The Ptolemaic army, like all its Hellenistic counterparts, was the army of Alexander, modified in the light of experience and necessity. Alexander’s forces consisted of a variety of complementary units that reflected a tactical concept based on pinning the enemy down by infantry pressure along much of the line and delivering the crucial assault at a selected point by means of heavy cavalry. This meant that the major tactical elements were a phalanx of heavy infantry armed with pikes of considerable length (5.5 m., later increased) and a strike force of heavy cavalry made up of squadrons of Macedonians, Thessalians, and allies. The gap inevitably arising in action between these elements was plugged by elite light infantry called hypaspists, 3,000 strong. These field forces, on which victory in general actions depended, were supplemented by a wide range of light troops, both horse and foot, and largely mercenary, and complemented by a highly sophisticated siege train.
When we turn to the armies of the Ptolemies, we encounter much that Alexander would have found immediately recognizable. At Gaza in 312 BC the Ptolemaic assault was delivered by a force of 3,000 cavalry armed with swords and the traditional Macedonian cavalry pike or xyston. This succeeded in turning the flank of the opposing cavalry force, which broke and fled the field, exposing the enemy phalanx to an assault on its left flank. Faced with this threat, they quickly turned tail and fled in confusion. Almost a century later the tactical thinking at Raphia (217 BC) was very similar: Ptolemy IV’s cavalry on the left wing was driven from the field by its Seleucid opposite numbers, whilst the Ptolemaic cavalry on the right wing reciprocated by defeating the Seleucid horsemen facing them. In this battle, however, victory was decided by Ptolemy’s phalanx, which, on the king’s personal encouragement, levelled pikes and charged the opposing phalanx which quickly collapsed. In 200 BC, Panion provides yet another example of cavalry as the striking wing, here very much to the disadvantage of the Ptolemaic army, since the Seleucid cavalry was able to demolish its left wing, drive it from the field, and then return to threaten the rear of the Ptolemaic phalanx, which had no alternative but to withdraw.
Despite the underlying tactical similarity to the armies of Philip II and Alexander, there was one crucial innovation that featured in all three actions: the use of war elephants, which was a tactic learned from the Indians. The elephants were employed as an ancient equivalent of the tank, in order to assault and disrupt the enemy line. One solution
Fleet dispositions at the Battle of Salamis exemplify the principle of a concentrated heavy assavdt on part of the enemy line much used in land warfare after the Batde of Leuctra in 371BC. Demetrius’ left wing, which he led personally, was the heavy wing on which he relied to shatter its opposite number and roll up the line against the shore, the centre and the right wing were relatively lightly held. Ptolemy placed the weight of his attack on the left wing. Ptolemy’s left was victorious, but Demetrius’ heavy contingent routed the opposing right wing and then induced the collapse of the Ptolemaic centre
To such an assault was to prevent them reaching the line in the first place, and this was achieved brilliantly by Ptolemy I at Gaza by throwing out in front of his army a screen of men armed with iron-covered stakes that were fixed into the ground to block the advancing elephants of Demetrius. Another remedy, clearly generally adopted, was to attack the elephants and their drivers with highly mobile light troops armed with javelins or bows. This meant, in turn, that any force using elephants could not advance without its own light-armed troops in attendance to neutralize those of the opposition. The major problem of the Ptolemies in using the elephant was that of getting an adequate supply of good quality animals—that is, Indian elephants. We hear of none in the army of Ptolemy I at Gaza, but after the defeat of Demetrius’ elephant force he captured the survivors. The Ptolemaic attempt to solve the problem in the long term was to use African elephants, and hunts for these animals are mentioned on several occasions in our sources. Unfortunately, the only trainable elephants in Africa are the forest variety which is smaller than the Indian, so that it is not surprising to find that Ptolemy IV’s elephants at Raphia quickly turned tail and fell back on his lines, with serious, though not disastrous, consequences for the army as a whole. We hear of no Ptolemaic elephants at Panion, though our one surviving source on this action is highly defective, but it is interesting to note that Seleucid elephants are claimed to have panicked the Aetolian cavalry on the crucial Egyptian left wing, and elephants are also mentioned as participating in the final encircling movement against the Ptolemaic phalanx that sealed the defeat of the entire army.
