
During late summer or early autumn of432, about a year after the naval battle off the Sybota Islands near Kerkyra, Sparta reached a decision which would change the course of Greek history: the Spartan Assembly (apella) voted to support the motion of the ephor Sthenelaidas declaring that Athens had broken the terms of the ‘Thirty Years Peace’ of 446 (Thuc. 1.87). The escalation of tensions only a year after Sybota illuminates the degree to which the political and economic spheres of interest of Athens and Sparta as the dominant powers in Greece were on a collision course. In 433/2 the treaties concluded by Athens with Leontinoi in Sicily and Rhegion in southern Italy were an indication of her growing interest in the Greek West (IG13 53, 54; Fornara 124, 125). From the Athenian perspective, however, the northern Aegean Sea was the most pressing problem, since Perdikkas II of Macedon sought to exploit the on-going conflict between Athens and Korinth for his own expansionist aims. He tacitly supported Poteidaia, the Chalkidians and Bottiaians in their desire to defect from the Delian League and he also sought by diplomatic means to explore the possibility of support from Sparta and Korinth (Thuc. 1.57). Athens feared the loss of access to the mineral resources and the timber for ship building from Thrace. She therefore demanded that the citizens of Poteidaia, a Korinthian colony but also a member of the Delian League, should dismantle their fortifications and expel the Korinthian appointed magistrates (epidamiourgoi).
After futile negotiations in Athens the Poteidaians secured a Spartan promise that Peloponnesian troops would invade Attika in case of an Athenian attack. Poteidaia rejected the Athenian ultimatum and allied herself with the Bottiaians and the Chalkidians, who had left their coastal cities and settled in Olynthos relying on the promise of Perdikkas II. Consequently the Athenians reinforced their contingent considerably, which was primarily sent out to counter the threat from Perdikkas II (Thuc. 1.56-65). Now they laid siege to Poteidaia. Tensions intensified when, on the motion of Perikles, the Athenian People’s Assembly (ekklesia) passed the Megarian Decree (Thuc. 1.67.4; 1.139.1-2; Aristophanes Acharnians 515-55; Peace 605-9; Fornara 123). It excluded the Megarians from all markets and harbours of the Delian League as well as from the Athenian agora (Kagan 1969: 251-72). The decree effectively embargoed Megarian and Korinthian imports of Thracian timber and mineral resources.
The anticipation of a great war was an important factor in the political plans of Perikles (Thuc. 1.144.3; Plutarch Perikles 8.7). In Sparta meanwhile the ephor Sthenelaidas and his political supporters, fearful of growing Athenian power, assessed the situation similarly. Thucydides (1.86.5) characterizes the situation as critical when he writes that in the debate Sthenelaidas took a clear position from the outset by demanding that the Spartans declare war. The Megarian Decree represented a provocation of Sparta as the hegemon of the Peloponnesian League. This became plain in the complaints of the Korinthians, Megarians, and other Spartan allies before the Spartan assembly of 432 (Thuc. 1.68-71). King Archidamos, however, warned - persuasively, it appears (Thuc. 1.80-85) - against declaring war at this point, on the grounds that Sparta was inadequately prepared for war. In the end Sthenelaiidas proposed that the Assembly should merely ‘state’ its view that Athens had broken the terms of the Peace of 446. In an unusual move designed to emphasize the seriousness of his proposal concerning the alleged violation of the truce, he required the Spartiates to vote ‘individually’ by grouping themselves in the apella according to their vote instead of the customary vote by acclamation (Thuc. 1.87.1-3).
The Spartan leadership then convened a meeting of their allies. After further debate it was decided that war was the only option (Thuc. 1.125), but this was not as yet a declaration of war.
In the following winter Spartan negotiators in Athens demanded the expulsion of the ‘Accursed’, which refers to a curse incurred by the Alkmeonid Megakles (a distant ancestor of Perikles), who had ordered the execution of the followers of Kylon who sought asylum at a sanctuary on the akropolis after an unsuccessful coup d’etat in the late seventh century (Hdt. 5.71; Thuc. 1.126). Perikles of course was an Alkmeonid and the Spartans attempted to undermine his political clout by this diplomatic manoeuvre, which naturally drew an Athenian rejection.
