The great commander Gaius Marius in the campaign against the invading Gauls in 102 bc made his soldiers observe the enemy closely from the fortifications of the camp. ‘In this way he gradually accustomed them to seeing them [the enemy] without fear and to listening without terror to the amazing and animal-like noises that they made. He urged them to study their equipment and how they moved, so that eventually what had at first seemed terrible became familiar and obvious as they got used to the sight’.52 Sight and noise were the two most important factors in an ancient battle. Tacitus, in a comment that may owe something to the military experience of his father-in-law Agricola, famously noted that ‘in all battles defeat begins with the eyes’.53 Similarly, Julius Caesar found that his soldiers were being frightened by stories from traders and others about the size and skill of the German warriors, whose facial expressions and fierce gaze could not be endured in battle. He had to call a meeting to dispel the fears.54 As the Parthians advanced on the Romans at Carrhae in 53 bc they simultaneously in many different parts of the field beat on drums fitted with bronze bells, making an eerie and terrifying noise. ‘Apparently they have correctly noted that of all our senses the sense of hearing has the most disturbing effect on us, most quickly stirs our emotions, and most effectively destroys our judgement.’55 These anecdotes usefully portray the sights and sounds of the ancient battlefield and the importance of psychology in warfare.56
Fighting in the Roman army was a personal experience, involving face-to-face combat, in which men used muscular force and cutting weapons to inflict highly visible, bloody wounds. The throwing-spear (pilum) was the traditional weapon of the legionaries and had a long tapering iron head (about 60 mm long) with a pyramid-shaped, barbed point. This weapon was constructed so as to bend on impact with armour or flesh and bone, so that it could not be thrown back. Any shield in which it lodged would be unusable. Since its weight was concentrated behind its point, it had the strength to penetrate a shield or armour, and its long, tapering head was able to reach the body of the enemy soldier.57 At its maximum range of about 30m or 100 feet, its penetrating power will have been less.
After throwing their spears the legionaries came to close quarters using a two-edged sword, with a blade length of between 40 and 55cm, and a sharp, triangular point between 9.6 and 20cm long. This sword was designed for cutting and thrusting, in which the legionaries were trained, rather than for slashing. It is likely that the legionary crouched behind his shield with left foot forward, and then, while shoving his shield into the chest or face of his opponent, swivelled to thrust forward moving his weight on to his right foot.58 Although this amounted to single combat, the soldier needed to know that his comrades on his left and right were performing a similar manoeuvre to keep the enemy occupied. Therefore, this kind of fighting required a disciplined battle line. If a soldier killed his opponent, ideally he should push forward into his space in the battle line, which would begin the break-up of the enemy formation, or perhaps attack the enemy soldier on either side.
According to Vegetius, the space allowed for each legionary to fight in the battle line amounted to a frontage of 90cm, and a depth of 2m, including 30cm occupied by the man himself. This allowed him to draw back and throw his pilum without striking the man behind and also to stab and cut with his sword.59 The troops would also be close enough to their comrades in the battle line to feel confident of their support. Soldiers in a second rank behind the leading rank could throw their pila over the heads of those in front.
For protection, legionaries were equipped with a helmet made of iron with a deep neck guard and flaps to protect the cheeks. Developments in design later provided greater protection on the front and top of the helmet through the addition of a crossbar and a wider neck guard.60 From the midfirst century the soldier wore articulated plate armour (lorica segmentata) on a base of leather straps, which covered the chest, back and shoulders (weight c. 9kg) and allowed the arms and legs freedom of movement.61 There was added protection on the shoulders to guard against scything downward strokes and perhaps those deflected off the helmet. The most important piece of defensive equipment was a rectangular curving shield, about 125cm long by 60cm wide, made of wood and leather, often with an iron rim and an iron boss in the centre protecting the grip. The shield would normally have been held with a straight arm, was very effective for deflecting weapons, and was also comparatively light, weighing c. 7.5kg. It could be used in battle for long periods and also carried easily on the march.62
The equipment of auxiliary soldiers presumably at first reflected the differing fighting styles of the native peoples recruited into the army but later became more standardized. Infantrymen usually carried a flat shield, a stabbing sword and spears, and could fight in open order as skirmishers or in formation like the legions.63 Specialist troops such as archers would inflict penetrating and cutting injuries with their missiles, while the impact of a sling shot even on a head protected by a helmet could leave a man dazed or concussed.64
Tacitus cleverly explains the benefits of Roman arms and fighting styles in contrast to those of foreign peoples in the advice that he has Germanicus give to his troops before battle against the Germans in ad 16:
