Ahmose of Dynasty Eighteen (1539-1514bce), after uniting the entire country again, still depicted his army following the Middle Kingdom type. But during the opening century of the Eighteenth Dynasty the military organization of Egypt appears to have undergone a major transformation (Gnirs 1996; Kemp 1978; Yoyotte and Lbpez 1969; Schulman 1964). This is most noticeable in the gradual development of the importance of the chariotry as well as the use of the word for ‘‘general.’’ The army still depended upon the conventional approach, one based on the navy as well as upon garrisons. The swift invasion of Lower Nubia was consolidated by the administration of a garrison commander at Buhen, an office common in the warlike Theban state (Kemp 1978). The venerable title ‘‘king’s son’’ represented the economic dependence of a high-ranking soldier upon the ruler (Schmitz 1976). It reflected the archaic paternalistic outlook of the early state where the highest military officials were called ‘‘sons.’’ (Spalinger (2004) covers the entire New Kingdom military system.)
Fast-moving armies of large size were not necessary for the opening push of the Egyptian state southward (Gnirs 1999: 83-7; Shaw 1991: 39-49; Spalinger 2002a). As late as Amunhotep I (1514-1493 bce) and Thutmose I (1490s bce) there were commemorations of naval battles at specific water channels. The pharaohs did not perceive the warhorse to be a key element of the Egyptian military in the south. In contrast, there were no large rivers in Palestine; feet and chariots transported men and material.
The focus on Asia, then, was the determining factor in the rise of a professional chariot corps. The Egyptians occupied strategic locations. In Palestine, Gaza was one of them. Inland, the Egyptians sought to control the key political and geographical centers of Palestine. Megiddo’s rebellion during the last months of Hatshepsut’s reign (1458 bce) occurred when the pharaoh’s army withdrew and the small number of garrison troops could not cope with the major revolt. Freedom of the roads was necessary to Egypt, for both commercial and military reasons. Unlike Nubia, there was no viceroy administering the Egyptian-held lands in Palestine.
Latent problems with this policy can be identified as soon as the pharaohs extended their area of influence further north into Syria. It was necessary to cross and protect the major rivers there, the Euphrates and the Nahr el Kelb near Beirut. There was also a major state in the interior of north Syria, Mitanni, also called Naharain. This kingdom, often described as a loose confederation of smaller states, was experienced in chariot warfare and horsemanship. For many years it had successfully resisted Hittite control from Anatolia. Mitanni, like the Hyksos, had an established warrior caste specializing in chariotry.
The war records of Thutmose III (1479-1425 bce) show again that the Egyptians sent their well-organized navy into action (Save-Soderbergh 1946). Key ports in Lebanon were quickly brought under permanent control. A garrison was established at Kamid el-Loz in southern Syria, and Kadesh on the Orontes River was forced to surrender. Egyptian garrisons remained small. The pharaoh raided down the Euphrates with his chariotry in tow, but a regular system of taxation is nowhere evident (Liverani 1990).
Around the end of the reign of Thutmose III and on into that of Amunhotep II (1426-1400 bce), army titles referring to horses and chariots reflected the increasingly more distinct career paths for professional military men (Gnirs 1996). At the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty (1539 bce) the generals appear to have come from bureaucratic careers. By the close of the reign of Amunhotep III (1353 bce) the members of the officer class owed their promotions to their length of service within the army and not in the bureaucracy as before. A split between the civilian and the military officialdom had come to pass (Gnirs 1999: 84-5; Shaw 1996: 154-5; Spalinger in press).
World History