In further negotiations Sparta demanded that the Athenians lift the siege of Poteidaia, restore Aigina’s autonomy (which had been subjugated in 458/7), repeal the Megarian Decree, and grant autonomy to all members of the Delian League. The Spartans ultimately signalled their willingness to enter into negotiations by reducing their criteria for peace to a repealing of the Megarian Decree (Thuc. 1.139). Perikles, who thought war was inevitable, persuaded the Athenian ekklesia to reject the Spartan demands (towards the end of the winter of 432/1: Thuc. 1.144-5).
It was, however, neither of the hegemonic leaders of their respective leagues who was the first to engage in military action: war erupted with the Thebans’ (unsuccessful) attack on Plataiai, a long-time ally of Athens (Thuc. 2.2-5). Athens and Sparta now intensified their preparations for war, but some time passed before the first strike of a Peloponnesian army in Attika. Sparta evidently realized even before negotiations broke off that there was no hope for compromise on the part of Athens in the question of autonomy for her allies. This explains why Sparta ultimately only insisted on the repeal of the Megarian Decree: it was a matter of prestige and she could not abandon it without a loss of face. The many events leading up to the outbreak of war do not permit simple allocation of guilt (Meyer 1997: 23-54). Time and again actions and reactions from both hegemonic powers confronted their respective decision-making bodies with problems of great complexity. Even the leading players were unable to assess realistically the consequences of their decision.
The Archidamian war
The strategies and aims of war were dictated by the opponents’ assets: The sheer striking power of the Peloponnesian army stood against the naval strength of the Delian League. Sparta intended to invade Attika and devastate the Attic regions, whereas Athens sought to avoid an open battle with the superior Peloponnesian army of hoplites. On the one hand the Athenians planned to transfer the country residents out of the endangered regions into the triangular safety zone marked by the fortresses of Athens, Phaleron, and Piraeus; on the other hand they tried to remain in control of the sea and of their own allies and to raid the enemies’ coastal lines in order to interrupt the lines of supply (Lewis 1992: 380-8).
By late May or early June the Peloponnesians under king Archidamos invaded Attika. The king once again offered peace talks, which were refused by Athens (Thuc. 2.12). Above all the invasion had a devastating psychological effect on the Athenian citizens who helplessly watched as the Peloponnesians pillaged and laid waste to their land (Thuc. 2.13-23). In order to secure Athenian trade Perikles ordered the seizure of the island of Aigina and the expulsion of its inhabitants. Naval operations were to secure the continuity of Athenian connections with Kerkyra and the Hellespont (Thuc. 2.25-7, 31-2). Despite an especially serious setback during the summer of 430 operations on the island of Zakynthos and in Akarnania continued in efforts to protect Athenian interests in the West.
During the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attika an epidemic reached Piraeus from the Near East and claimed numerous victims (Thuc. 2.48-54; Rubel 2000: 120-56). The ekklesia voted to sue for peace despite Perikles’ objections, but the Spartans rejected it. The desperate and war-weary Athenians deposed Perikles as strategos and fined him for ‘deceiving the people’ (Thuc. 2.65.3). Although he was re-elected in the spring of 429, he died soon afterwards of the ‘plague’, without having influenced the on-going war again.
Ever since the ostracism of Thoukydides son of Melesias (not to be mistaken for the historian Thucydides son of Oloros) in 443, Perikles was the pre-eminent figure in Athenian politics because of his undisputed personal integrity and his authority as a statesman, which he maintained without undermining the strength of the Athenian democracy. He was single-mindedly focused on the advancement of the interests of his polis (Kagan 1991: 91-116). He proved incapable, however, of mastering the great crisis of 432/1 because he embraced vague political theories about the inevitability of wars between rival powers. His death paved the way for the rise of ‘new politicians’ (Connor 1971) like Kleon and Nikias, who were wealthy entrepreneurs, to play a prominent role in Athens. Kleon, owner of a large tannery, lacked Perikles’ sophistication, but was accepted by many in the ekklesia, despite his rough manners. He had strongly criticized the strategies of Perikles and, like other Athenian politicians, was confronted with the problem of the stalemate in the war effort. Nikias, who held leases of silver mines and owned some 1,000 slaves, became one of the most important strategoi while at the same time avoiding military risks. He did not, however, succeed in influencing the ekklesia on a permanent basis. It was the trust of the demos, however, which remained the basis of a leading role in the polis. Every politician therefore had to reckon with the ever-present possibility of political defeat in the ekklesia despite previous successes in votes.
