Egypt became expansionist under Mentuhotep II (Habachi 1963; Fischer 1964: 112-18 [No. 45]; Goedicke 1982; Demidchik 1998; 2003). A reused inscription of this king, found at the Twelfth Dynasty royal palace at Ballas, quotes the king speaking to his army about his successes in the south and north (Lacovara 1997: 6-7; Wiener and Allen 1998: 7). His base remained the old Eleventh Dynasty capital, Thebes. This composition refers both to a Nubian campaign and to the seizure of territory from Medenit (the XXIInd nome of Upper Egypt) to the Mediterranean Sea. Hence, the text must be dated after the fall of Herakleopolis, which happened late in the king’s reign. The Eighteenth Dynasty reuse of such a text from an earlier period of civil war may have been intended to reinforce the later Theban rulers’ selfimage as doughty heroes about to shake off the northern enemy.
Mentuhotep’s opening lines summarize the campaign in Nubia. His army then speaks to him indicating that in the future the soldiers will return north. The enemy’s designation fits the warfare of the third millennium bc; the Nubians are called ‘‘bowmen,’’ a term that encompasses archers supported by well-equipped foot-soldiers but not by a fleet. Upon the return to their capital the Theban army eulogizes the success of the king in Lower Nubia (Wawat) and at the oases. The additional generic term ‘‘trouble-makers,’’ used at this juncture, might indicate resistance at the oases or local elites who had refused to support the Egyptians. No princes, rulers, or chiefs are mentioned. The Pharaoh first moved south, campaigning along the oasis routes, and then traveled north, where he seized the twenty-second Upper Egyptian nome - Herakleopolis must already have fallen - and continued marching to the sea. One private stela mentions that the owner was placed in Herakleopolis as an overseer of the ‘‘prison’’ of the ‘‘great doorway/garrison/ fortress’’ (Fischer 1960: 261-2). The warfare around Medenit seems to have been conducted by the marine sector of the army since, for example, the rigging of ships is mentioned.
Mentuhotep’s narrative is balanced by other sources, including private inscriptions as well as some blocks from Gebelein. Fischer noted the frequency of Nubians within the Upper Egyptian populace and laid emphasis upon the division of the local Theban army into Nubians and Upper Egyptians (Fischer 1961; 1962a). The sporran worn by the Egyptians originated with the Nubians and Libyans of the First Intermediate Period. According to stelae depictions the Aswan Nubians wore a feather on their heads, a custom not followed by other Nubians or Upper Egyptian soldiers of this same era.
At Gebelein there is a scene of Mentuhotep who is shown wielding a mace to smite a Libyan (Habachi 1963: 37-40; Marochetti 2005). These triumphal depictions performed an apotropaic role by linking the triumph of the sovereign with the assistance of a god. Another important aspect of this relief is the reference to Hathor, Lady of Dendera, in the king’s cartouche. The Pharaoh established a chapel at Gebelein for this female deity, and he later erected one for her at Dendera. On the rear wall at Dendera is the same smiting scene, and Mentuhotep II is designated as a ‘‘Horus who subdues the hill/foreign countries.’’ Thebes has now become the center of Upper and Lower Egypt.
Mentuhotep built his chapel at Dendera in which his might over the foreigner is reflected in scenes and small accompanying texts (O’Connor 1999). One key image has the monarch in the common pose of smiting enemies by holding an insignia of a unified Egypt. The accompanying hieroglyphs cite his military successes. Yet another text states that Wawat had to supply physical labor for the Thebans (Allen 1921; Goedicke 1960). Contemporary data relating to ‘‘Victorious Thebes’’ also reinforce this aspect (Aufrere 2001; Helck 1968: 119-26). This concept, which can be found as early as the reign of Antef II, grew out of the lengthy internecine warfare (Franke 1990: 124-7). The Abisko rock inscriptions note that the citizens of Thebes chanted to celebrate victory with a fervor that is remarkable (Darnell 2003; 2004).
The Egyptian word ‘‘youths’’ (ankhu) referred to soldiers; this common Middle Kingdom technical term word, also translated into English as ‘‘living one,’’ indicated a ‘‘warrior’’ (Berlev 1967; 1971). The term referred to the forcefulness, virility, vivacity, and courage of the young soldier. Composite ankhu titles designated warriors of a town, a nome, or the simple infantry. These men were subalterns of an atju, their military superior. The latter group was composed of superiors (‘‘great ones’’) as well as other officers One Koptite stela presents an atju who was chief of police, leading patrols on land or on water and directing hunters in the west and the east. Records refer to atjus in both Theban and Herakelopolian domains.
