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17-07-2015, 03:59

Internal Problems in Egypt after Raphia

The Hellenistic kingdoms insisted on Greek as the administrative language. Inevitably this caused tension between the non-Greeks and the Greek-speaking elite. Theocritus during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus can depict Greek housewives looking down on native Egyptians as thieving rabble (XV 47-50). A letter (mid-third century bc) from a native Egyptian to a Ptolemaic official named Zeno has survived; in it he complains that Greek officials have treated him badly "because I am not Greek" and "because I do not 'Hellenize'" (Austin, Nr. 245). Whatever precisely this last term means (dress? manners? proficiency in Greek?), this native Egyptian was clearly suffering what today would be called racial discrimination. To get along in Egypt, one had to "Hellenize."



During the Fourth Syrian War, however, in a desperate situation, Ptolemy IV Phi-lopator enlisted 20,000 native Egyptians for his phalanx. This was apparently the first time that the Ptolemies had recruited among the native population. As it turned out, it was Ptolemy IV's phalanx which won the day at Raphia. Polybius notes:



Immediately after these events Ptolemy (IV) waged war against the Egyptians. For this King, when he armed the Egyptians for the war against Antiochus (III), made a decision which was advantageous in the short term. In the long term, however, he was making a mistake. For the Egyptian soldiers owing to their pride in their victory at Raphia no longer took orders. Instead they sought out a leader and a representative since they were capable of looking out for themselves. Not long after they succeeded in this. (Pol. V 107)



Polybius later on states that Ptolemy IV had to contend with a guerilla war after a revolt:



Late (i. e., in his reign) circumstances compelled him to wage war as already noted. This war, apart from both sides' brutality and lawlessness, involved no pitched battles, naval engagements, or sieges, nor anything else worth mentioning. (Pol. XIV 12).



Another reference to this revolt occurs in the most famous Egyptian inscription of them all, the Rosetta Stone, from the year 196 bc. (Burstein, Nr. 103; see lines 19-28). The inscription - a decree in honor of Ptolemy V Epiphanes - is much more noticeably "Egyptian" in tone (for example, the continual references to Egyptian deities) than a similar decree in honor of Ptolemy III (Austin, Nr. 222). If appearances do not mislead, then the Ptolemies were now "Egyptianizing" a bit.



The revolt - as a hieroglyphic inscription from the Ptolemaic temple of Horus at Edfu shows (C. de Wit, Chronique d'Egypte, 36, 1961, pp. 73-75 and 287-289.) - began around the year 207 bc in Upper Egypt and lasted until Ptolemy V Epiphanes finally suppressed it in 186 bc.



Antiochus III now moved to deal with Achaius in Asia Minor. Before crossing the Taurus, he made an arrangement with Attalus, the King of Pergamum (Pol. V 107). Although Achaius and Attalus had been fighting each other, the danger existed that they might unite in the presence of a common enemy. Presumably Antiochus III offered recognition, with credible guarantees, of Pergamene independence since he avoided ceding any land to Attalus. In 216 the campaign began. Polybius’ account of the first two years of the war is missing, but in 214 Antiochus III had Achaius’ forces trapped in Sardis which he soon took (Pol. VII 15-18). What Achaius had held, Antiochus III regained for the empire: this included Hellespontine Phrygia (with the exception of Pergamene territory, obviously), Greater Phrygia, and Lydia, as well as adjacent territories.



Antiochus III appointed Zeuxis, a trusted official, over the satrapies of Asia Minor west of the Taurus (see most clearly Ma, Nr. 29). In 212 he campaigned in Armenia and reduced that land to tributary status once more. Antiochus III let its king, Xerxes, retain his throne and gave him a daughter of his, Antiochis, in marriage (Pol. VIII 23).



In 210 Antiochus III invaded Parthia. Arsaces II, the Parthian king, fled before him, and Antiochus easily enough took possession of Hecatompylus, the chief town in the region. From there Antiochus III marched northwards and took Tambrax, the chief town of Hyrcania (Pol. X 28-31). Arsaces II he left in power, presumably against payment of tribute (Just. XLI 5,7).



From Parthia Antiochus proceeded to Bactria. In 208 he defeated its king, Euthydemus, in battle (Pol. X 49), but allowed Euthydemus to continue to rule. However, he did make arrangements for Euthydemus’ son, Demetrius, to marry a daughter of his. Before leaving Bactria in 206, Antiochus III requisitioned all Euthydemus’ elephants. Antiochus III then crossed the Hindu Kush from north to south to enter what had once been the satrapy of Paropamisadae. Its current ruler, an otherwise unknown Indian called Sophagasenus, agreed to pay tribute and handed over more elephants, so that Antiochus III now had 150 of them. From here Antiochus proceeded through Arachosia and the Drangiane to Car-mania where he went into winter quarters (Pol. XI 34). There was no fighting in those three regions, nor did Antiochus have to deal with any independent rulers. Apparently, and despite all, those satrapies had loyally remained within the empire all this time. Polybius concludes his account of Antiochus III’s expedition as follows:



So ended Antiochus’ campaign in the Upper Regions, by which he made not only the Upper Satraps subject to his rule, but also the coastal cities and the rulers to the west of the Taurus. In sum, he made the Kingdom secure and impressed all his subjects with his courage and hard work. Owing to this expedition he was shown to be worthy of his Kingdom - not just to those in Asia, but even to those in Europe. (Pol. XI 39)



As to Antiochus III’s leaving existing dynasties in place (for example, in Parthia or Armenia), there was perfectly good Persian precedent for this - in the sixth century the Persians had allowed the kings of Cilicia to continue to rule there (see chap. 9). As for his permitting Euthydemus to remain satrap even after revolting, the Persians had done much the same in the case of Evagoras of Salamis (see chap. 19).



Antiochus III had brought the Seleucid Kingdom through its worst crisis yet; and the best was still to come.



 

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