The fortunes of war kept changing over the course of the following years. In 429 a small Athenian squadron commanded by Phormion operated with great success in the Korinthian Gulf (Thuc. 80-92), and Poteidaia was forced to surrender during the winter of 430/29 (Thuc. 2.70). Chalkidike nonetheless remained a source of danger for Athens. Although in 429 Peloponnesian troops did not invade Attika, they laid siege to Plataiai for the long term. In 428 Mytilene and three other poleis on the island of Lesbos seceded (Thuc. 3.2-6), but the Athenians brutally crushed the revolt and took bloody revenge despite another Peloponnesian invasion of Attika. Kleon in particular whipped up the emotions of the ekklesia, which - one of the darkest moments of Athenian democracy - voted to execute all male citizens of Mytilene and to enslave the women and children. The next day the resolution was modified, but still about one thousand so-called ring-leaders were put to death (Thuc. 3.2750). After the surrender of Plataiai in 427 the Spartans, urged on by their allies, displayed similar cruelty by ordering the execution of 285 surviving enemy combatants (Thuc. 3.52-68). In the summer of that year the ever increasing brutality reached its peak on the island of Kerkyra as certain subversive elements amongst its citizens caused civil war (Thuc. 3.69-81). They had bought their way out of Kor-inthian captivity on the promise of forcing an alliance between Kerkyra and Korinth. Thucydides analyses these events and lays bare both the destructive forces set loose during the war within many poleis and the abandoning of traditional values amongst their citizens (Thuc. 3.82-3).
In 427 the theatre of warfare expanded into the West. An Athenian squadron was dispatched in an unsuccessful effort to support Leontinoi against Syracuse (Thuc. 3.86) and had to retreat, after the Sicilian Greeks succeeded in settling their quarrels at the conference of Gela following a rousing speech made by Hermokrates of Syracuse (Thuc. 4.58-65).
The Athenian intervention, however, had far-reaching effects in respect to the strategic importance of Aitolia, Kerkyra, Kephallenia, Akarnania, and Zakynthos. By 426 these new plans came to life under the strategos Demosthenes, who sought to extend Athenian influence over Aitolia by a surprise attack designed to exert pressure on the Spartan allies in Boiotia (Roisman 1993: 23-32). In 425 Demosthenes, who accompanied the strategoi although he held no office, scored an unexpected success when the 40 triremes, which were to support the Athenian forces on Sicily, were delayed by inclement weather off the Peloponnesian coast near Pylos. Before their departure they set up a base at Koryphasion, the promontory of Pylos. Under the command of Demosthenes the garrison was manned with five trireme crews, who faced a siege when 420 Spartiates and perioikoi (non-citizen freemen in Lakonia) occupied the island of Sphakteria south of Koryphasion. In the end the
Lakedaimonians were surrounded by Athenian reinforcements and Sparta proposed peace negotiations, which, however, were rejected (Thuc. 4.2-23). The dominant speaker in the ekklesia was Kleon, who assumed the command of the Athenian forces in Pylos when the siege continued, but Demosthenes was the de facto commander of the operations which succeeded in overpowering the Lakedaimonians. The capture of 292 Lakedaimonian hoplites, including about 120 Spartiates, marked a turning point in the fortunes of war (Thuc. 4.26-41; Kagan 1974: 219-59). Victory now appeared within reach for the Athenians. In order to meet the expenses of the war they raised the phoros, the tribute of their allies, to c. 1,460-1,500 talents (M&L 69; IG13 71; Fornara 136) and planned major offensives against Megara and the Boiotians in 424. In the last analysis the failure of these expeditions was largely the result of inadequate means of communication (Roisman 1993: 42-51). Especially the Athenian defeat near Delion in Boiotia in 424 represented a serious set-back (Thuc. 4.90-9).
