Augustus reorganized the Roman army, and absorbed into himself the mechanisms for controlling the military and deciding questions of war and peace. Making use of earlier developments, he established a professional army, in which the soldiers were paid to spend their best working years (eventually twenty-five) as full-time soldiers; they could devote all their time to military duties, free from farming and commercial concerns or formal family responsibilities. Augustus intended that this standing army should be capable of meeting all the military requirements of the empire without the need to resort to disruptive special levies. This transformed war-making possibilities. The empire was virtually in a permanent state of war, in which year-round sustained campaigns could be fought where necessary. Augustus’ shrewd recruitment of non-citizen auxiliary troops from the less Romanized provinces or the periphery of the empire, and their eventual incorporation into the formal structure of the army, offered significant reserves of manpower.17
Strabo described Augustus as ‘Lord of war and peace’, and Dio speaks of the right of emperors ‘to declare war, make peace, and rule both foreigners and citizens in every place for all time’.18 The senate and people now counted for little, and if Augustus consulted them it was out of politeness. By the end of his reign most governors in charge of troops were directly under his control and incapable of taking any real initiative. So Augustus was not bound by the jealousies and prejudices of the aristocracy that had previously controlled senatorial debate and the appointment of governors, or by any high command of generals.19 All our literary sources, when describing Augustus’ military campaigns, indicate that he was effectively in charge. For instance, according to Florus’ history, the German wars resulted from a personal decision of Augustus.20 Dio describes how Augustus intended to wage war on Britain, but then changed his mind during a visit to Gaul.21 This is also the story in Augustus’ autobiography, the Res Gestae, though he is normally at pains to conceal his political dominance. ‘At my command and under my auspices two armies were led almost simultaneously into Ethiopia and Arabia Felix.’22 Similarly, embassies from foreign peoples seeking to confirm or develop relations with Rome came to Augustus, wherever he was.23 Eventually he appointed a committee of ex-consuls to hear embassies from peoples and kings, but only when he was too old to do so himself.24
The emperor’s control of military affairs was limited only in so far as he chose voluntarily to consult more widely.25 Here he could ask friends (amici) whose advice he trusted to attend his informal council, the consilium principis. He was not obliged to consult the council, or take its advice, and there was no formal membership or schedule of meetings. However, in the debate over the future of Judaea after the death of King Herod in 4 bc, we have a rare glimpse of the council’s involvement in the important question of whether peripheral lands in which Rome had an interest should be annexed or managed in some other way.26
Augustus’ decisions on war and peace should therefore indicate precisely how he wanted to use the Roman army, but they cannot tell us why he went to war or if he had some kind of general strategy. We still need to deduce this from the nature of the campaigns he conducted and the political and cultural context. We can have little confidence in the (rare) attempts by ancient sources to explain the motives for the wars waged by Augustus. Florus implies that Augustus generally had personal motives, alleging that he embarked on the German wars because he sought to emulate the campaigns of Julius Caesar in Gaul.27 This may, however, be a stock literary topos. Dio, on the other hand, describes Augustus’ military activity mainly as a response to the immediate situation and, indeed, suggests that the emperor was reluctant to pursue an expansionist policy.28 But Dio himself was opposed to territorial expansion in his own day, and may have allowed his prejudices to colour his narrative of Augustus’ reign.29 Suetonius says that Augustus had no desire ‘for aggrandizement or military glory’, and downplays his military conquests.30 Furthermore, the carefully selected information provided by Augustus in the Res Gestae is hardly a reliable guide. He gives the impression of a steady, planned advance of Roman power, and territorial aggrandizement on all fronts under his leadership as the unrivalled world conqueror. Other rulers are subservient to him, all wars fought by Rome are just, and peace achieved by victory is inevitably part of the fulfilment of her imperial destiny.31
The difficulty is that in military affairs, as in so much else, Augustus’ own views and personality remain enigmatic. His personal record as a military commander was poor, and he had no major military success to his name in his early career. Over the years, hostile and sarcastic stories were circulated by his political enemies,32 and the campaigns he conducted in Illyricum between 35 and 33 bc were intended partly to reinforce or create a suitable military reputation. But, although he was wounded twice, he did not complete the conquest.33 He was also greatly embarrassed by Sextus Pompey’s naval campaign in Sicily, and had probably accepted before the battle of Actium in 31 bc that he should rely on others to look after the details of military command for him. Suetonius relates some anecdotes about his views on army command, which, if true, suggest a conservative, cautious leader. He used to say that a war or battle should not be undertaken unless the expectation of gain was greater than the fear of loss. Memorably, he compared this to fishing with a golden hook, the loss of which could not be outweighed by any likely catch.34
