In the mid-twelfth century bc, Assyria was clearly experiencing difficulties. The infiltrations of the Ahlamu/Arameans across the Euphrates were threatening Assyrian control in Upper Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, the last repercussions of the Phrygian invasions in Anatolia had come close to the Upper Tigris, taking some territories (Alzi and Purulumzi) from the Assyrians. At the same time, the expansion of Elam in the Zagros foothills had reached the Lower Zab. Assyria therefore found itself significantly reduced in size, roughly extending from Arbela to Nasibina. However, Assyrian kings continued to claim their supremacy over the area extending from Upper Mesopotamia to the Euphrates.
A certain degree of stability was reached under Ashur-resh-ishi. The king managed to strengthen Nineveh and other key cities, such as Arbela, along the Zagros border, and Apqu, in Upper Mesopotamia. In terms of expeditions, Ashur-resh-ishi tried to push away the Aramean infiltrations along the Euphrates, from Carchemish to Suhu. He also fought against the Babylonians over certain territories along the Euphrates and the Tigris. In the battles at Zanqu and Idu, the Babylonians had to retreat, severely hindering the ambitious plans of Nebuchadnezzar I. The military endeavours of the king of Isin and his removal of the Elamites from foreign affairs had actually benefitted Assyria. This situation allowed the Assyrians to take over the areas left vacant by Elam.
The long reign (almost forty years) of Tiglath-pileser I continued and expanded the ambitions of the Assyrians with a much higher drive and rate of success (Figure 27.2). The king led Assyria through one of its most successful phases, similar to the one under Tukulti-Ninurta I (one and a half centuries earlier) or Ashurnasirpal II (two and a half centuries later). Unfortunately, being between two phases of crisis, the
Figure 21.2 Above: The apogee of the Middle Elamite period, ca. 1150—1120 bc; Below: The apogee of the Second Dynasty of Isin, ca. 1120—1105 bc, and Assyria during the reign of Tiglath-pileser I, ca. 1115—1075 bc.
Reign of Tiglath-pileser I appears as a brief success. Nonetheless, his reign is a good indication of the ease through which an energetic political leadership could guide a still intact state (such as Assyria) to great success, even in a phase of international instability. Five years of Tiglath-pileser’s military expeditions are documented in his annals. In the thirteenth century bc, Assyrian royal inscriptions had already begun to be much more narrative. From Tiglath-pileser’s annals, however, these texts began to be organised by year, becoming much more articulated and detailed historical sources.
There were two trends in the military efforts of Tiglath-pileser I. Firstly, there was an obscure and continuous military effort in the mountains. The latter stood dangerously close to the Assyrian countryside. This effort was essential for the survival of the state and the Assyrian access to raw materials, but brought little glory and many difficulties. Secondly, there were far more visible and rewarding efforts on an ideological level, but also less crucial. These efforts were mainly aimed at two coveted and distant destinations, namely, Babylonia in the south, and the Mediterranean in the west. Both destinations were ‘liminal’, the first one being a more political conquest, and the other a cosmic one.
The mountains extending from the Upper Tigris to the Upper Zab presented the same problems as the ones attested for the reigns of Shalmaneser I and Tukulti-Ninurta I. However, these problems were now further complicated by the military pressures of the Phrygians (the ‘Mushki’ in Assyrian) in the area and the rise of confederations of mountain tribes. Tiglath-pileser defeated the Mushki and re-conquered Alzi and Purulumzi. This victory constituted a crucial moment in the Assyrian expansion, so much so that the annals provide a topographic description of it. The first campaign was fought against Katmuhi (a state located on the Tigris close to the Assyrian border). This choice indicates the precarious state of Assyrian control at that time, even in the areas surrounding its heartland. The second campaign was fought against the land of Paphi, north of the Upper Tigris. The third campaign affected the Nairi lands, in the Armenian plateau, near Lake Van. The Assyrian king only imposed an annual tribute there, including bronze cauldrons and horses. The local political organisation remained intact, with a network of small local kings (whose names are mainly Hurrian, such as Kili-Teshub and Shadi-Teshub), who were part oflarger political entities (the largest one being Nairi). The latter probably developed as a response to an emerging sense of tribal and linguistic ‘nationalism’.
In the fourth year, the king began to focus his attention to the west and as far as the Mediterranean. However, the Aramean tribes constituted the first obstacle in this direction. These tribes now ruled in the Middle Euphrates, the Khabur Valley, and throughout Upper Mesopotamia. The (largely ideological) ambition of the Assyrian king was to push them back to the west of the Euphrates, the ideological boundary of the empire, towards Palmyra and Jebel Bishri, where they came from. The policy implemented, and maybe the only one possible, was that of ensuring communication among the Assyrian administrative centres. This allowed the interception and identification of tribal groups whenever possible, although their mobility made their subjugation or definitive destruction difficult to achieve.
Having somehow overcome the issue of the safety of the routes allowing communication between Assyria and the Euphrates, the remaining issue was the crossing of the river. This problem was not only technical, but also political. It marked the exit of the Assyrian army from the empire’s territories and the entrance into someone else’s territory, such as the one still defined as ‘Hatti’, even though the rival empire had long ceased to exist. The Assyrian king claims that he had imposed an annual ‘tax’ (paid in timber) on the king of Carchemish Ini-Teshub (II). It is clear, however, that it was a peaceful commercial agreement, even though the presence of the Assyrian army constituted an element of constant pressure. The third step was reaching the Mediterranean, which happened in Arwad. There, the Assyrian king received the ‘tributes’ of the other Phoenician cities, and ventured into an exciting trip by sea, reaching Sumura.
The Babylonian campaign took place in the final phase of his reign and was preceded by the usual fights east of the Tigris, in the area between the Lower Zab and the Diyala. The balance of power had visibly changed from the time of Nebuchadnezzar. The Assyrians were now able to reach the Diyala and then cross the Tigris, moving towards Babylonia itself. The northern Babylonian cities (Dur-Kurigalzu, Opis, Sippar) were conquered. The same fate befell the capital, but the episode did not have any important
Political consequences. The Assyrian king retreated, being content with his increased prestige and fully aware of his inability to consolidate control in Babylonia both militarily and politically.
The ideology lurking behind the military endeavours of Tiglath-pileser I was emphasised in his own inscriptions and expressed in several ways (Text 27.1). Firstly, there were the steles left (or carved on rocks) at the edge of the world, for instance, at the source of the Tigris. Then, there was the hunting of wild animals (lions, elephants, and buffalos) in the marshes of the Euphrates, or the capture of dolphins and narwhals in the Mediterranean. Symbolically, a hunt was meant to express the king’s ability to dominate the wild forces of nature. However, another significant aspect was the king’s ability to capture these animals and bring them to the heart of Assyria. The animals would then be left in ‘parks’ full of vegetation and with
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