Various sources recount how the city of Cirrha or Crisa (the older form), which lay on the Gulf of Corinth at the bottom of the valley below delphi, had once controlled the sanctuary there. according to them the Pylaean amphictiony from 595 to 586 waged the first sacred War against Crisa for control of delphi. in 591 the amphictiony captured Crisa after having poisoned its water supply during a siege. some Crisaeans, however, took to the hills and fought on until 586. thereafter the members of the amphictiony dedicated the land in the valley below delphi to apollo so that it became sacred land which might not be plowed. finally, after the war's end the victors reorganized the Pythian Games, the Panhellenic festival which took place at delphi, so that it now included athletic contests (aesch., III 107-112; Callisthenes, BNJ 124 Fr. 1; Paus. X 37,4-5; arg. Pind. Pyth. b and d).
Because none of these sources antedates the late fourth century, one scholar has argued that the story of the war arose then. However, as others immediately pointed out, Isocrates (XIV 31) referred to the war in the 370s (without, however, many details), so this extreme view has since been abandoned.
Moreover, certain elements in the stories of the First Sacred War can be corroborated, in particular the existence of a powerful city called Crisa which lay on the Corinthian Gulf which, however, had originally been called the "Crisaean Gulf" (thus consistently still in Thucydides). Yet that name cannot have arisen after the sixth century, because the name of the city itself had changed by then. Initially, it was "Crisa," but in the midsixth century the form was "Cirsa" (alcaeus, Fr. 7 Lobel-Page), and by the fifth it was "Cirrha" (the usual form in Pindar and aeschines). The name "Crisaean Gulf" was coined while the city was still called "Crisa." The gulf was not named after some insignificant hamlet, but rather after the most important city on it - as when it was renamed after Corinth later. A mighty city called Crisa really did exist ca. 600 bc.
Next, the amphictiony, which administered the sanctuary in classical times, was initially centered on another sanctuary, that of demeter of anthela at Thermopylae (Hdt. VII 200). during the archaic period it must have expanded to gain control over delphi. It continued to hold meetings at Thermopylae, but thereafter at delphi also (Strab. IX 3,7, p. 420). Its secondary acquisition of delphi, then, is demonstrable and confirms another element in the story of the First Sacred War.
Third, the amphictiony, perhaps rueing its poisoning of Crisa's water supply, later instituted a rule that none of its members might cut off another member's access to water (aesch. II 115). This prohibition against a member's cutting off another's water supply was in existence as early as 479. In that year the Greeks at Plataea swore an oath which included this prohibition despite its irrelevance to the situation at Plataea (Tod, GHI II, Nr. 204). This oath therefore cannot have been written for the occasion, but had been borrowed from elsewhere. The only other context in which this prohibition occurs concerns the amphictiony, i. e., the oath was borrowed from the amphic-tiony's files in 479.
(Continued)
Finally, the first Pythian Games with athletic contests took place in 582 (Marmor Parium, BNJ 239, A ep. 38), and the date is probably based on a list of victors. the story of the first sacred War dates that war to just before then when a powerful city called Crisa still existed. the amphictiony gained control over delphi somehow, and while it need not necessarily have been by war, people living in the area could point out the ruins of Crisa and tell stories about how the city had fallen in a war.
The Phocians, hired mercenaries, and seized Delphi. The Locrians, another tribe in the Amphictiony and the Phocians’ nearest neighbors, sent troops to recapture the sanctuary, but Philomelus’ mercenaries defeated them easily (Diod. XVI 24; cf. 29).
Both the Phocians and the Boeotians now prepared for full-scale war. The latter arranged for the Amphictionic Council to declare a sacred war against the Phocians, while these sent envoys throughout Greece to proclaim the justice of their cause. They found a ready ear among the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, the Boeotians’ traditional enemies (Diod. XVI 27-28; cf. 29). The Boeotians, for their part, had well-trained troops at their disposal as well as the active support of the Thessalians and Locrians, but Philomelus, in possession of the largest reserve of precious metal in Greece, offered mercenaries half again the going rate and quickly collected a sizable army (Diod. XVI 25; 30).
Accordingly, Philomelus invaded Eastern Locris in an attempt to keep his opponents from uniting against him. He managed to defeat the Locrian and Boeotian forces in a cavalry battle and then the Thessalians, but when the Thessalians joined up with the Boeotians and Locrians, he withdrew to Phocis. Here, at Neon to the north of Mt. Parnassus, the Boeotians inflicted a severe defeat and Philomelus himself died (Diod. XVI 30-31; Paus. X 2). The battle probably took place toward the end of the year 355.
