Opinion is divided on Augustus’ aims and intentions regarding the conquest of Germany. Was he, as Colin Wells assens, an open imperialist who aimed at permanent conquest of Germany from the beginning, or were his campaigns merely a reaction to the defeat of Lollius and the 5th Legion in 16 BC with the aim of pushing back the Germans to establish a permanent defensive frontier along the Elbe? If Augusms’ policy was a defensive one, then it was a very aggressive form of defence. The period from 15 BC to AD 9 was one of large-scale expeditions, massive troop deployment and territorial conquest. The concerted efforts to make a show of strength up to the Elbe, and even beyond by crossing it, tells us that it was an ideologically and strategically important goal for conquest. Although Wlleius’ remarks that Tiberius by 7 BC had just about made Germany a tributary province proved to be miscalculated they may reflect a situation the Romans perceived to be true. All evidence points to the intention to do just that in the years following. It appears that civilian settlements and cooperation with the local population at Haltern and Waldgirmes did take place. In Cologne a national sanctuary of Rome and Augustus was established around the birth of Christ. This was based on the pan-Gallic sanctuary of 12 BC at Lyon at which delegates from all tribes in Gaul met in annual assemblies. One of the priests of the cult-centre in Cologne in AD 9 was a Cheruscan, suggesting that all German tribes, including those east of the Rhine, were to be united in a larger German province with its political and religious centre in Cologne, Varus was sent not to carry out further military campaigns - he was too inexperienced for this - but to prepare the way for transforming Germany into a Roman province. He had been appointed to impose taxation and expedite the process of making Germany governable. If he proceeded too quickly, it was surely not his fault, but the ultimate responsibility of the state. The whole chain of events, involving preparation for conquest, military campaigns, permanent garrisons of army units, impiosition of taxation, is no different from any other attempt to enlarge the Empire through annexation anywhere else.
None of this points to a purely defensive Augustan policy. After the Varian disaster, however, Augustus realised that the annexation of Germany was unrealistic, at least for the time being, advising Tiberius in 14 to leave the boundaries of the Empire where they were. This was defensive policy. Enough first-hand experience had been gained to see that the regions between the Rhine and Elbe could not be subjugated or held in the long run. Only in rare cases had the Romans been able to form alliances with the elite of German tribes. The underdeveloped social hierarchy of most of the tribes was not suitable for the kind of cooperation aimed at the top of the pyramid in society which had been successfully applied to Celtic societies. The Germans before Augustus had not been content to stay behind the Rhine, and there was no reason to believe that other German tribes the Romans had only recently encountered, and many more they had not yet even met, were prepared to stay behind the Elbe. By 16, Tiberius had taken the advice given to him by Augustus on his deathbed.
World History
