Oratory was the ‘‘most fully worked-out technology’’ of the ancient world (Crook 1995: 197). Rhetoric, the sometimes controversial art of persuasive speaking, and the pathway to oratory, was taught through formal instruction and written manuals, and also by example through observation of orators and published speeches that were transcribed and circulated. This chapter will seek to clarify the connections between oratory and politics, and also between rhetoric and politics. Although it will argue that the political importance of one form of oratory has been somewhat exaggerated, it recognizes that oratory constituted an essential tool of Roman politics, and that rhetoric was contested precisely because it was the skill that made this tool available.
Deeply imbedded in the Roman political tradition was the belief that a distinguished Roman man should be a capable speaker. Quintus Caecilius Metellus eulogized his father Lucius (consul in 251 and 247) in 221 bce as having exhibited the ten attributes of a wise man; second only to a first-class fighter is the optimus orator (‘‘the best speaker,’’ Plin. HN7.140). The elder Cato joins moral qualities with eloquence in defining the orator: orator est, Marcefili, vir bonus dicendiperitus (‘‘the orator, son Marcus, is a good man skilled in speaking,’’ Cato Fil. 80; Jordan 1860. See also Holkeskamp 1995: 11-16). But lest we read too much into this, Astin (1978: 154) reminds us that he defines the farmer as a vir bonus colendi peritus (‘‘a good man skilled in cultivation,’’ Cato Fil. 78; Jordan 1860). This theme is developed at length in Cicero’s treatise on oratory, the De Oratore, a dialogue finished in 55 bce and set in 91 BCE. Here he has his two main interlocutors, Marcus Antonius (consul 99) and Lucius Licinius Crassus (consul 95 and censor in 92), present the orator as the consummate Roman statesman, who combines his vast experience with a solid but unenthusiastic acquaintance with technical Greek rhetoric and the basics of Greek philosophy. In this portrait of a Roman ideal, we see an expression of union between oratory and politics.
Yet at the same time, the elder Cato expressed a typical Roman attitude when he wrote, rem tene, verba sequentur (‘‘stick to the subject, and the words will follow,’’ Cato Fil. 80; Jordan 1860; cf. Cic. De Or. 2.51). The view that Cato himself studied Greek rhetorical theory, and even wrote a book on rhetoric, is discounted by Astin (1978: 147-56, 333). Although Antonius too had written a book on rhetoric, he describes it as a product not of learning but of experience (Cic. De Or. 1.208), and Cicero dismisses his own youthful treatise on rhetoric, the De Inventione, as a work for whose publication he does not wish to take responsibility (De Or. 1.5). The De Oratore is dismissive of the technical treatments of rhetoric (1.137, 2.50, 2.175, 2.201) and rhetorical exercises (2.109), preferring practical experience (3.74). However, Cicero also refers in it to systematic rhetorical classifications and analyses. Overall, while Cicero’s interlocutors discuss traditional rhetoric - the study of how speeches should be constructed and delivered - as ancillary at best, they treat oratory - that is, the practice of giving speeches - as intrinsic to political leadership.
Oratory was traditionally divided into three genera causarum (‘‘types of causes’’): deliberative, epideictic, and judicial (Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.7; Rhet. Her. 1.2; Quint. Inst. 3.4.11-16). Intuitively, one would assume that deliberative oratory was linked to politics, since it involved public debate on legislation and other public acts. Epideictic, the assigning of praise or blame, it would seem, might or might not be aimed at a political subject: an election speech would be obviously political, a funeral encomium less obviously so. Judicial oratory might seem to have the weakest link to the political context, since the ostensible object of a trial was to determine a verdict - whether the defendant had improperly injured the property of someone else, or upset public order. Yet for much of the twentieth century, scholars sought to uncover politics in judicial oratory and in the trials where it took place, and downplayed the political import of deliberative speeches. (Following the lead of ancient works on rhetoric, they paid less attention to epideictic oratory.) Only recently toward the end of the twentieth century have Roman historians started to adopt what would seem the more obvious approach, to stress the political importance of deliberative oratory and to downplay the politics in judicial oratory.
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