The Boeotians presumably thought the war effectively over (Diod. XVI 32) as they arranged for their leading general, Pammenes, to take an army of 5,000 troops to Asia Minor to fight for Artabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who was still in revolt against the King of Persia (cf. Chares’ campaigns during the Social War). Pammenes actually managed to defeat the king’s troops in two battles (Diod. XVI 34) even while he was sorely needed at home.
Philomelus’ second in command, Onomarchus, had survived the Battle of Neon. Over the winter of 355 to 354 he rallied the Phocians and, availing himself of the reserves in Delphi, hired mercenaries in superabundance and lavishly distributed bribes among the Thessalians to secure their absence from the campaign in the next year. In 354 Onomarchus took the field and in a series of vigorous campaigns captured the city of Thronium in Eastern Locris, sacked the cities of the Doris, and, turning towards Boeotia, managed to capture
Orchomenus. After an attempt to besiege Chaeroneia, he withdrew again to Phocis (Diod. XVI 32-33).
In Thessaly, meanwhile, civil war had broken out between the two main cities, Larissa in the north and Pherae in the south. In 354 the Larissaeans - at least claiming to represent the full Thessalian League - asked Philip of Macedonia for help against the Pheraeans (Diod. XVI 14 [cf. XV 61] and 35), and Philip did not hesitate. He had just taken Methone (Diod. XVI 31 and 34 - see Box 18.1), the last Athenian outpost in the northwestern Aegean, and now marched into Thessaly. The tyrant of Pherae, Lycophron, asked Onomarchus for help against Philip, and Onomarchus sent his brother Phayllus with 7,000 troops. Philip beat him, so Onomarchus himself went to Thessaly. No Greek other than Onomarchus ever defeated Philip, and Onomarchus did it twice.
Having driven Philip from Thessaly, Onomarchus returned to Phocis. In the next year (353) he invaded Boeotia, defeated the Boeotians in a major battle, and captured Coroneia. In 353, however, Philip entered Thessaly again and marched on Pherae. Onomarchus hastened to its aid, only this time Philip had gathered an army big enough (20,000 foot) to match Onomarchus’ (also 20,000 foot). The difference lay in the cavalry: here the numbers (3,000 to 500) favored Philip, who had apparently called up every available cavalryman in all Thessaly with the exception of Pherae. Onomarchus and the Phocians finally met their match, and 6,000 Phocian troops fell, Onomarchus among them (Diod. XVI 35).
The issue now was effectively settled, but the Phocians still had vast reserves of cash, and now their allies in Greece were both free of other conflicts and willing to help - if perhaps not so much to aid the Phocians’ cause as to prevent the Boeotians from winning. The Athenians, having just come to terms in the Social War, bought the Phocians precious time by occupying the pass at Thermopylae and preventing Philip from following up his victory with an invasion of Phocis (Diod. XVI 38). The Athenians also sent a full 5,000 foot and 400 horse, the Lacedaemonians 1,000 foot, and the Peloponnesian Achaians an additional 2,000. Moreover, the tyrant of Pherae, Lycophron, even if Philip had forced him from Pherae, still had 2,000 mercenaries with whom he joined the Phocians. Onomarchus’ brother, Phayllus, having survived the terrible defeat at Philip’s hands, now assumed command and hired mercenaries to make good the losses.
Phayllus, however, lacked his brother’s military talent, and when he invaded Boeotia he suffered three defeats (Diod. XVI 37). An invasion of East Locris fared a little better, but in 352 he died of disease, and Onomarchus’ son, Phaleucus, took over the leadership. After some initial success the Boeotians defeated him twice (Diod. XVI 38,3-7), and by now the Phocians’ cause was obviously lost. In the next years the Phocians finally began to run out of cash, with many recriminations amongst their leaders as to who had wasted what or misappropriated how much (Diod. XVI 56), but the war had sapped the Boeotians’ resources as well. To gain money, the Boeotians supplied troops for the Persians’ latest attempt to reconquer Egypt (Diod. XVI 40 and 44), and this surely prevented them from gaining a decisive victory over the Phocians in the next few years as the war continued in desultory fashion.
The Phocian War accomplished for Boeotia what the Social War had for Athens, namely a severe diminution of power just when Philip of Macedonia was building his own empire in the north. As for Phocis, the war devastated it (see below). The Phocians may have declined as swiftly as they had risen, but if circumstances had been a little different, Onomarchus might have erected a Phocian “empire” in central Greece. That it was a league-state and not a city-state which had brought itself into such a position is characteristic for the period.
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