The impact which the capture of a mere 120 spartiates had on sparta's war effort seems, at first glance, disproportionate. Yet this mistakes the nature and size of the spartiates' society. In the year 479 there were approximately 5,000 adult male Spartiates of fighting age (presumably between the ages of 20 and 60 - Hdt. IX 28; Xen. Hell. V 4,13). The loss of 120 out of 5,000 can be keenly felt.
Adult male Spartiates formed a closely knit group within the larger Lacedaemonian society in which they were a tiny minority - and as a minority, they always had to be on their guard (Xen. Hell. III 3,4-7; Plut. Cim. 16; Lyc. 28). They alone held political rights. It was, moreover, difficult to become a Spartiate. Each Spartiate had gone through the agoge - the system of military training which a Spartiate boy entered at age seven and in which he remained until he was thirty (Plut. Lyc. 17sqq.; see chap. 6). The agoge, with all its rigors was for the Spartiates a vast, shared experience of twenty-three years' duration which shaped them as a class and formed their collective attitudes.
The final step to becoming a Spartiate was admission into a syssition (Plut. Lyc. 12). This was almost a fraternity or club. In theory an adult male Spartiate took each evening meal at his syssition with some fifteen companions. Each evening the eldest man present, after all were foregathered, pointed at the doors and said, "what is said here does not pass those." Men here could speak openly and trust each other not to repeat anything. When a fresh graduate of the agoge applied for membership, a vote was held and only a unanimous result was sufficient for admission. Each member had to be fully certain in his mind that he could trust the applicant absolutely - that the applicant was genuinely "one of us."
This sort of thinking - the concept of "one of us" - characterized the Spartiates' society. "One of us" had gone through the agoge; "one of us" could be trusted in a syssition; "one of us" would stand his ground in battle and come back with his shield or on it; "one of us" held the proper attitudes; and so on. And now, after their surrender on Sphacteria in 425 bc, one hundred and twenty "of ours" were in prison in Athens. Every Spartiate still in Sparta probably knew most of the prisoners personally and had at least heard of the rest - cf. the comments of Thucydides at V 15. Given the nature of Spartiate society, the loss of 120 Spartiates loomed large; and the paralyzing horror which it caused is all too comprehensible.
Lacedaemonians’ best efforts to deprive them of bases, they now actually had more rather than fewer. With Sphacteria, Pylos, and Cythera (captured in 424: Thuc. IV 54), the Athenians now held bases all round the Peloponnese and could raid anywhere at will. In Acarnania, where the Lacedaemonians had had high hopes of frustrating the Athenians’ raids, the war had turned decisively in the latter’s favor. Owing to the Lacedaemonian inability to challenge the Athenians’ naval supremacy in the Aegean - and even in the Gulf of Corinth -, all
Attempts to foster and to support revolts against Athens had failed miserably and the invasions of Attica had proved a waste of time.
All Lacedaemonian effort, careful planning, and genuine creativity had counted as nothing. But the Lacedaemonians had one more card to play, and this time they would win the trick. In 424 Brasidas, who had distinguished himself on various occasions already, marched northwards with an army of 1,000 mercenaries and 700 Helots armed as hoplites (Thuc. IV 78 and 80). The composition of this force requires comment. The Lacedaemonians commonly availed themselves of Helots for filling minor roles in the army, but had hitherto declined to allow them to serve as hoplites. Besides the issue of the prestige associated with fighting as a heavily armed infantryman (see Box 10.1) - a prestige incompatible with the Helots’ degraded status -, the last thing which the Lacedaemonians wanted was Helots with military experience. Yet in desperation the Lacedaemonians gave arms to Helots (whom they later freed - Thuc. V 34) and hired mercenaries - another first for them.
Brasidas first led his troops to Heracleia Trachinia where he waited while he negotiated with various Thessalian clans for permission to march through Thessaly. The negotiations were tricky since the Thessalians were on good terms with the Athenians at the time, but Brasidas’ diplomatic skills proved equal to the challenge, and he obtained passage through Thessaly (Thuc. IV 78). He arrived in Macedonia to a warm reception from King Perdiccas II, an old enemy of the Athenians. Granted, Perdiccas had his own motives - he wanted help in conquering the region of Lyncestis in the mountains to the west of Macedonia proper (Thuc. IV 79). Presumably Brasidas, in exchange for permission to pass through Macedonia, had to promise to aid Perdiccas against Lyncestis later on.
Various Chalcidian cities were still in revolt, and Brasidas was determined to foster even more rebellions. In this, diplomacy served him better than force of arms, and Thucydides grudgingly does him the honor of stating that “he was not a bad speaker - for a Lacedaemonian” (Thuc. IV 84). At Acanthus Brasidas entered the town alone, addressed its assembly, and spoke persuasively enough that the Acanthians revolted and threw in their lot with him (Thuc. IV 88). The situation for the Athenians in the north was worsening rapidly.
Late in 424 fighting flared up again between the Athenians and the Boeotians. At Delium, the Boeotians inflicted a heavy defeat on the Athenians in one of the very few major land battles during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. IV 89-10l).
In the winter of 424 to 423 Brasidas, meanwhile, achieved his greatest success. Near the mouth of the River Strymon lay Amphipolis, a large Athenian colony which had been founded in 436 (Thuc. IV 102; Diod. XII 32). The Athenians had recruited the majority of the colonists from places other than Athens so when Brasidas appeared in the neighborhood with an army and offered generous terms, many Amphipolitans lent a ready ear. The city capitulated without a fight (Thuc. IV 106).
The loss of revenue for Athens was substantial, since Amphipolis provided access to silver and gold mines in the interior. A curious circumstance of
Amphipolis’ founding made the loss particularly galling to the Athenians: when they founded this colony, the Athenians apparently retained ownership of the land on which the physical city of Amphipolis stood. Legally - and the Athenians insisted on this for decades afterwards (see chap. 18) - it was their land which Brasidas had taken. Moreover, Brasidas had won for Sparta a bargaining chip in the negotiations for the return of the 120 Spartiates, and finally the Athenians began to negotiate. The first fruit was a one year’s truce, sworn in 423 (Thuc. IV 117).
Meanwhile, other cities had joined Brasidas, including Torone (Thuc. IV 110-114) and Scione (Thuc. IV 120-121). Scione, however, had joined close to the day on which the armistice was made: the Athenians insisted that it had surrendered to Brasidas after, the Lacedaemonians with equal stridency that it had done so just before the day in question (Thuc. IV 122). In this atmosphere neither side observed the truce in the north. Brasidas accepted the surrender of an additional town, Mende (Thuc. IV 123); and the Athenians sent troops to recapture it and Scione (Thuc. IV 122). At Mende they met with success, and they began to besiege Scione (Thuc. IV 130-131).
Elsewhere, however, the truce held. When it expired in 422, Cleon persuaded the Athenian assembly to send to the Chalcidice an army some three to four thousand strong with himself as commander. Upon arrival Cleon managed to capture Torone. He then sailed around Mt. Athos towards Amphipolis (Thuc. V 2-3). Here Brasidas and Cleon met in battle, and Cleon (and the assembly that had sent him) learned the hard lesson that beginner’s luck applies only once. His troops were routed with heavy loss of life (including his). Brasidas, however, fell in the battle as well (Thuc. V 6-11).
World History
