Plato’s Political Rhetoric

In several passages of the Gorgias, Plato speaks of a rhetoric that is better than the flattering rhetoric taught by Gorgias and practiced by Callicles and Athens’ leaders.

Called ‘true rhetoric’ (517a) or the discourse of ‘the expert and virtuous rhetor’ (504d), this rhetoric does not flatter, but instructs. It is imagined that if it could flow without obstruction from the beneficent, authoritative political expert to the citizens who need it and would heed it, they would prosper. Rhetoric of this kind has not been realized and is unlikely ever to be realized in democratic Athens, but it is an essential part of Plato’s political theory.

In one sense it is precisely Socrates’ own discourse that represents the true political rhetoric proposed in the Gorgias. This is evident from Socrates’ comment on the pastry cook’s imagined prosecution of a physician before a jury of children (521d): ‘I think that I am one of very few Athenians’, says Socrates, ‘not to say the only one, engaged in the true political techne:, and that of the men of today I alone practice statesmanship. When I speak on any occasion it is not with a view to winning favor, but I aim at what is best, not what is most pleasant’. Likewise in the Apology, Socrates distinguishes between the deceptive, false plea ofhis prosecutors, which is intended to secure a conviction only to advance their own interests, and his own frank plea, which aims at the truth, justice, and the advancement of the interests of the Athenian audience (17a-18a). Socrates claims that his discourse in court is the same as that which he uses to converse privately with fellow citizens outside the political institutions (18a). Admonishing his interlocutors, in court and elsewhere, to value their souls above physical, worldly goods, Socrates claims to benefit his fellow citizens by means of the method and the message of his discourse (29d-31c, 36c-37a). But this is a unique kind of political discourse and is properly distinguished from rhetoric. Socrates is forced out of Athens’ political institutions because when uttered in the competitive democratic institutions, his frank discourse would be at best inconsequential and at worst dangerous to himself and his friends (31c-32e). Thus is the philosopher in a democracy silenced and left to pursue philosophy in private and without political effect (Gorgias 522a, Republic 496c-e).

An argument from the Statesman indicates why Plato developed a structural role for rhetoric as a tool of philosophy. Plato acknowledges that rhetoric possesses a certain utility with regard to persuasion, and on that basis he grants rhetoric a limited and dependent claim to the status of techne (303e-304e). The limit is set by philosophy: rhetoric is turned into a tool to be used for the advancement of the social and political ends that are determined strictly by philosophy. In this respect rhetoric becomes precisely parallel to the other tools that are at the disposal of the benevolent, philosophically enlightened ruler, such as mythological tales, civic cult, noble lies, and, when appropriate, the use of force. Plato’s efforts to develop a form of rhetoric that would serve proper political ends become evident in his two large-scale attempts - the Republic and the Laws - to imagine political communities under the control of philosophy. In both dialogues the purpose of the state is to enhance knowledge and virtue among the citizens individually and the community as a whole; all are benefited by philosophical rule (Republic 590c-d). The rhetorical issue that arises is indistinguishable from the issue of mass political education, namely, how can philosophical knowledge and the willingness to accept philosophical guidance be transmitted from ruling philosopher to the citizens at large.

Two rhetorical innovations are evident in the Republic. The first concerns a unique rhetorical situation prior to and necessary for the creation of the just polis. As part of Socrates’ demonstration of the feasibility of this polis (473b-502c), he considers the problem of finding people who would be willing to entrust themselves to philosophical rule. These people will become the initial population of the polis and only after they have signed on, so to speak, will they and especially their children become subject to the educational measures of the just polis (501a, 540e-541a). Socrates imagines addressing this audience, and though he does not present a full speech, he outlines what such a speech would contain if it were to persuade these people to join the nascent state and acquiesce in philosophical rule for their own good (499d-502a). The rhetorical task resembles Socrates’ task in the Apology, namely, to defend the authority and utility of philosophy against long-standing misconceptions and current slander before an unsympathetic, autonomous audience. But the speech sketched in the Republic contains nothing like the blunt, unsettling challenge to convention presented by Socrates in the Apology Of course, Socrates failed to persuade the Athenian jury, though he did not regret that fact. In the Republic, Plato wants the speech to succeed because it is necessary for establishing the feasibility of the just polis. The speech sketched in the Republic steers clear of flattery, but it consists entirely of conventional attempts to soften, persuade, cajole, and convince. It must be conventional: the people to whom it is addressed are themselves conventional and as yet untouched by philosophical education.