One of the most notable changes in the Ptolemaic army in the fourth and third centuries bc is the progressive dilution of its Macedonian element, initially in favour of mercenaries but ultimately leading to the incorporation of the Egyptian machimoi, or warrior class. As early as Gaza in 312 BC Diodorus describes the army as containing
18,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, partly Macedonian, partly mercenary, but we are also informed that there were numerous Egyptians in it, some employed as baggage-carriers, others as soldiers, presumably auxiliaries. By the time we get to Raphia these trends have gone much further. Here Ptolemy IV disposed of an elite cavalry force 3,000 strong, of which over 2,000 were Libyans or Egyptians. Similarly, in a phalanx of probably 45,000 men no fewer than 20,000 were Egyptian. Ptolemy fielded, in addition, 2,000 mercenary cavalry, both Greek and non-Greek, 3,000 Cretans, 3,000 Libyans, and 4,000 Thracians and Galatians. Indeed, it is highly improbable that
Macedonians and their descendants formed more than a small proportion of this army.
The cost of funding such a large mercenary force was clearly a heavy drain on the resources of the Crown, which could be met only if the economy of the country was functioning properly, but the internal disruptions that rose thick and fast after the death of Ptolemy IV were bound to impair the ability of the rulers of Egypt to maintain such troops. The problem of guaranteeing an adequate supply of soldiers drawn from ethnic groups traditionally exploited by Macedon was addressed at an early stage by the Ptolemies through the creation of a large military reserve stationed in settlements throughout the country. In these places they were given land allotments whose size was determined both by rank and type of unit. These plots they often did not farm themselves but simply used as a source of income, but they received them on the understanding that, whenever they were needed, they would be called up for service, as in the case of the 4,000 Thracians and Galatians mentioned in the build-up to the Raphia campaign. It is, however, intriguing that this is the only contingent in this category mentioned by Polybius at that juncture, and the fact that it formed a relatively small part of the army fielded for this operation indicates that clemchs (military settlers to whom the king gave allotments of land called kkroi) were not regarded as the ideal source for the bulk of the army.
Another obvious solution to the military manpower problem was the Egyptian militia or machimoi, a remedy first tried apparently at Gaza that fell into abeyance for many years, probably through a keen awareness of its possible political disadvantages. Ultimately, shortterm necessity swept long-term considerations imperiously away, and we find this group being exploited with spectacular success at Raphia, where the bulk of the phalanx which gave Ptolemy the victory consisted of Egyptian soldiers. The growing reliance on this class created by the increasing difficulty in acquiring troops from traditional Ptolemaic sources led to a critical shift in the balance of power within the country, which is sharply highlighted by Polybius:
As for Ptolemy, his war against the Egyptians followed immediately on these events. For the aforementioned king, by arming the Egyptians for his war against Antio-chus decided on a course of action which was appropriate to the immediate circumstances, but ignored the future consequences. For the soldiers, exalted by their victory of Raphia, were no longer inclined to obey orders, but were casting around for a leader and figurehead, thinking themselves capable of looking after themselves. In this they finally succeeded, not long afterwards. (Polybius 5.107)
The army, however, was not the only requirement. The realization of Ptolemaic ambitions in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean was also dependent on the maintenance of a powerful battle fleet. This force was not only a means of establishing and maintaining a Ptolemaic presence in the area but also served as a weapon in the propaganda battle for prestige and status. As in more modern times, large and powerful naval units could be used to generate a sense of power even when direct armed confrontation was not at issue. The critical strategic importance of the fleet was grasped from the very beginning of the Ptolemaic period, and its rise and decline are an unfailing barometer of Lagid imperial and political fortunes in the Greek world.
