Among the artful modes of persuasion, Aristotle lists persuasion through character. He introduces it in Rhetoric 1.2, where is it is presented in terms of uprightness. Aristotle is careful to say that he is not concerned with preexisting reputation. Rather, the orator, through what he says, is to present himself as an upright person who is worthy of trust (1356a2-13). In Rhetoric 2.1, Aristotle returns to persuasion through character and explains it in terms of practical wisdom, virtue and goodwill. The credible speaker is said to be one who is believed to have all three of these attributes. For the orator who lacks anyone of these attributes is likely to give bad advice (1378a6-16). At first reading, Aristotle seems simply to have expanded his account of persuasion through character. When he introduces this mode of persuasion in 1.2, he is content to mention a single attribute, but later in 2.1 he gives a fuller account, in which uprightness is represented by virtue and two additional attributes are listed: practical wisdom and goodwill. Together the three attributes make the speaker credible and that is important, for there are occasions when opposing arguments are or seem to be equally strong, so that the listener has little choice but to consider the speakers and to decide in favor of the speaker who appears wise, virtuous and full of goodwill.
There is, however, a difference in orientation between 1.2 and 2.1. In 1.2 Aristotle is focused on judicial oratory and therefore mentions uprightness, i. e., moral goodness, which carries special weight in courtroom cases. We may compare the discussion of non-artful proofs in 1.15, where Aristotle calls attention to testimony concerning character. This testimony may relate to the speaker and serve to establish his uprightness, or it may relate to the adversary with a view to his baseness (1376a23-29). It is taken in advance of the courtroom proceeding, and if needed, it is read out by a clerk of the court. That is not true of persuasion through character, but it does not rule out comparison with persuasion through character as presented in 1.2. In both passages, 1.15 and 1.2, Aristotle is focused on judicial oratory and the persuasive power of upright character.
The persuasiveness of good character is strongly emphasized by the assertion ‘character has almost, so to speak, the greatest authority in winning belief’ (1356a13). Aristotle is not denying the primary importance of arguing the issue - note the qualifying words ‘almost, so to speak’. Rather, he recognizes that exhibitions of cleverness may be detrimental in a courtroom situation. For an obviously clever man is thought to be capable of planning and carrying out a crime. Hence, in discussing narration within judicial oratory, Aristotle advises us to reveal moral choice and to avoid speaking from thought, for the former manifests character and the latter practical wisdom. We should say, for example, ‘I wanted that and made a choice; and if I did not profit so much the better’ (3.16 1417a15-18, 23-27).
In addition, Aristotle’s strong endorsement of persuasion through character appears to be motivated at least in part by dissatisfaction with the writers of rhetorical handbooks. In 1.1 he attacks these writers for ignoring argument in favor of emotional appeal. They are said to pass over deliberative oratory and to write about speaking in the courts, where the arousal of emotions like pity and anger is thought to be especially effective. Aristotle does not want to deny the utility of emotional appeal in judicial oratory, but he does believe that the writers of handbooks have failed to recognize not only the importance of rational argument but also that of persuasion through character.
In 2.1 Aristotle discusses persuasion through character from a different point of view: namely that of deliberative oratory. He first lists three attributes - practical wisdom, virtue and goodwill - that are looked for in a credible speaker. Then he explains that when any one of these attributes is missing, men fail to offer sound advice. For men who lack wisdom err in their beliefs; men who lack virtue do not say what they think; and men who lack goodwill may fail to offer the advice that they know to be best (1378a6-14). It should be emphasized that there is no inconsistency here with what is said in 1.2. Uprightness has not been dropped. It is listed as ‘virtue’ (the adjective ‘upright’ actually occurs at 1378a12) and placed along side two other attributes that render a deliberative orator credible.
In joining the three attributes, Aristotle is not breaking new ground. He is simply giving formal recognition to what political orators had long known. We may compare Thucydides 2.60.5-6, where Pericles, at the end of the second year of the Peloponnesian War, is made to recommend perseverance. He is addressing the Athenian Assembly and presents himself not only as a man who is ‘inferior to no one in knowing and setting forth what needs to be done’ but also as ‘a friend of the city, and superior to money’. Here we have the Aristotelian triad with only slight modifications. Practical wisdom is divided into knowing what needs to be done and being able to present this knowledge in an intelligible manner. Goodwill becomes being a friend of the city, and virtue is narrowed to incorruptibility in regard to money. Thucydides even has Pericles anticipate Aristotle by commenting on the harmful effects of the opposite attributes. Being unable to present clearly what one knows inhibits counsel, being possessed by ill will toward the city diminishes the loyalty with which counsel is offered, and not being superior to money means that one can be bought.
The triad of attributes set forth in Rhetoric 2.1 reappears with little modification in Politics 5.9, where Aristotle lists the attributes that qualify a man for high office. Those who are going to hold authority, we are told, ought to be marked by 1) friendship toward the established political arrangement, 2) maximum capacity for the work of high office, and 3) the virtue and justice proper to the political arrangement (1309a33-37). The first of these attributes is equivalent to being a friend of the city (Pericles) and more generally possessing goodwill (Rhetoric 2.1). The qualifier ‘established’ is of some interest, for it underlines the fact that not all cities are arranged in the same way. Some have democratic constitutions, while others are oligarchies. The friendship of the person qualified to hold high office must be directed toward the city under its present arrangement, and the goodwill of the deliberative orator must be similarly directed (or at least appear to be so), if his words are going to be persuasive. The second attribute, maximum capacity for high office, is equivalent to possessing knowledge (Pericles) or practical wisdom (Rhetoric 2.1). Only in the Politics passage there is no mention of the ability to set forth policy (Pericles), perhaps because some high offices do not require speaking in public. The third attribute, virtue and justice, includes incorruptibility (Pericles) and corresponds neatly with the sort of virtue that Aristotle looks for in the deliberative orator (Rhetoric 2.1). Here the Politics is instructive, for Aristotle adds a reference to the political arrangement. What is just, he tells us, varies with the constitution, so that there are different kinds of justice (1309a37-39). The justice and more generally the virtue that are demanded of candidates for high office are not the same in every city. Aristotle does not have his eye on the virtue of the perfect man as discussed in his Ethics. Rather, he is concerned with the qualities that a given city-state values. Its citizens acquire these values through the moral education provided by the city-state, and they exercise them in administering political office. Similarly, the orator who is going to be persuasive in the deliberative Assembly must present a character that reflects the values of his audience. Addressing the citizens of a democratic city-state, the orator will present himself as someone who values freedom. Speaking before an oligarchic audience, he will show respect for wealth, and confronted by aristocrats, he will recognize the importance of education and tradition (cf. 1.8 1366a4-6).
Compared with the two other artful modes of persuasion, rhetorical argument and emotional appeal, persuasion through character is discussed with remarkable brevity. A possible explanation is that Aristotle is not breaking new ground when he discusses persuasion through character. Already in Homer we find anticipations of the Aristotelian triad. Nestor, for example, is presented as someone experienced in counsel, well intentioned, and courageous (Iliad 1.250-273, 9.94-104). We have already seen how Thucydides has Pericles lay claim to the triad, and if we consult the Rhetoric to Alexander we find the author recommending the same three attributes, when discussing the introduction of a deliberative speech (29 1436b22-26). Apparently persuasion through character and the triad of attributes cited by Aristotle had become part of the rhetorical tradition, so that brief remarks sufficed.
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