The opposition to Alexander that manifested itself at the time of Philip’s death had been silenced by swift and decisive measures, but the opponents remained. In the first year of the Asiatic campaign, the king found evidence of secret negotiations between Alexandros Lynkestes and representatives of the Great King. In winter 334/3, the Lynkestian was arrested on information divulged by a Persian agent named Sisenes (Arrian 1.25). The theory that he had not been in treasonous contact with the chiliarch Nabarzanes and the exile Amyntas son of Antiochos, but was himself the victim of conspiracy devised by Alexander (thus Badian 2000), is unconvincing (see Heckel 2003a). At the time, however, Alexander’s position was far from secure, and he was reluctant to test the loyalty of Antipatros by executing his son-in-law. The Lynkestian was nevertheless kept in chains for three years before being brought to trial.
Further dissatisfaction resulted from the king’s acceptance of his ‘divine birth’ at Siwah. For the conquest and administration of the satrapy, Alexander’s recognition by the priests of Amun was a political expedient. But the subtleties of politics were wasted on the conservative Macedonian aristocracy, which had grown to regard its king as first among equals. Like the king’s later orientalisms, the decision to exploit native sentiment was regarded by the conquerors as a demotion of the victors and their practices. Hegelochos, perhaps a relative of Philip’s last wife Kleopatra, appears to have plotted against the king in Egypt, but the plan came to naught and was disclosed only in 330, more than a year after the conspirator’s death at Gaugamela. Philotas had also voiced his displeasure in Egypt, treasonous activity for a lesser man. His claim that Alexander’s military success was due primarily to Parmenion’s generalship did not sit well with the son of Philip of Macedon, perhaps because there was some truth in it. Before the final decision at Gaugamela, the remark was ignored but not forgotten. The echo of Philotas’ boast would resound in Phrada in 330, when Parmenion had been left behind in Ekbatana.
In Alexander’s camp there now occurred the first open signs of opposition to the king’s authority and policies. The so-called ‘conspiracy of Philotas’ in the autumn of 330 was, if anything, an indication that many of the most prominent hetairoi had begun to question Alexander’s leadership. At that time, a relatively unknown individual named Dimnos either instigated or was party to a conspiracy to murder the king. The details of this plot he revealed to his lover Nikomachos, and by him they were transmitted to Nikomachos’ brother Kebalinos and ultimately to Alexander himself. Philotas’ role is at best obscure: what we do know is that Kebalinos reported the plot to him and that he did not pass it on, later alleging that he did not take it seriously. He could perhaps point to the humiliation endured by his father, Parme-nion, who falsely accused Philippos of Akarnania of planning to poison the king in Kilikia. But the fact remains that Philotas was already on record as having made boastful remarks which exaggerated his own achievements, and those of his father, and cast aspersions on Alexander’s generalship (Arrian 3.26.1; Plutarch 48.1-49.2 provides the details). That this occurred in Egypt, after Alexander’s acceptance of his role as ‘Son of Amun’, is significant; for it is a clear sign of how the orientalizing policies of the king were alienating the conservative commanders of the army. Hegelochos son of Hippostratos was also said to have harboured treasonous ambitions at this time (Curtius 6.11.22-9). Furthermore, in the deadly world of Macedonian politics, where assassination was a regular and effective tool, it was easily believed that anyone who knowingly suppressed knowledge of a conspiracy must in some way have approved of it. This, at least, was the substance of the charge against Philotas and, combined with his previous record of disloyalty, it was sufficient to bring about his condemnation and execution. Alexander nevertheless was careful to give the impression of legality to his actions, for he knew that the execution of the son would have to be followed by the father’s murder. Charges were laid against Parme-nion, and Polydamas the Thessalian was sent in disguise to Ekbatana, where the murder was carried out swiftly by men Alexander felt he could trust (see Badian 1960; Heckel 1977; Adams 2003).
The deaths of Philotas and his father gave Alexander the opportunity to eliminate Alexandros Lynkestes, who, if he was no longer a danger to the king, remained a political embarrassment. Antipatros appears not to have protested against the imprisonment of his son-in-law, and the king, who had now become truly the master of his growing domain, felt secure enough to execute the traitor. A lengthy incarceration will have given the Lynkestian time to rehearse a defence, but the hopelessness of his position rendered him confused and all but speechless.
The elimination of Philotas required a restructuring of the command of the Companion Cavalry. The king had learned that it was unwise to entrust so important an office to a single individual, and his solution was designed to limit the power of the hipparch while making conciliatory gestures to the old guard. Philotas’ command was thus divided between Black Kleitos, who had saved the king’s life at the Graneikos and whose sister had been Alexander’s wet nurse, and the untried but unquestionably loyal Hephaistion. The latter appointment proved to be not merely a case of nepotism but an unsound military decision, and within two years the Companions were divided into at least five hipparchies, of which only one remained under Hephaistion’s command.
