This war for control of Sicily resulted in a military stalemate.
Date: 481-480 b. c.e.
Category: Wars and battles Locale: Western Mediterranean region
Summary It was in Carthage’s national interest to protect Sicily, Sardinia, and its Greek Sicilian allies in order to secure and expand its commercial trading empire and, perhaps more important, to control the route to Spain and its rich mineral resources. However, the development of a very virulent form of Greek nationalism in Greek Asia and in Sicily became an extreme threat to the strategic realization of those interests. In 514 b. c.e., the Spartan prince Dorieus, a Greek nationalist, set out to colonize Carthage’s Tripolitania province aided by Cynrenaica’s Greeks. However, Dorieus and his allies were ejected from Tripolitania, only to return a few years later to colonize a Carthaginian region in western Sicily. Carthage and its Greek Sicilian allies reacted very quickly, and Dorieus and his military cohort were killed in a minor battle. Later, Dorieus would be viewed as a martyr by all Greek nationalists in Sicily led by the emerging Siceliot tyrants.
In this context, the Carthaginian-Syracusan War had its historical origins in the rise of the Greek Siceliot tyrants, whose central objective was to push Carthage out of Sicily and Sardinia. Beginning in 498 b. c.e., Hippocrates of Gela (d. 491 b. c.e.), one of the first Siceliot tyrants, spent eight years looting and subjugating Greek colonies in northeastern Sicily and threatening Carthage. The uneasy political existence between the Greek Siceliot tyrants and Carthage centered on their joint occupation of Sicily and Carthage’s intent to protect its security and economic interests.
In 491 b. c.e., Hippocrates died and was succeeded by one of his captains, Gelon (d. 478 b. c.e.). A supporter of the patriotic war ideology, Gelon quickly declared war against Carthage and its main allies in the western Sicily region. His central goal was to terminate Carthage’s influ-
The Battle of Himera. (F. R. Niglutsch)
Ence in the Gulf of Gabes and, if possible, eject Carthage from Sicily (and Sardinia) altogether. Gelon and his allies were largely unsuccessful because of inadequate military resources and Carthaginian resistance. However, in 485 b. c.e., the displaced aristocracy of the city-state Syracuse asked Gelon to restore it to royal power. Instead, Gelon quickly occupied Syracuse, eliminated all internal threats, and ruthlessly transformed it into the most powerful state in Greek Sicily.
Meanwhile, Carthage grew concerned with Gelon and his allies and worried that their military machinations in western Sicily were becoming increasingly dangerous. In 480 b. c.e., the sudden displacement of an important Greek Sicilian ally, Terillos of Himera, from his city-state convinced Carthage to invade western Sicily with large army and naval forces. Led by Hamilcar (d. 480 b. c.e.) the Magonid, Carthage anticipated very strong military resistance from Gelon and his Greek Sicilian allies to the restoration to power of Terillos in Himera. Before the battle, Hamilcar of Carthage had an army of about 30,000 foot soldiers and a strong cavalry force, and Gelon of Syracuse had an army of no more than 24,000 foot soldiers and 2,000 horses.
The Battle of Himera (480 b. c.e.) was decided by good intelligence rather than by a regular military battle. The historical record indicates that Gelon intercepted a Carthaginian communication indicating precisely where Hamilcar the Magonid would be on the day of the battle and had his cavalry forces kill Hamilcar. Gelon also set ablaze Carthage’s naval squadron. The Carthaginian army and its allies were disoriented by the death of their commander and dissolved as a serious fighting unit when attacked by Gelon’s forces.
Significance Carthage sued for peace in the aftermath of the Battle of Himera. Because Gelon was not in a political position to exploit the defeat, he settled for a large silver payment as tribute. Carthage, deeply shaken by the defeat, turned inward and began the subjugation of African territories.
Further Reading
Caven, Brian. The Punic Wars. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980. Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Punic Wars. London: Cassell, 2000. Warmington, B. H. Carthage. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
Michael J. Siler
See also: Gelon of Syracuse; Syracuse.
World History
