Four persons dominate Caesar’s narrative of the fateful events in Rome in early January 49 (1.1-6): the consul L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, Pompey’s father-in-law Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica, Cato the Younger, and Pompey himself. They bring it about that the senate majority, ‘‘forced by the consul’s words, by the fear inspired by an army on the doorstep, and by the threats of Pompey’s friends, vote unwillingly and under duress’’ for Scipio’s motion against Caesar (2.6) and are deprived of their ability to decide freely (3.5). They are responsible for causing decisions to be made in haste and confusion and without proper notification of Caesar (5.1), for initiating harsh decrees concerning Caesar and the most eminent officials, the tribunes (5.5), and for taking measures that ‘‘overturned (or mixed up) all human and divine laws’’ (6.8).
Lentulus uses threats in urging the senate to take a determined stance against Caesar; otherwise, he will disobey the senate’s will and rethink his options, including joining ‘‘the goodwill and friendship of Caesar’’ (1.2-3). He attacks and abuses those who offer more moderate proposals and refuses to allow a vote on them (2.4-5). His motives are despicable: huge debts, vast ambition, and a sick desire to become a second Sulla (4.2). In sharp contrast, we later see him fleeing in panic from Rome, even leaving the treasury open (1.14.1), occupying an extravagantly equipped tent in Pompey’s camp at Pharsalus (3.96.1), and dying an inglorious death in Egypt (3.104.3).
Scipio, no more than Pompey’s mouthpiece, also uses threats to influence the senate against Caesar (1.4-2.1). He is motivated by ambition for power, exploitation of his kinship with Pompey, fear of prosecution, love of self-display, and hunger for adulation by powerful men (4.3). Appointed governor of Syria, he claims the title imperator after actually sustaining military setbacks, brutally extorts money and supplies, abandons his still endangered province, and even plans to steal the treasures of Diana’s temple in Ephesus (3.31-3). As an army commander, he is reckless and cowardly, causing unnecessary losses (3.36-8). Having joined Pompey’s camp, he quarrels with others prematurely about the distribution of Caesar’s offices and the punishment of neutrals or lukewarm supporters (3.82-3).
Cato, perhaps Caesar’s most determined enemy, opposed a compromise in early January and agreed to seek peace only when the war had already broken out (Cic. Att. 7.15.2). Caesar mentions old enmities and resentment about an election defeat as his motives (1.4.1) and recalls Cato’s attempt in 52 to block the bill that allowed Caesar to run in absentia (1.32.3). In the spring of 49, as governor of Sicily,
Cato was displaying great energy in getting old ships repaired and ordering the towns to supply new ones. He had his lieutenants out in Lucania and Bruttium, enlisting Roman
Citizens, and was trying to raise a certain number of cavalry and infantry from the Sicilian towns. When these preparations were nearly complete he heard of the approach of Curio [whom Caesar had sent to take over Sicily] and complained in a public speech that he had been abandoned and betrayed by Pompey. Pompey had undertaken an unnecessary war when everything was in a state of total unreadiness and, when questioned by himself and others in the Senate, he had declared that he was fully prepared and ready for war. Having made his protest, Cato fled from the province. (1.30.4-5)
Although many have interpreted this passage as an attempt to ridicule Cato, Caesar in fact characterizes his actions positively (see also App. B Civ. 2.40); unlike most of Pompey’s officers in Italy, Cato accomplishes much, and his preparations are almost complete when he is overtaken by military events. According to Appian (B Civ. 2.40), Cato decided not to risk a fight in order to spare the lives of those under his command. Overall, compared with others, Caesar describes Cato with deliberate restraint, using him, and the speech he attributes to him, to cast a devastating light on Pompey (David Yates, ‘‘The role of Cato the Younger in Caesar’s Bellum civile.,’ in preparation).
Pompey, indeed, receives Caesar’s sharpest criticism. Applying military power and ruthless intimidation, he directs the oppression of the senate majority (1.1-3). His motives are listed in most detail (1.4.4-5): he is incapable of standing in another’s shadow; manipulated himself by Caesar’s enemies, he has betrayed his friendship with Caesar, used illegitimate military means to advance his own power and supremacy (potentia dominatusque), and is eager to force a decision by war. He misleads the senate in describing the strength and morale of the two armies (1.6.1-2). He is good at moralizing (1.8.3-4) but a failure in seeking peace (1.10-11, 26.2-5; 3.18, 57), imposing discipline on his subcommanders (1.19.4), and maintaining popularity in Italy (12-13, 15-16, 18, 28.1). At Dyrrachium he is boastful (3.45.6) but unable to grasp victory when it is in his reach (3.70.1; Gelzer 1968: 235). Before the final battle he succumbs to manipulation by others, tolerates their infighting (3.82-3), and absurdly predicts certain victory (86-7), but chooses poor tactics (92) and leaves the battlefield prematurely (94), sitting despondently in his tent and escaping in the last moment in disguise with only a few friends (96). Fittingly, this shadow of the former ‘‘great’’ Pompey dies in a little boat off the coast of Egypt, betrayed and alone (103-4). Obviously, Caesar was deeply angered by the betrayal of his former ally and son-in-law. Cato had at least been consistent.
These are the leaders. Smaller figures such as Labienus, also a traitor, who needs to legitimize himself by cruelty (3.19, 71), Afranius and Petreius, failures as commanders of Pompey’s Spanish legions (1.41-87), and Varro, a weathervane as governor of Farther Spain (2.17-21), are treated with equal contempt and sarcasm. Generally, as Collins shows with many examples (1972: 946-56), the Pompeians are cowards and weaklings, cruel, greedy, vainglorious, and incompetent. The positive examples are all on Caesar’s own side, ranging from brave centurions like Scaeva and Crastinus (3.53, 91, 99), to subcommanders like Curio, who demonstrates loyalty and bravery even in military failure (2.23-44), to Caesar himself, a model as a leader (Rosenstein, chapter 7 in this volume), always decisive and active, seeking victory even in adversity, commanding the absolute loyalty of his men because he respects them, cares for them, and shares their dangers, concerned about the safety of all Roman citizens, whether on his or the other side, and always trying to restore peace for the greater good of the res publica. This portrait of Caesar the general and statesman is intimately tied to his political strategy, to which we finally turn.
World History