However, despite this unpromising background Augustus in fact became Rome’s most successful conqueror, and added an enormous amount of territory to the empire, almost doubling its size. North-west Spain, Raetia, Noricum, Pannonia, Moesia and Germany all saw prolonged fighting and wars of expansion. Egypt was added to the empire, there was fighting in Arabia and Ethiopia between 25 and 22 bc, while Galatia and Judaea were absorbed peacefully into Roman control. Indeed, more conquests were threatened or predicted, in Britain, in Parthia, and even in China. Augustus took the title imperator (‘general’) as his forename, celebrated three triumphs, and was acclaimed on twenty-one occasions as imperator.35 He also admired Alexander the Great, the most famous conqueror of all, used his image in his signet ring, and visited his tomb in Alexandria, declaring that Alexander was a real king while the remains of the Ptolemies were mere corpses.36 He was of course the adopted heir of Julius Caesar, a most distinguished general who at the time of his death had been planning campaigns against the Dacians and the Parthians.37 In any case, whatever military activities Augustus undertook, he controlled the means by which his image and activities were presented so as to make the best impression on public opinion. At a pinch he could dress up routine military action as a great victory.
What were Augustus’ reasons for going to war so often?38 In reality, it is likely that political and dynastic reasons predominated. The new ruler needed to show himself as a successful conqueror who brought glory to Rome, and to conceal the more obvious picture of the victor in a squalid civil war. The enhancement of Augustus’ military glory, his status, prestige and place in the canon of great Roman leaders were important not just with the soldiers but also in the wider political world, as he tried to establish himself in a position from which he could not be challenged. What is more, Augustus by birth was one of the upper classes, for whom war-making had been an important part of their cultural and social identity. The influence of his background and environment should not be underestimated. His sons and grandsons, marked out for great things in the dynasty, also needed an opportunity to show themselves to the soldiers, to display their military prowess, and to bring home the laurels of victory.
Warfare was therefore largely a personal decision, affecting the emperor and his family. But how far was he influenced by outside factors, such as public opinion or the perceived military needs of the empire? The traditionally bellicose outlook of the upper classes and the formidable record of the Roman people in waging war could create their own momentum and a public opinion eager for war. This might inspire a drive towards wars of imperial aggrandizement or revenge, or condition government thinking to a kind of permanent war footing.39 Furthermore, it is possible that the permanent presence of an army of 300,000 men could itself encourage an atmosphere where warfare was begun easily without fear of criticism or serious repercussions. Now, the size of the army was in my view determined by what Augustus thought would suit his interests and resources. He aimed to secure his personal protection and also enhance his dignity as the preeminent military leader.40 He had after all succeeded by overcoming in battle his rivals for supreme power and wished to avoid the same fate.41 Since the army was stationed in the provinces (it might be dangerous to his security to keep it in one spot),Augustus perhaps felt that he ought to give the army something to do, and by sending the troops on campaign keep them militarily active and also out of the way of the provincials.42
We must not necessarily assume a rational approach, and there is no disputing that Augustus was audacious if not reckless in his pursuit of political power at the age of 19. However, there is no evidence that the size or location of the army contributed significantly to his decisions to go to war. He was a shrewd and often ruthless man, and it is difficult to believe that he was dragged into fighting any wars against his will. Although Augustus had huge resources and many opportunities for significant military action, he also had diplomatic opportunities, especially in the context of
Rome’s relations with Parthia, and excellent channels of communication with local communities and rulers, which he took over and exploited. It is indeed more likely that he manipulated or encouraged public opinion to suit his own ends. It will not have been difficult to obtain approval from the upper classes for campaigns of legitimate conquest after the civil wars. Ordinary people will have enjoyed the triumphal ceremonial, displays and handouts associated with the victories of Roman armies.
