W. W. Fortenbaugh

Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric - henceforth Rhetoric - is fundamental to any study of classical Greek rhetoric; indeed, its importance is not limited to antiquity but extends to the present day. The reason is clear. Aristotle offers us a concise, yet comprehensive view of the art of rhetoric.

Aristotle explains rhetoric in terms of persuasion. He is, however, careful to point out that actually effecting persuasion - e. g., securing a conviction in court or passing legislation in the Assembly - is not required of the art. Much as a skilled doctor may practice his art flawlessly and still fail to cure a hopelessly sick person, so the practitioner of rhetoric, the orator, may speak with consummate skill and nevertheless fail to persuade his audience. Hence, Aristotle defines the art of rhetoric as the capacity to consider in each case the possible means of persuasion. Furthermore, he recognizes that not all persuasion is of one kind and not every kind belongs to the art of rhetoric. Physical torture, for example, may bring forth a confession, but it is not part of the art. Rather, there are three artful modes of persuasion, each of which is accomplished by what the orator says: he persuades his audience by arguing the issue, by presenting himself as a man of good character, and by arousing emotion in the audience. Aristotle also recognizes that orations are spoken aloud before an audience, so that he takes account of delivery, albeit briefly and critically. In addition, he recognizes that rhetorical persuasion proceeds by words, and words must be selected and arranged in order that the orator may express himself clearly, with a certain elevation, and in a suitable manner. Finally, Aristotle considers the fact that an oration divides into discernible parts (introduction, narration, argument, and epilogue), each of which makes special demands on the orator. All of the above takes less than two hundred pages (191 in the Oxford Classical Text), so that the Rhetoric has the virtue of being economical as well as comprehensive.

The composition of the Rhetoric is, however, problematic. The work, as it has come down to us, contains three books, which do not form a seamless whole. The first two books deal with the artful modes of persuasion, but do so in a surprisingly disjointed

Manner. 1.1 begins the work by calling for a rhetoric that restricts itself to arguing the issue. Emotional appeal is viewed as outside the art, even though in 1.2 it is recognized as an artful mode of persuasion. The sections on the character of the orator and the arousal of emotion, 2.1-11, break up the account of rational argument, as do the sections on character tied to age and fortune, 2.12-17. Even the account of rational argument can be puzzling. For example, in 1.2 Aristotle introduces the general lines of argument that we know from his Topics, and in 2.23-24 he discusses a selection of these lines of argument. But in between he ignores them and works with a distinction between specific premises and common premises. The third book is not closely tied to what precedes and appears to be composed of two distinct treatises: a discussion of style or expression in 3.2-12, followed by a quite independent account of the parts of an oration in 3.13-19.

These problems of composition cannot be entirely ignored and in what follows I shall offer some reflections that may help remove certain difficulties. But on the whole, I shall be focusing on the doctrine of the Rhetoric and not the unity of the treatise.