In the same year the conquest of the Spartan island of Kythera raised hopes in Athens, but the Spartan Brasidas was able to advance into Thrace with a small force of mercenaries and helots who, for the first time in Spartan history, served as hoplites. By capturing Amphipolis and some other poleis he scored a direct hit against Athenian naval supremacy (Thuc. 4.102-16). The Spartans made overtures to the Persian Court even before Brasidas’ campaigns, but these proved fruitless (Thuc. 4.50). A willingness to come to an arrangement grew steadily in both poleis. In Athens the hope of victory diminished rapidly, and the Spartan leaders were eager to ransom the soldiers who had been captured on the island ofSphakteria. In the spring of423 a one-year armistice agreement was concluded (Staatsvertrage 183) which was favourable for Athens. It was not, however, renewed when it expired in 422 because Brasidas did not wish to put his successes in Thrace in jeopardy - in defiance of orders from the ephors. Kleon now assumed the Athenian command in Thrace but fell in the defeat at Amphipolis. Brasidas died of his wounds after the battle and received a hero’s honours in Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.6-11). In sum Brasidas was a strict proponent of Spartan Machtpolitik. The slogans of freedom which gained him political success in some of the Thracian poleis were merely a means towards achieving his goals. Leading Spartans, however, considered his far-reaching strategic plans to be a danger to the political order of Sparta.
After the battle of Amphipolis politicians who recommended a peace arrangement forced the issue in both Athens and Sparta. In the spring of 421 they reached a settlement which was to establish a 50-years’ peace. The Peace of Nikias, named after the most important Athenian negotiator, provided in essence that both poleis were to acknowledge the mutual spheres of interest of pre-war days and that any conflicts were to be settled by arbitration. The treaty also included concessions on the part of both sides (Thuc 5.18-19; Staatsvertrage 188). The Athenians retained Nisaia, the harbour of Megara, while Thebes remained in possession of Plataiai. Athens was to leave Koryphasion, the promontory of Pylos, whereas Sparta was obliged to withdraw from Skione, a polis which was in revolt against Athens and which the Athenians had already decided to destroy.
This agreement was a clear indication that the Spartans had failed to make good on their professed goal of‘liberating the Hellenes’ from Athenian hegemony, which they considered a tyranny. On the other hand Athens achieved less than had been predicted by Perikles. At the beginning of the war, in 431, the willingness of Perikles to incur a far greater risk than Athens was able to handle had had its motives in his overestimating Athenian military power. After his death, none of the politicians was able to deliver on his plans (Thuc. 2.65).
The unstable peace and the Athenian expedition to Sicily
After the settlement of the Peace of Nikias the situation throughout Greece remained volatile. The Spartan commanding officer in Amphipolis refused to surrender the city and other poleis in Thrace to the wrath of Athens (Thuc. 5.21). The Boiotians did not give up the Attic frontier post of Panakton and the Korinthians did not succeed in linking their old colonies of Poteidaia and Kerkyra to the metropolis, the mother city (Korinth). Moreover it was uncertain whether the peace between Sparta and Argos, which reached its term in 421, could be renewed (Kagan 1974: 19-32; 1981). As her most important allies did not ratify the Peace of Nikias, Sparta changed her course and settled for a defensive alliance with Athens which was supposed to last 50 years (Thuc. 5.23; Staatsvertrage 189). The reaction to this new development was an alliance between Mantineia, Argos, and Elis. Soon Korinth and the Chalkidians joined them (Thuc. 5.28-31; Staatsvertrage 190). In the spring of 420 the Spartans formed an alliance with Boiotia because of growing discord with Athens (Thuc. 5.39.2-3).
Alkibiades exploited this new situation for his own daring coup: after his entering office as strategos in 420 he negotiated a 100-year alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantineia (Thuc. 5.43-7; Staatsvertrage 193; IG13 83). When the conflict between Argos and Sparta intensified, the Spartan leaders were determined to thwart further disintegration in the Peloponnesian League.
