Plutarch wrote biographies of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Pyrrhus, both of whom spent most of their lives engaged in ultimately useless military adventures. Demetrius eventually fought his kingdom away before drinking himself to death, and Pyrrhus spent five years fighting in the West (see chap. 22) with nothing to show for it before getting himself killed in street fighting in Argos (see chap. 23). other Diadochi, however, such as Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus left off adventuring and settled down to the much harder and more worthwhile business of governing kingdoms, yet Plutarch evidently found this less congenial and declined to write their biographies. If Plutarch had written these works or if Hieronymus of Cardia were better attested for the period in question, more might be known of how these Diadochi administered their kingdoms. What is known of Lysimachus' kingdom gives at least some idea of what the successful Diadochi concentrated on doing.
For example, when Lysimachus died there were some 9,000 talents stored up in the treasury at Pergamum alone (Strab. XIII 4,1, p. 623). Two additional treasuries happen to be attested - in Sardis (Poly. IV 9,4) and Tirizis in Thrace (Strab. VII 6,1, p. 319) - and more probably existed. Unless the situation in Pergamum should be seriously misleading, during his long reign Lysimachus had paid careful attention to the financial affairs of his kingdom - and the money had piled up. Demetrius Poliorcetes found this distinctly unkingly, however, and scoffed that Lysimachus was just a "money-counter" (Plut. Demetr. 25) - which goes a long way towards explaining why Demetrius failed where Lysimachus succeeded. In the long term money-counting accomplished more than military campaigns.
All the same, Lysimachus' careful husbanding of his kingdom's financial resources may have had its drawbacks. According to one inscription (Burstein, Nr. 23 - a letter from, probably, Antiochus I) the city of Erythrae had been "exempt from payment of tribute under Alexander and Antigonus (i. e., Monophthalmus)" - but not apparently under Lysimachus. Even if Erythrae's exemption from "tribute" had been mostly formal (that is, Erythrae had had to pay something such as a syntaxis, just not a "tribute" per se - see chap. 19), the phrasing still implies that Lysimachus drew the financial reins more tightly than had his predecessors. When Demetrius Poliorcetes invaded Asia Minor in 287, many cities there joined his side with an alacrity which suggests strong dissatisfaction with Lysimachus' rule. After Demetrius had left and Lysimachus had regained control, Lysimachus exacted indemnities from those cities which had revolted - at least 25 talents from Miletus alone (IvonMilet 138). These exactions may account for why many of the cities in Asia Minor revolted again a few years later when Seleucus invaded in 281.
Whose Macedonian troops proved unwilling to fight against a Macedonian who had fought beside the great Alexander. Although Antigonus sent aid (Paus. I 10), Pyrrhus would not risk a battle, withdrew to Epirus, and ceded his half of Macedonia to Lysimachus (Plut. Pyrrh. 12). Pyrrhus, expelled from Macedonia, soon turned west for new adventures (see chap. 22). Lysimachus, meanwhile, became king of all Macedonia in addition to Thrace. He controlled all of Thessaly (Euseb. I 241 Schoene), excepting Demetrias, as well as the better part of Asia Minor west of the Taurus. However, he was an old man now and could no longer keep his house in order. He had his eldest son and logical successor, Agathocles, executed, allegedly owing to the intrigues of his young wife, Arsinoe (daughter of Ptolemy I Soter) who wanted to place her own young son upon the throne. Arsinoe was an ambitious and clever woman with a long career of courtly intrigue and imperial politics ahead of her (see chap. 23 for the next installment), and she may well have made short work of a hapless Agathocles. His many friends, however, resented what had happened, and the aged Lysima-chus resorted to additional executions to stifle their murmuring. His rule in Asia Minor, moreover, had never been popular (as Demetrius’ invasion had demonstrated), and some officials, such as Philhetaerus, the officer in charge of the treasury at Pergamum, were secretly sending out feelers to Seleucus (Just. XVII 1; Strab. XIII 4,1, p. 623; Paus. I 10) who now sensed that his time had come (Memnon, BNJ 424, Fr. 1.5.7).
