In 404 BC, as the Peloponnesian War in Greece ended, in Persia King Darius II died. His death set in train a series of events which would lead to the full-scale Lacedaemonian invasion of Asia Minor already alluded to in the previous section. First, Darius II’s son, Artaxerxes II, ascended the throne to the displeasure of his half-brother, the so-called younger Cyrus. During the Peloponnesian War, at Darius II’s behest, Cyrus had coordinated efforts with the Lacedaemonians to defeat the Athenians in Asia Minor (Xen. Hell. I 4,3sqq.). This work had left him with good contacts in the Greek world, and here he gathered some 10,000 mercenaries (among them the historian Xenophon of Athens) for a rebellion against his brother. Troops loyal to Artaxerxes II, however, smashed the rebellion in the Battle of Cunaxa, on the banks of the River Euphrates, in 401 BC. Cyrus the Younger perished, but the 10,000 Greek mercenaries, under the inspired leadership of Xenophon, fought their way back to Greece. Xenophon records the story of the march of the 10,000 in the Anabasis (“a march up-country”), a fascinating tale of swashbuckling endeavor which manages to present an inglorious retreat as a triumph over bumbling Persians. This presentation of the Persians would prove highly influential among the Greeks (see chap. 19).
Artaxerxes II, however, secured his rule all the same. As the satraps in Asia Minor - primarily Pharnabazus of Hellespontine Phrygia and Tissaphernes of Lydia - finally set about re-establishing Persian rule in the Greek-settled regions of Asia Minor shortly thereafter, many cities there feared reprisals, in particular for their support of the younger Cyrus’ rebellion. Since many cities stood under the control of Lacedaemonian harmosts and decarchies at the time, they appealed to Sparta for help (Diod. XIV 35; Xen. Hell. III 1,3).
The Lacedaemonians sent out a commander, Thibron, to wage war against the Persians on behalf of the Greeks of Asia Minor. He arrived in 399 BC with some 1,000 Neodamodeis (Helots freed against their future military service) from Sparta, 4,000 troops from Peloponnesian allies, and 300 cavalrymen from Athens (Xen. Hell. III 1,4; cf. Diod. XIV 36). Thibron made very little headway, however. He briefly held Magnesia on the Meander and attempted to besiege Tralles in Caria (Diod. l. c.). Pergamum and a few other places surrendered to him, but the taking of even so minor a town as Larissa in the Troad proved too difficult (Xen. Hell. III 1,6-7). The cities on whose behalf Thibron was fighting were expected to provision his troops, but this became problematic during the winter of 399 to 398 (Xen. Hell. III 2,1). Complaints about Thibron’s troops’ rapacity poured in to Sparta (Xen. Hell. III 1,8 and 2,6-7), and in 398 Dercyli-das arrived to replace him (Diod. XIV 38; Xen. Hell. III 1,8).
Dercylidas, although more vigorous than Thibron, made little progress as well, taking only a handful of towns in the Troad and the Aeolis (Diod. l. c.; Xen. Hell. III 1,16-28). He did at least hit upon a solution to the problem of provisioning his troops over the winter: for the winter he made a truce with Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and moved his army to Bithynia. The Bithynians were in revolt from Pharnabazus who was perfectly happy to see Dercylidas plunder their land (Xen. Hell. III 2,1-5). When the winter ended, Dercylidas and Pharnabazus agreed to extend the truce. Dercyli-das spent most of 397 either fighting on the Chersonese against the Thracians (Diod. l. c.; Xen. Hell. III 2,9-10) or besieging the town of Atarneus in Asia Minor. The siege of this minor place, held by Chians, took eight months (Xen. Hell. III 2,11). On two occasions the ephors ordered Dercylidas to invade Caria, but he never did (Xen. Hell. III 1,7 and 2,12). In fact, by the end of 397 Der-cylidas was negotiating with both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia. This produced a proposal whereby the Persians would allow the Greek cities autonomy if the Lacedaemonians withdrew their harmosts (Xen. Hell. III 2,20). Dercylidas sent the proposal on to Sparta (Xen. Hell. III 2,19-20; Diod. XIV 39).
The ephors responded by relieving Dercylidas of his duties, by abolishing the decarchies which Lysander had installed, and by sending out King Agesilaus in 396 with a force of 30 Spartiates, 2,000 Neodamodeis, and 6,000 allies (Xen. Hell. III 4,2; cf. Diod. XIV 79). With the troops already in Asia Minor Agesilaus had some 13,000 at his disposal, more than double what Thibron and Dercyli-das had had. For the first time the Lacedaemonian general commanded troops sufficient for major campaigns. The reversal of Lysander’s specific policies did not entail a retreat from Asia Minor; far from it, the Lacedaemonians were redoubling their efforts.
Tissaphernes, alarmed at the size of this new Lacedaemonian army, played for time. He negotiated with Agesilaus while secretly requesting a large army from Artaxerxes II. Tissaphernes received his army, but Agesilaus, correctly guessing that Tissaphernes would not use it for the benefit of Pharnabazus, left Lydia and invaded Hellespontine Phrygia instead (Xen. Hell. III 4,6 and 11-12; cf. Diod. l. c.). Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus detested each other (cf. Xen. Hell. III 1,9), and Agesilaus exploited their enmity.
While Agesilaus made little progress in Hellespontine Phrygia, Pharnabazus had no army sufficient for defeating him (as emerges from Xen. Hell. III 4,1314). The stand-off did, however, buy Agesilaus time to remedy one weakness in his forces, a lack of cavalry, through recruitment and training (Xen. Hell. III 4,15). In 395, having built up his cavalry, he invaded Lydia and marched on Sardis. Tissaphernes, with an army of (allegedly) 10,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry, opposed him every step of the way. Near Sardis, at a place called Thybarnae, Agesilaus set a trap for Tissaphernes (see Box 15.1 for discussion of the sources). Some 1,400 troops were hidden near thick woods as an ambush. Agesilaus led the Persian troops (mostly cavalry) which were harassing him past that place. When the ambush was sprung, Agesilaus turned and attacked. The result was a modest victory over the Persians. Tissaphernes fled to Sardis while Agesilaus briefly contemplated an invasion of the satrapy of Greater Phrygia to the east (Hell. Oxy. col. VII; Diod. XIV 80).
Tissaphernes’ failure had consequences. Artaxerxes II had him arrested and executed (Diod. XIV 80; Xen. Hell. III 4,25); his replacement was Tithraustes, who himself could think of nothing better to do than to bribe Agesilaus to invade Hellespontine Phrygia again (Xen. Hell. III 4,26). Meanwhile Pharnabazus sent a Rhodian by the name of Timocrates to Greece to bribe politicians in various states to attack Sparta at home - in the hope that Agesilaus would be recalled to mainland Greece. Timocrates liberally distributed fifty silver talents in Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, and Argos (Hell. Oxy. coll. VI-VII; cf. Xen. Hell. 5,1-2, with different details). The bribes’ efficacy is debatable. According to Xenophon they worked like a charm, but according to the Oxyrhynchus Historian they were wasted since the politicians who took them hated the Lacedaemonians anyway and were already fomenting war. In either case Agesilaus did have to return to mainland Greece when Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, and Argos all united against the Lacedaemonians (Diod. XIV 83; Xen. Hell. IV 2,1-2).
Although Agesilaus left 4,000 troops behind in Asia Minor (Xen. Hell. IV 2,5), the Lacedaemonians’ war to “liberate” the Greeks of Asia Minor had come to an end. As a final codicil, Conon, the former Athenian commander who had gone to the Persians at the end of the Peloponnesian War (see chap. 14),
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