These military chiefs were the predecessors of the officials of the next unified era, the New Kingdom (Chevereau 1987; 1989; 1991; 1992; Stefanovic 2006). Known are atju of the Nubians, of the guard, of the House (of the king), of the necropolis, of the oasis, and of ships. Military men at the Nubian fortresses were either atju or simple ankhu, while others were connected to a city such as Nekhen or Qaw el-Kebir/Tjebu in nomes III and X of Upper Egypt. Khusobek, who was a ‘‘great atju of the city’’ before he was promoted to ‘‘atju of the king’s table,’’ presents a cursus honorum of Middle Kingdom warriors (Baines 1987; Goedicke 1998a). The ‘‘atju of the king’s table’’ were the officers of the fleet of Pharaoh, and this title was often associated with the true infantry soldiers.
The southern borders were carefully scrutinized so as to allow entry only to those who had the right; transgressors were arrested. One of the regular patrols was led by the well-known Khusobek. Under Senwosret III he had advanced his career and became an officer of the royal guards. After this, he received the rank of ‘‘Great Tutor of the Town Garrison.’’ When heard from again in the 9 th Year ofAmenemhet III, Khusobek was already the ‘‘tutor of the naval team of the commander/ruler.’’
During the Middle Kingdom the practice continued of drawing members of each unit from a particular area. Many soldiers retained their ties to their ‘‘home base.’’ A powerful family-based nomarch could still lead his own troops. From the mid Twelfth Dynasty on the overlapping of military and administrative functions gradually began to resolve. In the Koptos Decree of Antef, dated to the Seventeenth Dynasty, the key governmental roles were divided between a commandant of the local troops and a governor who handled the non-military activities (Breasted 1906: I 339-41). Although this edict is post Middle Kingdom, locally based generals were earlier known at Kusae, This, and Koptos. Infantry in the Nubian fortresses included soldiers from Elephantine, Thebes, and other Upper Egyptian regions. Indeed, Khusobek fought in Nubia against the kingdom of Kush beside his city regiment.
The military commander of a naval team acted as tutor or guardian to the ‘‘youths,’’ and naval terminology was applied to other activities: an apiru or ‘‘crew’’ worked on the pyramids; their word for their phylae, zau, derived from a noun meaning ‘‘board,’’ as in ‘‘wooden board,’’ and may have referred to their positions on board ship; and agricultural workers of the period were organized into izut, ‘‘naval teams’’ or ‘‘crews.’’ Finally, a division of the youths would comprise
One thousand young males led by an atju (Berlev 1967). Those who attended the military schools and excelled at the most difficult service in the fleet would become officers.
In the civil fleet the ‘‘Commander of the Ships’’ stood over the ‘‘Tutors of the Naval Teams,’’ but in the military fleet the captains of the ships obeyed the king’s commands communicated directly by the vizier. For this reason they were the elite sector of the military. According to an inscription dated to the reign of Senwosret I Hammamat was a geographic center for a fleet. An even larger one ought to have been stationed at the royal residence in the north.
The royal flotilla was the ‘‘royal army.’’ Stationed among this elite sector were foot-soldiers, now organized into teams that formed the basis of squadrons. Together, the latter were called ‘‘battleship teams’’ (izut). Infantry officers were usually battle-experienced veterans. Within the naval ranks, especially at the beginning of the Thirteenth Dynasty, the officers were royal princes or relatives of the royal family. Evidence from Seventeenth Dynasty confirms the situation (Juridical Stela: Lacau 1933; Ryholt 1997: 159-60, 261, 289).
Military organization in the Middle Kingdom achieved only the colonization of the part of Nubia that was close to the river, a minor influence on the kingdom of Kush, and perhaps the control of a few Levantine ports. Egyptian military activity in Asia was limited. Notwithstanding the evidence of warfare from the so-called ‘‘Annals’’ of Amenemhet II, the Khusobek stela (with the attack upon Sekmem), the Execration Texts, literary compositions such as Sinuhe, archaeological data, and unpublished details, the conquest of Canaan would have been impossible. The Middle Kingdom army was amphibian; that of the New Kingdom would be land-based.