In the battle of Mantineia of 418 the Spartans under King Agis II succeeded in defeating the Argives and their allies - including an Athenian contingent - and in disrupting the new ‘Quadruple Alliance’ (Thuc. 5.64-74). They were unable, however, to impose a lasting pro-Spartan regime on Argos. In these years Sparta and Athens pursued their policy of strength with utmost brutality. In 417/16 the Spartans occupied the city of Hysiai near Argos and killed all captured citizens (Thuc. 5.83). The Athenians also showed their disregard for all rules of conduct. In the winter of 417/16 they executed all male citizens of the island of Melos and enslaved the women and children, because Melos was not willing to give up her neutrality. In his famous ‘Melian Dialogue’ Thucydides in masterly fashion transformed the negotiations of the summer of 416, when the Athenian envoys conveyed their demands, into a paradigm of an unscrupulous policy of terror (Thuc. 5.85-111).
Alkibiades probably did not participate in the action against Melos. In 416 he strengthened the position of the Athenian partisans in Argos once again. Furthermore he saw the chance of a large-scale Athenian intervention on Sicily, when in the winter of 416/15 the Elymian city of Segesta (or Egesta) in western Sicily sought support in Athens against the polis Selinous, which was allied with Syracuse (Thuc. 6.6). According to Alkibiades, who had been raised in the house of his uncle Perikles, a new struggle for power against Sparta was inevitable anyway. He pleaded for a preventive strike in order to thwart a coalition of Athens’ enemies in Sicily and Greece proper (Thuc. 6.16-18). As to the ‘Sicilian Expedition’, he succeeded in carrying the day against the warnings of the more cautious Nikias. The ekklesia voted for the expedition with Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos as strategoi autokratores (generals with plenipotentiary powers) and on equal terms, and it instructed them to protect Segesta and generally to deal with the Sicilian Greeks ‘in a way that serves Athens best’ (Thuc. 6.8.2). For Athens it was a daring undertaking (Kagan 1974: 191; 1981). It is true that up to that point Sparta had been unable to gain the upper hand in Greece, even with the support of new allies in the West. But even if the Athenians had been successful in incorporating the Sicilian Greeks into the Delian League, Athens’ military and logistic potential would not have been sufficient to control the vast maritime space between the Carthaginian and Persian spheres of interest.
Shortly before the departure of the Athenian expeditionary force herms (stelai displaying an erect phallus and a bust of Hermes with a small altar for common people’s offering) were mutilated one night (Thuc. 6.27-9) - an act allegedly planned by perhaps a dozen perpetrators: Athens was in turmoil (Rubel 2000: 178-232). Hermes was considered to be the patron god of travellers, and therefore none of the sailors in the Athenian fleet wanted to share the triremes with blasphemers. Moreover, in public opinion it was linked to an alleged conspiracy against democracy. Denunciations and incriminations created further confusion. Alkibiades, who was perceived as a typical champion of the Athenian jeunesse doree (‘gilded youth’), was accused of another sacrilegious act, the profanation of the Mysteries of Eleusis (Plutarch Alkibiades 19; Andokides 1.11-18). At first no action was brought against Alkibiades, but he was soon recalled. While returning to Athens he fled to Sparta. There he is said to have divulged some of Athens’ far-reaching, but not in every respect believable plans of conquest and to have advised the Spartans permanently to occupy the Athenian fortress of Dekeleia (Thuc. 6.53; 6.88.9-93).
After some initial successes Nikias and Lamachos began to besiege Syracuse. In 414, however, Lamachos fell in battle at Epipolai, the plateau near Syracuse (Thuc. 6.101.6). When the surrender of Syracuse seemed to be imminent, the arrival of Gylippos, who had been sent by Sparta, turned the scales in favour of the besieged (Thuc. 7.1-7). He circumspectly organized the defence of the city, so that it was now the Athenians who found themselves under siege. After a belated and futile attempt by the fleet to break through the lines, and after a further delay due to a lunar eclipse, the Athenians had to retreat to the interior of Sicily and surrendered after a short while. Nikias and the renowned commander Demosthenes, who had been sent with reinforcements to Sicily, were executed. About 40,000 men - combatants and noncombatants - retreated in disarray (Thuc. 7.75.5). Several thousand managed to flee to Katana, but numerous men who had surrendered individually to the Syracusan soldiers were enslaved, against the customs of Greek warfare. About 7,000 men were captured as prisoners of war. For 70 days they were held in the notorious quarries of Syracuse in unspeakable conditions. Most of them died of hunger and exhaustion. Those prisoners who survived were also sold into slavery (Thuc. 7.87), with the exception of the Athenian citizens and their Greek allies from Sicily and southern Italy, who were left in the quarries and whose fate is unknown.