The strain of combat and campaigning under the harshest conditions took its toll on soldiers and commanders alike. In summer 328, at a drinking party in Marakanda, the stress of combat mixed with personal resentment and political outlook into a deadly brew. The event that precipitated a quarrel between Alexander and Black Kleitos, the former commander of the ‘Royal Squadron’ ( ile basilike) of the Companion Cavalry, was, on the face of it, innocent enough. A certain Pierion or Pranichos, who belonged to the king’s entourage of artists, recited a poem that appears to have been a mock epic about one of their own - the harpist Aristonikos -who died in battle against Spitamenes (Holt 1988: 78-9 n. 118, plausibly). But the veteran warrior, Kleitos, took umbrage and faulted Alexander for allowing Greek non-military men to ridicule a Macedonian defeat at a function that included barbarians. And we must assume that there were greater issues at play: Kleitos had watched Alexander’s transformation from a traditional Macedonian ruler to an orientalizing despot with disapproval, and the argument that ensued was as much a clash of generations and ideologies as the machismo of two battle-scarred veterans under the influence of alcohol.
The underlying tensions were not to subside. If anything, the marriage of Alexander to Rhoxane in winter 328/7, which had done so much to reconcile the barbarians with their conquerors, proved immensely unpopular with the army and its commanders - even more so, if there is any truth to claim that Alexander arranged for similar mixed marriages between his hetairoi and Baktrian women (Metz Epitome 31; Diodoros 17 index 1). Furthermore, the king’s attempt to introduce the Persian practice of obeisance known as proskynesis at the court, for both barbarians and Macedonians, not only proved a dismal failure but increased the alienation of the Macedonian aristocracy.
Many scholars have seen Alexander’s unsuccessful experiment with proskynesis as a thinly veiled demand for recognition of his divine status. This is, however, highly unlikely; for the Greeks themselves knew that the Great King was never regarded as divine and that proskynesis was merely part of the court protocol. That they considered it an inappropriate way of addressing a mortal ruler is another matter. If hostile sources chose to equate Alexander’s adoption of the practice with a request for divine honours, that was a misinterpretation - either deliberate or unintentional - of the king’s motives. (In view of his later demands, this is not entirely surprising.) Furthermore, the claim that proskynesis required the Macedonians to prostrate themselves before their king is equally nonsensical. Herodotos, in a famous passage concerning the practice (1.134.1), makes it clear that the extent of debasement was directly proportional to the status of the individual and was not restricted to the greeting of the Great King (cf. Xenophon Anabasis 1.6.10). If Macedonians like Leonnatos ridiculed the Persians for abasing themselves, it demonstrates merely that the conquered peoples approached their new sovereign as suppliants, thus humbling themselves before Alexander in a way that would not have been required of them at the court of Dareios, where the hierarchy was clearly established. The position of Persian nobles at the court of Alexander was yet to be determined and obsequious behaviour was a form of self-preservation. By contrast, Alexander would have required of his hetairoi little more than a kiss on the lips or the cheek, and it is perhaps a misunderstanding of this practice that led contemporary historians to claim that Alexander gave a kiss to his hetairoi only if they had previously performed proskynesis, when in fact the kiss and the proskynesis were synonymous. What is certain, however, is that the ceremony, which was intended to put the Persian and Macedonian on a roughly equal footing (Balsdon 1950: 382), and which suited Alexander’s new role as Great King, was rejected by the Greeks and Macedonians, and that Kallisthenes of Olynthos was among the most vocal of those who voiced their objections. Nor is it difficult to understand that the nobles who had long regarded their ruler as primus inter pares would be reluctant to acknowledge that they, like the conquered enemy, were now ‘slaves’ ( douloi) of the Great King.
The extent of the alienation can be seen in the so-called ‘Conspiracy of the Pages’. The plot had its origins in a personal humiliation: Hermolaos son of Sopolis, while hunting with the king, had anticipated Alexander in striking a boar, an act of I'se-majeste (but: Roisman 2003: 315-16). For this he was flogged. But the view that he plotted to murder the king in order to avenge this outrage is simplistic, and it was recognized even at the time that there were larger issues at play. The Pages were the sons of prominent hetairoi, and their hostility towards Alexander was doubtless a reflection of the Macedonian aristocracy’s reaction to his policies. The conspiracy itself came to naught: Eurylochos, a brother of one of the Pages, brought the news of the plot to the somatophylakes, Ptolemaios and Leonnatos, and the conspirators were arrested, tried and executed. But the episode revealed once again the extent of disaffection amongst the Macedonian aristocracy. The elimination of the conspirators also gave Alexander the opportunity of ridding himself of Kallisthenes (Aristotle’s nephew), the official historian who, over the course of the campaign, had developed too sharp a tongue for the king’s liking and had played no small part in sabotaging the introduction of proskynesis. As tutor of the Pages, he could be held responsible for their political attitudes, and, although there was no clear evidence to incriminate him, the suspicion of ill-will towards the king was sufficient to bring him down. If the king’s friendship with Aristotle, perhaps already strained, mattered, he may indeed have intended to keep Kallisthenes in custody until his fate could be decided by a vote of the League of Korinth. The conflicting stories of the nature of his death reflect at least two layers of apologia. In the version given by Ptolemy, he was tortured and hanged, a punishment at once barbaric and appropriate to traitors (Arrian 4.14.3; cf. Bosworth 1995: 100); Chares of Mytilene says that he was incarcerated for seven months and died of obesity and a disease of lice (cf. Africa 1982: 4) before he could stand trial (Plutarch 55.9 = Chares FGrHist 125 F 15).
World History
