In 317, shortly after he had taken Athens, Cassander appointed as its governor an Athenian called Demetrius, from the deme of Phalerum (Diod. XVIII 74). Demetrius, once in charge of Athens, justified the confidence which Cassander placed in him. Impeccably loyal to his benefactor, he secured for Athens a decade of peace. Not everyone, however, could approve of an Athenian serving as a foreign power's puppet governor (e. g., Demochares, BNJ 75, fr. 7).
But for now Demetrius' position was unassailable. Since he himself served as eponymous archon in 309 (Diod. XX 27), this office was probably filled by election in this period (unless by improbable coincidence the lot fell on the name of the man who happened to be the Macedonian-appointed governor). Seven nomophylaces ("law-guardians"), with wide-ranging powers to make sure that other officials were acting in accordance with the laws (Philochorus, BNJ 328, Fr. 64; see Pollux, VIII 102 for the link with Demetrius, though Pollux speaks of eleven nomophylaces), were also probably elected (cf. Xen. Oec. IX 14). The Council of the Areopagus moreover had augmented judicial powers (Diog. Laert. II 101 and 116) and was partially responsible for enforcing Demetrius' sumptuary laws (Philochorus, BNJ 328, Fr. 65; cf. Cic. de Leg. II 66). In other words it was a mostly oligarchic constitution even if the Assembly and the Boule otherwise functioned as under the classical democracy.
Demetrius, moreover, for the first time ever carried out a census in Athens (Ctesicles/Stesicleides, BNJ 245, Fr. 1). Normally maximum military levies (e. g., the 13,000 Athenian hoplites attested at Thuc. II 13 and 31 for the year 431) provide the only clue to a state's population, but for once the demographer has actual data, even if the figures have been rounded off: 21,000 citizens (presumably adult males over 18) and 10,000 resident aliens (again, presumably adult males). The figure given for slaves (400,000) is, unfortunately, impossibly high, so probably there has been an error in the transmission of the numeral.
Demetrius also improved Athens' financial situation. He reduced expenditure where he could, but probably his keeping Athens out of war helped most of all. Athens' annual revenue rose to 1200 talents (Duris of Samos, BNJ 76, Fr. 10), and Demetrius boasted of the low prices of goods during his tenure (Demetrius, Fr. 90 Fortenbaugh).
Demetrius, finally, was a man of letters as well. He studied philosophy under Aristotle's successor in the so-called Peripatetic school, Theophrastus (Cicero, de Fin. V 54) and, given the timeframe, presumably also Aristotle himself. Demetrius wrote widely on many topics, and two and a half centuries later Cicero would write that Demetrius alone of the Greeks was both a scholar and a statesman (De leg. III 14).
Nonetheless, given the ongoing wars of the Diadochi, sooner or later war would come to Athens again no matter what Demetrius did. When Demetrius Poliorcetes, Antigonus Monophthalmus' son, took Athens in 307, Demetrius of Phalerum had to flee (Plut. Demetr. 8-9). He stayed with his patron Cassander for a decade and after Cassander's death found refuge with Ptolemy I Soter in Alexandria (Strab. IX 1,20, p. 398; Diod. XX 45).
Against Peithon, and for this reason Eumenes, upon his arrival in the east in 317, found a large army already gathered (Diod. XIX 14). It took all of Eumenes’ diplomatic skill to manage the individual satraps so as to gain control of this army for his own purposes.
Antigonus, meanwhile, with his own army pursued Eumenes into the eastern satrapies, and there ensued a game of cat and mouse as each sought to out-maneuver the other. Towards the end of 317 the two armies met in the region Paraetacene on the marches between Media and Persis (Diod. XIX 34). Eumenes was once again going up against one of the most experienced generals of the time. Antigonus had some 28,000 infantry, 8,500 cavalry, and 65 elephants; fighting against them on Eumenes’ side were 35,000 infantry, 6,100 cavalry, and 114 elephants. Among his infantry stood some 3,000 of Alexander’s veterans, all at least sixty by now, many seventy and some even older; but fighting with a sarissa gave the edge to experience, and these elderly veterans, at the heart of Eumenes’ phalanx, carried the day in the center. Eumenes himself led light cavalry in a highly successful flanking maneuver on his right wing, put Antigonus’ left wing to flight, and pursued it. With a desperate maneuver Antig-onus managed to avert total defeat. As Eumenes’ center advanced, a gap opened up between it and Eumenes’ left, and through this gap Antigonus led a cavalry charge which, unexpected as it was, nearly routed Eumenes’ left wing. Eumenes broke off his pursuit and returned to rescue his left wing, but by then it was nearly night, and the battle ended. Antigonus remained in possession of the battlefield, so, technically, could claim the victory though his losses (3,700 infantry, 54 cavalry, 4,000 wounded) greatly exceeded Eumenes’ (540 infantry, hardly any cavalry, and 900 wounded) (Diod. XIX 27-31). Anxious to avoid any more such “victories,” Antigonus soon retreated into Media and went into winter quarters (Diod. XIX 32).
Eumenes himself went into winter quarters in the nearby region of Gabene, where, owing to the scarcity of provisions, he had to divide his army into many parts such that some detachments were six days’ march from others. A twenty-five days’ march through inhabited country separated the two armies; but a nine days’ march through a desert (Diod. XIX 34). About the time of the winter solstice Antigonus led his army towards Eumenes’ camp by the shorter route hoping to catch Eumenes by surprise. Eumenes, however, got wind of Antig-onus’ march in time (Diod. XIX 37-39), and a second full battle took place. Once again the 3,000 elderly veterans cleared the field in front of them (Antigonus allegedly lost some 5,000 men), but Eumenes himself, fighting this time with his cavalry on the left wing, was badly beaten by Antigonus who even managed to capture Eumenes’ camp. (Diod. XIX 40-43).
Only with difficulty had Eumenes retained control of an unwieldy army commanded by various satraps, none of whom liked him, and the Macedonian troops in the army had never quite willingly followed a Greek. After this humiliation and the capture of his camp, Eumenes’ standing with the satraps and the troops was destroyed. They seized him and handed him over to Antigonus, who had his opponent put to death (Diod. XIX 43-44), ending one of the most remarkable careers of the era. In early 316 Antigonus, despite two effective defeats, became master of the Asian part of the empire. He distributed the eastern satrapies anew (Diod. XIX 48) and appeared to be well on his way to uniting the entire empire under his control.