Tactically, naval warfare developed to a marked degree in the late fourth century bc. The trends emerge clearly in the best recorded of Ptolemaic sea fights, the Battle of Salamis, which was fought off the east coast of Cyprus in 306 BC and ended in the catastrophic defeat of the Egyptian fleet. The action arose from an attempt by Ptolemy to relieve his brother Menelaos, who was being besieged in Salamis on land and sea by Demetrius, son of Antigonus. Ptolemy had approximately 140 warships, facing perhaps 180 of the enemy. Diodorus, our fullest source, unfortunately for our purposes, gives more information on the fleet of Demetrius than that of Ptolemy, but there can be little doubt that these details apply equally well to the opposition. A number of points emerge: in the first place, we hear of soldiers being embarked and of much action involving them; secondly, Demetrius equipped his ships with ballistae and catapults capable of firing bolts three spans (c.0.5 m.) in length, which were used to good effect; thirdly, ships of various rates were engaged—for example, Demetrius’ powerful left wing contained 30 ‘fours’, 10 ‘fives’, 10 ‘sixes’, and 7 ‘sevens’, though the bulk of his fleet consisted of ‘fives’. The Ptolemaic fleet, on the other hand, was made up entirely of‘fives’ and ‘fours’; furthermore, both fleets appear to have drawn up for battle as three blocks of ships— a centre with a wing on either side—but Demetrius made his seaward wing particularly powerful while Ptolemy did likewise on the landward side; finally, we should note that the fleets employed a primitive system of signalling.
This summary reveals several important features. In the first place, naval warfare has clearly been powerfully influenced by warfare on land. While ramming manoeuvres were still being executed, the emphasis has shifted from fighting battles of manoeuvre to conducting land battles at sea, which placed a heavy premium on developing ever bigger units capable of carrying large forces of marines who force a decision by slogging it out toe-to-toe with the enemy. Athenaeus’ description of Philadelphus’ fleet demonstrates the point perfectly: not only does he state that it contained 2 ‘thirties’, i ‘twenty’, 4 ‘thirteens’, 2 ‘twelves’, 14 ‘elevens’, 30 ‘nines’, 37 ‘sevens’, 5 ‘sixes’, 17 ‘flves’ (as well as a force of ships rated as ‘fours’ to ‘one-and-a-halfs’ which was numerically double the rest), but he also describes a monstrous ‘forty’ of Ptolemy IV that he makes a point of saying was capable of carrying no fewer than 2,850 marines. The structure of these heavy ships has been much misunderstood, older literature interpreting the terms used to designate them as referring to banks of oars. This is quite impossible. These vessels were propelled mainly, if not completely, by multiple-rower sweeps and would never have had more than three banks of oars, and the ‘rating’ must refer to the number of oarsmen in a unit of rowers. The largest ships are now known to have had a catamaran structure that would obviously greatly increase the deck space available for marines, making such ships a particularly formidable proposition in a land-battle-at-sea. The militarization of naval warfare is also illustrated by the mounting of artillery aboard ship, a practice that obviously reflects the greatly enhanced importance of artillery for both siege warfare and field use in the army of Philip II and Alexander. The use of a heavy wing as a strike force by both protagonists is another case of adapting land warfare to the sea, since the employment of that principle was a fundamental tactical device in the Macedonian army. The use of signals will also emanate from the same source.
Powerful and effective though the Ptolemaic fleet was in the first half century of the dynasty, their shipbuilding efforts in themselves could not guarantee consistent success, and in the mid-third century BC their fleets suffered three hammer blows that presaged the gradual unravelling of Ptolemaic sea power in the area: at Ephesus (probably in 258 BC) a Ptolemaic fleet suffered a reverse at the hands of the Rhodian admiral Agathostratus, probably, in this case, being outmanceuvred by superior seamanship rather than outfought in a struggle between marines; apparently about the same time the Ptolemies suffered a second major reverse off Cos at the hands of Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedon, in which a powerful three-banked ship played a critical role in bringing the Macedonians victory; subsequently, apparently C.245 BC, Antigonus, although outnumbered, inflicted another defeat on the Ptolemaic navy at Andros, this time probably by outfighting the Ptolemaic marines.
World History
