This is a typical example of a treaty of the period, both in terms of its structure (reciprocity expressed through repetitions) and its subject matter (the capture and return of fugitives).
‘Tablet of the treaty, when Pilliya and Idrimi swore divine oaths and sealed this treaty. They will return fugitives to each other: Idrimi will seize the fugitives of Pilliya and will return them to Pilliya; Pilliya will seize the fugitives of Idrimi and will return them to Idrimi. Whoever will capture a fugitive, he will return him to his master: if it is a man, (the master) will pay 500 shekels of copper as a ransom, if it is a woman, he will pay 1000 shekels of copper as a ransom. If a fugitive of Pilliya enters the land of Idrimi, and nobody seizes him, but his master seizes him, he shall not pay a ransom to anyone. And if a fugitive of Idrimi enters the land of Pilliya, and nobody seizes him, but his master seizes him, he shall not pay a ransom to anyone. In whichever town they are hiding a fugitive, the town leader and 5 notables will swear divine oaths. The day in which Barattarna will have sworn divine oaths with Idrimi, from that day on the extradition of fugitives will begin. He who will violate the instructions of this tablet, may Teshub, Shumegi, Ishhara (and) all the gods destroy him!’
Statements expressing reciprocity and equality clearly represent the nature of political relations of the time. These can be found in letters with greeting formulas written following the diplomatic etiquette of the time, in formal treaties, featuring a meticulous attention to reciprocity, and in calculations of the value of gifts given and received. In the case of the latter, ideals of generosity, expressed through counter-gifts of higher value, were in marked contrast with the attention great kings paid to maintaining the economic stability of their kingdoms. This issue might have been indelicate to express, but it was nonetheless important.
Even ‘vertical’ relations were based on specific shared ideas. They followed a precise protocol based on inequality, rather than reciprocity, as was more fitting in the case of relations between a ‘servant’ and his ‘master’, rather than between ‘brothers’. The dependence of the small king on his master was based on ‘loyalty’ (kittu, a term that in the Old Babylonian period was used to indicate ‘justice’). The small king was completely devoted to the great king and tried to serve him in every possible way, with all his heart and without reservations or ambiguities. Everything, from his own person to his wealth and any information at his disposal, had to be offered to his great king. A small king had no way of being released from his obligations, since he could not leave his rank among the other kings and regain his freedom of action. Therefore, his secondary role was based on a forceful play of powers. His only alternative was to betray his master to join another neighbouring master. Similarly, paying tributes to a great king did not constitute an inconvenience, but a necessary choice.
In order to consolidate the fundamental nature of Late Bronze Age political relations as based on exchange, the loyalty and tributes provided by the small kings had to be returned in some way by the great kings. Therefore, great kings guaranteed ‘protection’ (the verb nasaru), namely, the preservation of the small kings’ kingdoms against internal or external attacks. As long they remained loyal, small kings could demand to be allowed to continue their rule and to choose their successors. Another term dramatically used to express this ‘vertical’ interaction was ‘life’ (balatu), since the great king made his loyal small king ‘live’. Politically, the great king made him live because he allowed him to rule over his kingdom. Physically, the great king protected him. A rebellion or a betrayal, such as an attempt to change master, was punished with the small king’s removal from his throne or even his death.
The network of relations based on loyalty and protection ensured a considerable local stability for the great powers of the Near East, while the network of ‘brothers’ provided stability for the system as a whole. This stability was also the result of a vast number of breaches of this system of interactions, from internal betrayals and removals of kings from their seat, to the many inter-regional wars. However, these glitches never managed to damage the basic structure of the system. This period therefore becomes a concrete expression of the remarkable proximity between brotherhood and hostility.
Peaceful and normal diplomatic and commercial relations were characterised by a high degree of conflict. Marriage negotiations and commercial calculations seem to have constantly brought relations to the brink of breakdown, although this was often more due to the kings’ behaviour than to specific issues. None of the kings wanted to appear too complacent or too submissive. After all, these were not the characteristics of a great ruler. Consequently, negotiations were deliberately protracted in time. This came at the expense of messengers and ambassadors, due to the established practice of keeping them in one’s court as a sign of dissatisfaction. The exchange of letters, gifts and women kept political relations alive, especially when they were in process, rather than when they terminated. For this reason, negotiations took a long time and, as soon as they were completed, new ones followed.
Even wars did not require the basic rules of interaction to be removed, but simply new ones to be implemented. Wars were heroic acts, but also ordeals to ascertain who was right. They therefore required a continuation of diplomatic relations (though with a different meaning than the one envisioned by Carl von Clausewitz) through other means. Heroism and ordeals both required kings to follow the rules of equality, without those deceits and ambushes employed by barbarians. Only mountain or desert nomads attacked unannounced, suddenly and at night, or behind someone’s back, when an enemy was not ready. Among civilised kings, wars were declared, explaining the ethical and legal causes emphasising that the challenger was right and the enemy a traitor.
Wars were waged through the deployment of armed forces at the time and place agreed upon, with a precise division between who had to attack and who had to defend himself. If the outcome of the battle showed who was right, the defeated enemies, at least the ones belonging to the military aristocracy, could be freed after paying a ransom. The enemies were respected if they had fought correctly and bravely, or despised if they acted in cowardly manner, without following the established rules. Everyone was seen as belonging to the same civilisation and to the same social stratum. Enemies were not barbarians or invaders, but warriors able to win a war through the support of their respective gods. Contempt for inferior peoples was directed towards nomads and mountain people, the latter of whom were considered outside of this civilisation due to their refusal to accept the political hierarchy and rules governing the Near East, and their compensation for their inferiority through deceit.
World History