The second and very different rhetorical innovation of the Republic is evident in the early education of the guardians, out of whom will emerge the ruling philosophers. The philosophers rule by virtue of their expertise in the political techne, and that expertise, the product of natural talent and long, arduous training, entails an incorruptible character. Political power is to be concentrated in the hands of the philosophers, yet it is to be safe in the hands of the philosophers. The childhood education of the guardians is designed to give their character the decisive imprint it will bear throughout their lives, namely, utter confidence in the goodness of the gods and the order of the cosmos, in the value of justice and the other virtues, and in the priority of the polis over the wants and interests of individuals. As made evident in the Gorgias, such beliefs depart from the norms of Athenian culture, which were shaped by Homer, tragic poetry, and the conventional pursuits of glory, wealth, and power.

Plato’s idea is, first, to insulate the young future guardians from Homer and the other traditional sources of Greek childhood education, thus eliminating any exposure to the baleful, corrupting ideas; this is Plato’s famous censorship of the poets. But equally important is the complementary step, less often remarked, of inundating the young guardians with messages and media that inculcate the values that are to shape their character for the rest of their lives. This is a massive rhetorical endeavor in which Plato recognizes, and seeks to control, a vast range of influences on his captive audience (376c-402c): not only the staples of childhood education such as mythological tales and narrative and dramatic poetry, but also particular rhythms, songs, and diction, and even household furnishings and objects. Plato aims to shape every possible facet of the young guardians’ environment in order to influence their propensity for adopting philosophical values.4 The Republic’s famous ‘noble lie’ (414c-415d) is likewise an example of rhetoric in the service of social education under the guidance of philosophy. According to the noble lie, the citizens of the polis are all children of their mother, the earth, but their status in the polis is determined by the metal which god has implanted in them, gold, silver, bronze, or iron, corresponding to the rulers, the auxiliary guardians, and the lower classes. The noble lie reflects the true capabilities of the respective portions of the population; it is not a lie with respect to its underlying content. It is a lie with respect to its mythological form, and it is precisely that form which Socrates expects will help to convince the citizens, especially the lower classes, to accept their position in the polis by tying that position to divine necessity.

In the Laws, the philosopher produces a comprehensive law code that permanently enshrines his political wisdom and is intended to shape the populace into a just society. As the vehicle for communication between the political expert and the citizenry at large, law becomes a tool of mass education, and Plato undertakes two rhetorical innovations focused on the law. First, he utilizes the language of the law as an instrument of mass communication. The laws’ directives are clear, comprehensive, and readily applicable to the lives of the citizens. Punishments are clearly specified and carefully calibrated to indicate the degree of culpability and the relative importance of the various crimes and offenses. Yet Plato also wants the citizens, who are to aspire to nobility and freedom, to obey the law willingly because they understand it rather than comply meekly out of fear of punishment. Hence, the Laws’ second rhetorical innovation: the lawgiver is a master rhetorician who composes preambles to the law code as a whole and to individual laws within the law code.5

The preambles are brief deliberative speeches, designed, as Plato says, to add persuasion to the compulsion contained in the law proper (718b-723d). The preambles manifest a variety of rhetorical strategies: some explain the purpose of the law; some offer high-minded reasons for obeying the law; others simply exhort the citizens to obey in the name of a lofty purpose. They are all composed in a grand style that in itself suggests authority and inspires obedience. Yet in accord with Plato’s political-philosophical principles, the lawgiver has a monopoly on rhetoric in the polis of the Laws. To prevent the kind of abuse that in Plato’s view regularly takes place in Athenian courts, Plato outlaws schools of rhetoric, the learning of rhetoric by ordinary citizens, and the use of rhetoric by litigants pleading their cases in court (937d-938c). The justification is the same as the view Socrates expressed in the opening of his plea in the Apology: popular courts can deliver justice and enforce the laws properly if litigants are prevented from using rhetoric and compelled to declare their arguments openly.