The largest Athenian operation of the Peloponnesian War failed (Kagan 1974: 353; 1981), but the war was yet not lost for Athens. One of the first reactions to the Sicilian disaster was the appointment of ten probouloi (preliminary advisors) who were to prevent precipitous resolutions by the ekklesia. But this must not be perceived as the victory of the oligarchic forces within Athenian society. Athens’ main goal remained her hegemony over the Delian League. One of the important measures was the introduction of a 5 per cent import and export tariff replacing the phoros (tribute). Even after the ‘Sicilian Expedition’ Sparta did not consider herself as the master of the situation, although her designs of 432/1 seemed to be on the verge of succeeding.
The fall of the Athenian thalassoeraey
In the late summer or early autumn of 414, after Athenian raids on Peloponnesian coastal regions, Sparta declared that the Athenians had broken the Peace Treaty of 421. In 413 the Spartans occupied Dekeleia as a key position in Attika. Their main targets were agricultural production and the silver mines of Laureion.
Dekeleia became the headquarters for King Agis II. There, in the winter of 413/ 12, he met with envoys from Euboia and Lesbos who appealed for help in the matter of their intended secession from the Delian League. In Sparta a similar request was the subject of debates between the Spartans and envoys from Chios and Erythrai. The satrap Tissaphernes also explored whether he might find common ground with Sparta (Thuc. 8.5;Kagan 1987: 28). Making the most of the current pressure on Athens, he wanted to gain Spartan consent to the renewed claim ofthe Achaimenid king Dareios II to dominion over the Greek poleis in Asia Minor. In 412/11 the agreement was drafted in three treaties (Thuc. 8.18; 8.37; 8.58; Staatsvertrage 200, 201, 202; Lewis 1977: 90-109). In return Sparta received Persian subsidies to build and sustain a fleet which could match that of Athens. In order to expand the war Sparta tried to support secession movements within the Delian League in 412. The Spartans were successful in Chios and Miletos (Thuc. 8.6-12; 8.14; 8.16-17), whereas the Athenians were able to crush the revolt of Samos and to regain control over Mytilene and Methymna on Lesbos (Thuc. 8.23). All things considered, the Athenians prevailed in Ionia, but they had to give up the blockade of Miletos and lost some of their influence over the coastal regions of Asia Minor. Yet once more they reclaimed the initiative: the Spartans began to distrust Alkibiades, who now fled to the Persian satrap Tissa-phernes. In order to exploit the Persian interest in the Hellenic disputes for his own purposes, he attempted to persuade the satrap to adopt a policy of creating an appearance of being supportive of the causes of both Athens and Sparta. Alkibiades’ next step was to suggest to the officers and to the rank and file of the Athenian fleet based on the island of Samos that he would be able to negotiate an alliance with Persia, including Persian subsidies if an oligarchic regime was established in Athens (Thuc. 8.45-54). His proposals were favourably received by a group of relatively wealthy Athenians who were not content with democracy. Not knowing that Alki-biades used them for his intrigues, they sent Peisandros, one of their leaders, to Athens with instructions to organize an oligarchic coup d’etat. With the help of chosen hetairoi (members of socio-political groups of men) he intimidated the citizens, until he reached his aim in May of 411. A commission of thirty syngrapheis (authors) was formed, who were to draw up laws and proposals, allegedly in the best interest of the political order of the polis. According to Pseudo-Aristotle Ath. Pol. 29.2 twenty men were added to the ten probouloi of 413 of this committee (Fornara 148; Heftner 2001: 130-48). Arrangements were made for the establishment of a new Council of the Four Hundred, which was of course dominated by the most eager of the oligarchic conspirators. The Council of the Four Hundred never accomplished its ostensible task of bestowing full citizenship upon only a select five thousand men and subsequently showed its true colours as a regime of terror (Thuc. 8.63-71).
