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The ancient evidence for the political history of this period is accumulated and sorted, on a year-by-year basis, in Broughton 1951-86, in consequence of which detailed annotation is unnecessary here.
Roman political morality demanded a balance between the ambitious exercise of personal virtue and fealty to the common good: Earl 1967.
Brunt 1971a: 91-9.
Italians in politics: Wiseman 1971. Ambitus: Linderski 1995: 107-14; 638-9; Yakobson 1999.
Evidence and further references in Badian 1990a.
Vanderbroeck 1987; Mouritsen 2001; Tatum 2004. Cf. Millar 1998.
Though it is fair to observe that Cicero’s references to the optimates very often refer to a narrow combination of nobles. He paints a very different picture, however, in his defense of the senatorial establishment at Sest. 98.
Popularis politics: Tatum 1999: 1-16. The notion of a genuine popular movement continues to attract eminent adherents: cf. Wiseman 1994a: (e. g.) 339, 346, 367.
Rathbone 1981, but cf. Nicolet 1994: 619. See now Rosenstein 2004.
Brunt 1998b.
The so-called Lex Plotia Agraria: see Marshall 1972.
Wiseman 1994a: 329-33.
De Souza 1999.
Caesar is often (but wrongly) designated the only senator who supported Gabinius’ measure: Watkins 1987.
Pompey’s campaign: Seager 2002: 47-9.
Sherwin-White 1984: 159-85. Contra, Kallet-Marx 1995: 312-14.
Sherwin-White 1984: 186-234.
Crassus’ investments abroad: Shatzman 1975: 377.
In his (fragmentary) speech De rege Alexandrino.
Challenged corruption: Cic. Verrines. Championed tribunate: Cic. Corn. Cicero and the equestrian order: Bleicken 1995a; Berry 2003.
Frederiksen 1966; Nicolet 1994: 641-2.
In a letter to Catulus, Catiline wrote: ‘‘I have pursued a course of action that offers hope of preserving what remains of my prestige (dignitas)’’ (Sall. Cat. 35.4).
The reality of an actual and coherent conspiracy (as opposed to a multiplicity of illicit and dangerous acts given menacing shape by means of Ciceronian rhetoric) is questioned by Seager 1973.
Discussion of this complex problem: Drummond 1995.
Plut. Cat. Min. 1.3: ‘‘When he engaged in study, he was slow to comprehend.’’
Badian 1972a: 103-4.
Cic. Att. 2.1.18: ‘‘that man, though he possesses a noble spirit and absolute integrity, none the less is doing the Republic harm, because he speaks in the Senate as if he were in Plato’s Republic, not Romulus’s cesspool.’’
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Regulations affecting professio: Linderski 1995: 91-4.
Caesar’s affair with Servilia, Cato’s half-sister, was notorious (Plut. Brut. 5) and cannot have improved relations between the two men.
In consular elections, Roman voters voted for two candidates.
The First Triumvirate was simply a personal agreement. The Second Triumvirate (among Marc Antony, M. Aemilius Lepidus and Octavian) was an entirely different matter: that was a legal entity established by the Lex Titia of 43 (sources in Broughton 1951-86: 340). The terminology (which is entirely modern) is unfortunate.
Linderski 1995: 425-6; Tatum 1999: 126-30.
They were sensible to do so: in 58 two praetors, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Memmius, insisted on a senatorial debate over the legitimacy of Caesar’s acts; the debate lasted three days (Suet. lul. 23). And the controversy continued throughout that year. Transition from patrician to plebeian status: Tatum 1999: 96-102.
Tatum 1999: 114-35. It is commonplace, however, for scholars to view the whole of Clodius’ legislative package as popularis (e. g., Wiseman 1994b: 377-8), but this is an unnatural construction to put on the laws regulating religion and the census and is also to ignore the explicit testimony of Dio 38.12.8.
The attempt to try Caesar: Badian 1974.
Pompey’s connection with Claudii Pulchri: Tatum 1991.
The profitability of the Gallic War: Badian 1968a: 89-91.
The misleading account of Clodius’ death in Cicero’s In Defense of Milo is corrected by the commentary of Asconius: Asc. 30-2C.
Shackleton Bailey 1965-68: 1.38-40 and Gruen 1974: 494-6 argue that there was no realistic possibility of a prosecution and consequently Caesar’s motives must be explained otherwise.
Contra, Gruen 1974: 458-60.
Fehrle 1983: 214.
The legally appropriate termination of Caesar’s command (the Rechtsfrage of modern scholarship) was contested at the time (Caes. B Civ. 1.9.2; Cic. Att. 7.7.6, 7.9.4) and remains uncertain: cf. Seager 2002: 193-5.
Cic. Att. 9.10.2: ‘‘Sulla could; can I not?’’
Badian 1990b: 34-5.
Further particulars and bibliography: Rawson 1994b.
Cic. Att. 7.7.7, 8.11.2, 9.7.3, 9.10.2, 10.7.1.
A Companion to the Roman Republic Edited by Nathan Rosenstein, Robert Morstein-Marx Copyright © 2006 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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