The existence of a kingdom that united Palestine as a whole (or even the entire Levant) is anachronistic and justified by post-exilic nationalistic interests (as well as other interests linked to them). On the contrary, the presence of two kingdoms, Judah in the south with its capital, Jerusalem, and Israel in the north with its capital, Samaria, is confirmed by other contemporary sources. Moreover, it follows the overall development of the Levant in the Iron Age until the Assyrian conquest (that is, from the tenth to the mideighth centuries bc) (Table 23.1). The complex network ofpowers in Palestine, then, found consolidation through six important elements: the Philistine Pentapolis, the kingdom of Judah, the kingdom of Israel, Ammon, Moab and Edom (Figure 23.1).
Despite the failure of its hegemonic ambitions in Palestine, the Philistine Pentapolis was strong enough to remain independent from the larger kingdom of Israel and the neighbouring one ofJudah. The former differences between the Philistines and the prevailing local Semitic population had gradually diminished through a process of linguistic assimilation and acculturation. After the disappearance of Aegean (found on Philistine pottery) or Egyptian (anthropoid sarcophagi) elements, characterising the first phase of Philistine presence in the Levant, Philistine material culture became similar to the one found in the Levantine cities located further inland. Similarly, personal names became Semitic and deities took on local names (such as Dagon at Gaza and Ashdod, and Astarte at Ashkelon).
Political leaders held a Philistine title, namely, serantm, which has been compared to the Greek tyr-annos. We do not, however, know if and to what extent this Philistine leadership was different from Canaanite kingship. Other elements of the Philistine socio-political system (such as armies of mercenaries, land allotments to vassals and so on) were originally Canaanite. Despite having an elite of foreign descent, the Philistine city-states ended up becoming an element of continuity with the Late Bronze Age. This is especially the case when they are compared to the more innovative ‘nation’ kingdoms developing further inland.
Among the latter, the kingdom ofJudah (from the ninth to the eighth centuries bc) was initially a small and marginal kingdom. It was dependent on either Israel, or Damascus in an anti-Israel position, or Assyria in an anti-Israel and anti-Damascus position. From an economic point of view, the kingdom was cut off from the Mediterranean by the Philistine cities and from the Transjordan caravan routes by Edom and Moab. Therefore, the kingdom ofJudah could only count on the few agro-pastoral resources available in its hilly (mountain ofJudah) and semi-arid (Negev) territory (Figures 23.2 And 23.3). The alleged dynastic continuity of the ‘House of David’ and the prestige of the temple of Yahweh are ah later fictionalisations. The latter were probably developed at the time ofJosiah and then further expanded by exilic and postexilic ideologies.
On the contrary, the kingdom of Israel ruled over a far larger and varied territory, which included plains (Jezreel and the Middle Jordan), mountains and access to the Mediterranean (south of the Carmel) and to the Transjordan caravans (Gilead). Consequently, up until the Assyrian conquest of the area, the kingdom of Israel held a hegemonic position in Palestine. The historical and institutional development of the kingdom went through various stages. First, the kingdom was a tribal state, run by a group of elders. The
Figure 23.1 Iron Age Palestine. Left: The kingdom of David, tenth century; Centre: Map of Palestine between the ninth and eighth centuries bc; Right: The Assyrian and Babylonian provinces.
Figure 23.2 Beersheba, a typical example of Iron Age urban settlement in Palestine. 1: Water system; 2: Circular street; 3: Storehouses; 4: Gate; 5: Well.
Figure 23.3 The standardised household plan of Israelite cities. Ted Beit Mirsim, stratum A, north-western quarter.
Kingdom was at war with Judah over the border between the two (land of Benjamin), and was without a capital, a dynasty and a stable structure. The situation degenerated into a series of usurpations, short-lived reigns and internal conflicts. However, by the mid-ninth century bc Israel was a stable kingdom, ruled by the dynasty of the ‘House of Omri’. This dynasty made Samaria its capital and built a palace with a royal court, a bureaucracy and a state administration.
The reigns of Omri and Ahab were characterised by considerable building programmes and saw establishment of kinship ties with the royal family of Tyre. Israel got involved in commercial activities and turned the kingdom ofJudah into a protectorate. Moreover, Israel was involved in military conflicts with Damascus over the strategic region of Gilead and had to suffer the initial stages of the Assyrian expansion. This swift transformation of the kingdom of Israel triggered several internal problems. These problems were caused by the division between a ‘modernising’ effort championed by the court at Samaria and a more conservative attitude. The latter’s religious, ethical and social arguments were championed by prophets accusing rulers of idolatry and corruption. The Yahwistic revolt led by the general Jehu caused a change in the ruling dynasty, but failed to alter the political organisation of Israel, which continued along the same lines. However, the Assyrian conquest of Syria soon put Israel in a difficult position, being forced to choose between submitting to or opposing the Assyrians.