Meanwhile in Samos Thrasyboulos and Thrasyllos upheld Athenian democratic principles. They enabled Alkibiades to return to Samos, where he was appointed strategos by the crews of the fleet. In September successful Spartan naval operations off the east coast of Euboia led to the fall of the Four Hundred, who tried in vain to enter into negotiations with the Spartans (Thuc. 8.89-93). A new regime of the Five Thousand was proclaimed, but it never became reality (Andrewes 1992: 479-81). After the Athenians had lost Euboia, operations shifted to the Hellespont, regions important for the Athenian grain supply. In the spring of 410 the Athenian fleet under the command of Alkibiades scored a splendid victory off Kyzikos in the Propontis (Xenophon Hellenika 1.1.11-23; Diodoros 13.50-1; Kagan 1987: 23846). Now the Spartans sued for peace, but their proposal on the basis of the status quo, which would obviously have required major Athenian concessions (Bleckmann 1998: 396-404), was rejected by the ekklesia (Diodoros 13.52.2-53.2; Philochoros FGrHist 328 F 139, F 140).
In late 408 or more probably early 407 Alkibiades returned to Athens in triumph (Fornara 159) and was appointed strategos autokrator (effectively commander-inchief of the Athenian forces). He left the bulk of his fleet at Notion, the harbour of Kolophon, to join the Athenian forces at Phokaia with some troops and a few triremes in order to coordinate the operations against Phokaia and other poleis in northern Ionia. During his absence he appointed Antiochos, the kybernetes (helmsman) of his own ship, to be his lieutenant at Notion. Antiochos was defeated by the Spartan nauarchos (admiral) Lysander, who set up a trap for the Athenian triremes. Alkibiades lost his office or was not re-elected as one of the ten strategoi (Xenophon Hellenika 1.5.12-14; Diodoros 13.71.2-4; Hellenika Oxyrhynchia 4.1-4; Ellis 1989: 91-3). After his term of office ended, Lysander also had to hand over his command to Kallikratidas, who was defeated and fell in the battle off the Arginousai Islands, situated between Lesbos and the mainland (Xenophon Hellenika 1.6.24-38). This last Athenian victory was followed by the scandalous and tragic trial against the strategoi, who could not rescue numerous ship-wrecked sailors due to a rising windstorm in the course of battle (Xenophon Hellenika 1.7.1-35; Rubel 2000: 307-41). The victorious strategoi were tried before the highly emotional ekklesia and condemned to death.
In 405 Lysander, at that time epistoleus (lieutenant) of the newly appointed nauarchos, commanded the Spartan fleet. He had about 200 triremes at his disposal thanks to Persian subsidies, which he obtained primarily because ofhis good relations with the Achaimenid prince Kyros. At Aigospotamoi in the Hellespont Lysander struck hard and fast, outwitting the incompetent Athenian naval command nearly without a fight. Contrary to the customs of war the captured 3,000 Athenians were ordered to be executed (Xenophon Hellenika 2.1.15-32; Diodoros 13.105-6.7). Athens was no longer able to equip a new fleet. In the following weeks Lysander captured the last Athenian positions within the territories of the Delian League with the exception of Samos, which resisted a while longer. He ordered all Athenians to return to Athens, now under siege, in order to increase the famine there in the hope of accelerating the end of the war. In the spring of 404, after a prolonged siege, he forced the Athenians into submission. Athens had to tear down the ‘Long Walls’ to some extent and to dismantle the fortifications of Piraeus. Furthermore she had to hand over all triremes except twelve and to suffer the return of her exiles. The Delian League had ceased to exist. Athens had to comply with the Spartan command and to pay tribute, thereby acknowledging the Spartan hegemony. On her part Sparta rejected demands made by the Thebans and Korinthians to destroy the city of Athens, enslave the citizens and sell their slaves (Xenophon Hellenika 2.2.19-23). This request was presumably not only a result of the long-lasting hatred between Athens and her rivals, but also an indication of fear that Sparta could become too powerful by installing a regime closely attached to her (Lotze 1964: 45-6; Powell 2001: 198).
World History
