Practices

To a far greater extent than Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the Rhetoric to Alexander is tuned to the practices of its time, as could be seen with the discussion on legislation and worship or diplomatic mission report, or suppression of uproar, etc. This aspect singles out the Rhetoric to Alexander as the witness of rhetorical doctrines that are seldom, if not at all, described elsewhere.

More specifically, it is the only treatise to mention the examination speech (exetas-tikon eidos, chaps. 5 and 37). Indeed, however allusive the rhetorician may be and notwithstanding the observation that the examination speech is rarely used alone and the fact that other customs, particularly private ones, are hinted at (chap. 37), several features recall the proceedings of dokimasia (examination before taking public office) and euthune (presentation of accounts at the end of a term of office) imposed on magistrates by the rules of democracy in Athens. These features are namely the offensive character of the tactics described, the existence of a ‘civic’ norm evinced in political consistency and in social behaviour accepted as honourable (epitedeumata endoxa, 1427b27), and the fact that the examination includes a prospective dimension (the ‘possibility that the orator may contradict himself’ is considered, 1427b26).

The same proximity to contemporary practices is apparent in the development on request (aitema, chap. 19). This particular technique seems empty of rhetorical content since, for the orator, it simply consists in asking his hearers for what he wishes to obtain from them (attentive listening, leniency, etc.). The comparison of the Rhetoric to Alexander with extant judicial exordia and more ancient texts (tragic texts in particular) shows that the request is expressed in a fairly codified way and probably corresponds to a kind of ritual inherited from the ancient supplication practices.7

Another striking example of the practical integration of the treatise into the context of Athens in the classical period is a precept that clearly refers to the activity of the sycophant. The rhetorician defines the plausible as the coincidence between what the orator says and ‘that which the hearers have examples of in mind’ (1428a25-26). One of the potential applications of this precept is the selection of the allegations according to the existing possibilities to substantiate them: ‘if the person you are accusing is young, what people of the same age do, say that this person has done it; on account of the similarity between the deeds, credibility will thus be lent to the allegations against him. Likewise, showing that this person’s friends are such as you say he is will have the same result. Indeed, because he associates with them, it will be easy to believe that he behaves in like manner’ (1428b26-32). And it is extremely surprising that such a sentence should not have drawn the attention of historians.