There were also genuine military needs in some parts of the empire. Augustus reacted to all this by exploiting circumstances and opportunities, with a shrewd idea of his own benefit both in military and political terms. He did not launch the empire on a new phase towards world conquest (even on the basis of the limited Roman concept of the world), or set out to keep the army constantly occupied with wars. But equally he did not have a minimalist defensive view of his responsibilities, based on the security of the empire or some notion of the best defensive line. Augustus went to war to confirm control of lands widely accepted as Roman but insufficiently pacified, such as Spain, or to secure territory arguably crucial for Rome’s vital interests and neglected by previous Republican governments. Appian, commenting on Augustus’ subjection of the Alpine tribes, expresses surprise that so many Roman armies crossing the Alps had neglected to deal with these peoples and that even Julius Caesar had not brought about their subjection during the ten years of his campaigns in Gaul.43 The Alps were certainly important for communications and the security of northern Italy. Similarly, the whole region including Illyricum, Pannonia and Moesia, which absorbed much of Rome’s military energy, was pivotal for east-west communications. In these areas Augustus could have been considered derelict in his duty as princeps if he had not taken action, though such action was of course unremittingly imperialistic. Elsewhere simple financial profit may have persuaded Augustus. The annexation of Egypt brought huge booty, and Strabo thought that the invasion of Arabia was motivated by hopes of large gains in revenue.44
Therefore, although Augustus’ foreign policy was expansionist and imperialistic, it was also expedient and exploitative. He fought wars of imperialist aggression where he thought he was likely to be successful, and where he could increase his standing and that of his family in public opinion. In fact most of his imperialist wars, except perhaps that in Arabia, seem to have been fought for territory as well as for booty and prestige. On the other hand, he could not afford to be humiliated by serious military setbacks; it would not do to lose a war or to have Roman territory overrun. Augustus was furious at the defeat of Quinctilius Varus and the loss of three legions in Germany.45 Therefore decisions to fight needed to be carefully balanced. When Augustus elected to launch large-scale campaigns across the Rhine, but not across the Euphrates into Parthia, even though he had the opportunity of supporting a pretender to the Parthian throne, he may have been thinking that Julius
Caesar had conquered Gaul relatively easily in ten years, whereas Crassus had fared disastrously in Parthia, and Antony had made heavy weather of his attempted invasion a few years previously. Consequently, when it suited the emperor, he used diplomacy judiciously, as in the settlement of relations with Parthia and the eventual conclusion of a treaty. Elsewhere he avoided expeditions that some at least expected: for example, to Britain.46Throughout his reign Augustus very effectively used a combination of warfare, threats, the power of his reputation, and occasionally his personal presence on campaign, to get what he wanted. The greater his reputation became, the better this worked. Thus a contemporary writer commented on his dealings with the Parthians: ‘Augustus achieved more through the grandeur of his reputation than another commander [Antony] had achieved through force of arms.’47
In a way Augustus defined his position by conquering so much territory and proving himself a worthy heir of Julius Caesar.48 Throughout his reign he also maintained the army as an effective fighting force, and made sure that funds were always available to support it. Therefore decisions to go to war were not influenced by anxiety about the readiness or skill of the army, and this remained true well into the third century. At the same time Augustus was not a warrior and he left a complex legacy for his successors, which is perhaps summed up in his enigmatic advice to Tiberius to keep the empire within limits.49 He was surely not thinking of formal boundaries or a complete end to military advance, but meant that Tiberius, using his own experience as a commander, should exercise appropriate discretion in his use of the Roman army, according to circumstances and the nature of those peoples presently on the edge of Roman control. Tiberius was strong-minded enough to eschew further military conquests (though Rome continued to acquire more territory); he had his own military glory based on long commands and two triumphs. But no emperor could escape totally the trappings of military power with which Augustus had surrounded the imperial position, or the precedent he emphasized of achieving peace through military victory, symbolized by closing the doors of the temple of Janus on three occasions during his reign.50
World History