The other kingdoms along the Transjordan plateau (Ammon, Moad and Edom) had less of an impact on the political developments of the area. Their main problem was maintaining their independence. In the case of Ammon, the threat came from Israel and Damascus. This forced the Ammonites to get involved in the Syro-Ephraimite wars for the control of Gilead and the ‘King’s Highway’. In the case of Moab, this kingdom initially almost fell under the control of Israel. The stele of the Moabite king, Mesha, provides a rare opportunity to compare the Israelite version of the events, which has survived in the Bible, with the Moabite one. The two appear to be opposite versions of the facts, but share a similar theological view. Edom experienced several phases of submission to the kingdom ofJudah. Moreover, its proximity to Egypt provided it with some scope for political manoeuvre. Among the three Transjordan kingdoms, Edom was the most marginal, weakest and least organised one. However, it had a key position, linking Judah to the Red Sea, and controlled areas rich in minerals, especially copper and iron. The economy of all three Transjordan kingdoms was centred on animal farming and the passage of caravans travelling from Yemen to Syria, and vice versa. These kingdoms were therefore far wealthier than they would have been had they relied solely on what their local resources could provide, an aspect that explains the precocious Assyrian interest in the area (Figure 23.4).
Throughout this phase of independence and political pluralism, Palestine became an integral part of a network of Aramean, Phoenician and Neo-Hittite states further north, which are here separated according to their location and ethno-linguistic features for convenience. In terms of political relations and material culture, very few elements distinguished the courts of Jerusalem, Samaria or Rabbath Ammon from the courts of Tyre, Damascus or Hama. The rise of ‘national’ traits, however, became a much more influential factor in this period. These national traits were centred on the choice of language used and the dynastic or national deity worshipped, namely, Yahweh for Jerusalem, Milkom for the Ammonites, Chemosh for the Moabites, Baal for Tyre, and Hadad for Damascus. These political and national entities had interacted with each other for centuries, taking advantage of their relative distance from the surrounding empires. The Egyptians led their last military expedition in the area under Sheshonq, and the Assyrians would lead their first incursions with Shalmaneser III. Therefore, between 1200 and 750 bc the provision of Levantine resources as a tribute to the surrounding empires or the occasional booties were modest in scale and in their impact on the local economy. This was in marked contrast with the situation of the area after the Middle Bronze Age.
Relations among the kingdoms and ruling houses of the Levant naturally fluctuated between alliances and wars. External alliances often met with violent reaction from the local population, mainly for religious and nationalistic reasons. The latter acted as the main motives for wars. The issue was that alliances between
Figure 23.4 Storage jar with its stopper and a royal stamp on the handle, kingdom ofJudah (Lachish, seventh century bc).
Ruling houses from different national backgrounds (in terms of language, religion or culture) tended to link courts, thus bypassing the rest of the population. In fact, these alliances were sealed through inter-dynastic marriages, gift exchanges, dispatches of specialists and commercial activities.
All these interactions brought a large number of foreign products and trends to the royal courts, as well as people speaking foreign languages and with different cultural backgrounds (such as the kings’ wives and their retinues). These influences ultimately led to the introduction of foreign cults. The population was far more committed to national and religious values than the appreciation of exotic products. Therefore, it condemned its rulers. The main advocates of these criticisms were the prophets loitering in the courts, who became the spokespersons of anti-royal opinions. Even in case of serious problems in regional wars, such as the measures to be taken in the face of the Assyrian threat, we encounter constant clashes of opinion. These disagreements not only took place within the court, but also outside of it, and adopted the typical ‘code’ of the prophetic message
The outcome of wars (from victory to defeat, one’s own destruction or the opponent’s, foreign interventions and so on) was always explained theologically, more as a result of ethical and religious factors, rather than military prowess. Just as in the Bronze Age, war was always a ‘sacred war’, apparently fought by soldiers, but ultimately fought by the gods of each party. Bronze Age wars were also sacred in the sense that they were an ordeal meant to show who was right and who was wrong in the political and diplomatic disputes preceding the conflict. In the Iron Age, however, wars were sacred because they were essentially a clash between national deities (personified by their respective armies) who prevailed depending on their strength. The enemy would therefore be beaten not because he was wrong, but because he had sinned by worshipping the wrong deity and not being part of the ‘chosen’ people. Consequently, in the Iron Age, national identity was cemented more through wars than through peace. In this sense, it was easier to mobilise the population through the words of prophets championing a fight until death, than through the courts implementing more realistic and opportunistic measures.