In 281 Seleucus invaded. Some cities revolted from Lysimachus (Poly. VI 12), and Seleucus, meeting no resistance, marched to Sardis where the commandant of the citadel surrendered (Poly. IV 9,4). Lysimachus crossed the Hellespont to fight it out with Seleucus, and the two armies met at Cyrupedium, “the plain of (the River) Cyrus,” just to the north of Magnesia by Sipylus. Seleucus won, and Lysimachus fell (Just. XVII 2; App. Syr. 62 and 64; Euseb. I 234 Schoene). Seleucus then took possession of Lysimachus’ former dominions in Asia Minor. When Lysimachus’ widow, Arsinoe, attempted to hold Ephesus, the city revolted as Seleucus approached (Poly. VIII 57).
Some forty years after he had first become satrap of Babylon, Seleucus was now in a position to gather under his rule not just all Alexander’s Empire, but all the lands the Persians had ever held. He even compelled Armenia, a Persian satrapy that Alexander had never conquered, to recognize his overlordship (App. Syr. 55) and to pay tribute (Pol. VIII 25). He also sent one of his generals to conquer Cappadocia on the Pontus, a Persian satrapy which neither Alexander nor any other Diadochus had ever attempted to take; here, however, the Cappadocians under their king Mithridates defeated his army (Trogus, Prol. 17; Memnon, BNJ 424, Fr. 1.7.2). Seleucus himself crossed the Hellespont to take possession of Macedonia (App. Syr. 62), and no one, neither Pyrrhus nor Antigonus Gonatas, could realistically oppose him. The only other part of Alexander’s Empire which was not yet under his rule was Egypt, and Seleucus had plans for that land as well.
Ptolemy I Soter had died in early 282. A few years earlier he had disowned his eldest son, Ptolemy Ceraunus (“Thunderbolt”), in favor of a younger son, conventionally known as Ptolemy II Philadelphus (“Sibling-loving”), who did in the end ascend the throne of Egypt. Ptolemy Ceraunus had left Egypt and was now with Seleucus, who had promised him aid in regaining his paternal throne (Just. XVI 2,7-9; Memnon, BNJ 424, Fr. 1.8.2; App. Syr. 62). One may however doubt how sincerely Seleucus had meant that promise. After all, if Seleucus conquered Egypt, what would stop him from ruling Egypt himself? And it was doubtful that Ptolemy II Philadelphus alone would be able to withstand an invasion by Seleucus.
Seleucus had worked patiently and quietly for forty years. He had never striven obviously for complete dominion as Antigonus Monophthalmus had. He had never engaged in rash invasions (such as those of Demetrius Poliorcetes) nor had he waged war for the sake of small goals (for example, winning Hollow Syria back from Ptolemy I Soter). Only when large things were at stake was he willing to fight, and he did so with careful preparation. Now in 281 he stood at the threshold of the ultimate goal. Early in 280, however, Ptolemy Ceraunus, who had ambitions beyond being Seleucus’ tool, had Seleucus I Nicator (“victor”) assassinated (Memnon, BNJ 424, Fr. 1.8.3; App. l. c.; Just. XVII 2,4). Even if Seleucus died before he could reunite all Alexander’s Empire, he had still attained more than any other Diadochus.
At his death, his realm - with a few minor qualifications - was coextensive with that of Cyrus the Great. Out of all the wars of the Diadochi and out of Alexander’s expedition itself there had emerged, at long last, practically unaltered the old Persian Empire - under a new dynasty to be sure, but in many ways still the old Empire (see chap. 23). Unlike Ptolemy I Soter and Lysimachus, Seleucus had moreover kept his own house in order. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Antiochus I Soter (“savior”), whom he had made co-regent by the end of 292 (Parker-Dubberstein, p. 19) and put in charge of the Upper Satrapies (Plut. Demetr. 38; App. Syr. 59).
World History