The natives’ huge shields and long spears are not so manageable among tree-trunks and scrub as Roman spears and swords and tight-fitting armour. You must strike repeated blows and aim your sword points at their faces. The Germans do not wear breastplates or helmets, and even their shields are not reinforced with iron or leather, but are merely plaited wickerwork or flimsy painted wooden sheets. The front rank alone has some kind of spear. The rest have nothing but clubs burnt at the end, or with short metal tips. Physically they look tough and are good for a short charge. But they cannot stand being wounded. They quit and run away unashamedly, ignoring their commanders.65
Despite the increased numbers and importance of the cavalry in the Roman army of the imperial period, we do not hear much about cavalry actions in battle. However, Arrian, who had commanded troops as governor of Cappadocia, describes cavalry-training exercises in a military textbook (Ars Tactica).66 This work helps us to see how, at least in theory, cavalrymen engaged in battle. The exercises were principally designed to test the accuracy of the soldiers in throwing:
Good horsemanship is especially needed to be able to throw at those who are charging in and at the same time to give one’s right hand side the protection of the shield. When riding parallel to his target, the rider must swivel himself to the right in order to throw. When making a complete about turn. . . he must turn right round as far as the tenderness of the sides allow, to face the horse’s tail, so as to throw backwards as straight as possible. . . and he must quickly turn forwards again and bring his shield to cover his back.67
Then Arrian describes more manoeuvres:
They advance first with spears levelled in defensive style, then as though they were overtaking a fleeing enemy. Others, as if against another enemy, as their horses turn, swing their shields over their heads to a position behind them and turn their spears as though meeting an enemy’s assault. . . . Also they draw their swords and make a variety of strokes, best calculated to overtake an enemy in flight, to kill a man already down, or to achieve any success by a quick movement from the flanks.68
Hadrian, addressing the first ala of Pannonians at Lambaesis in Africa, congratulated his troops: ‘You did everything in order. You filled the plain with your exercises, you threw your javelins with a certain degree of style, although you were using rather short and stiff javelins’.69
Cavalry is most effective as an attacking force. Heavy (armoured) cavalry has a shock effect, while light cavalry can try to wear the enemy down by harassment. Several formations of light cavalry were employed; cavalrymen were normally drawn up so that the lines were wider than they were deep. But a deep or sometimes a wedge formation could be used to break through the enemy line.70 Cavalry attacking infantry could hope to cause the line to break by the fearsome impression of their gallop, or they could throw spears, while horse archers used arrows shooting from horseback. Although it is difficult to make horses charge into an immovable line, if the cavalry got close enough they could slash with their swords at the heads and shoulders of the enemy, but would themselves be vulnerable to leg wounds. A battle with other cavalry would be different. Again it is unusual for two lines of cavalry to charge at full speed into each other since the impact could immobilize both sides; thus a cavalry battle would often result in a melee using swords and shields in a confined space. This is why cavalrymen had defensive armour, and helmets with deep neck guards and ear protectors designed to protect them from blows coming from different directions.71 Josephus describes one encounter between cavalry and infantry. A Jewish infantry force was attempting to storm the town of Ascalon, but was repulsed by a single Roman cavalry unit. The Jews were inexperienced and advanced in disorder, while the Romans presented orderly disciplined ranks that responded perfectly to their commander’s signal. The Jews were routed and fled across the plain, which was suited to cavalry manoeuvres. ‘The cavalry headed off and made the fugitives turn, smashed through the crowds huddled together in flight, slaughtering them in throngs, and, wherever groups of them fled, the Romans surrounded them and, galloping round them, easily shot them down with their javelins.’72
It is probable that from the second century ad the Romans began to use relatively heavily armoured cavalry, whose entire role was to intimidate the enemy by the expected shock of their charge. Under Trajan appears the First Ulpian thousand-man ala of lance-carriers (ala I Ulpia contariorum milliaria). This must have been equipped with a long lance (kontos), which was held in two hands along one side of the horse’s neck.73 In the reign of Hadrian an ala cataphracta first appeared in which both rider and horse may have been armoured. The value of armoured cavalry was probably in the visual shock of their slow and steady advance (it would be tiring for the horses to move at more than a trot) and their ability to wound from a distance with their long lances. However, there is only limited flexibility in the deployment of this kind of cavalry because horses and riders tire quickly, especially in a warm climate, if clad in heavy armour.
Battles fought with even the limited technology of the ancient world will have been noisy affairs. In battle both sides tried to sustain their own courage and to undermine the enemy’s by creating as much noise as possible. The Parthians as we have seen used drums,74 while some German tribes emitted a roaring battle cry called the baritus, which they amplified by holding their shields in front of their mouths.75 Roman commanders liked to make sure that fighting began with a rousing war cry, which was organized and taken up in unison as the enemy approached. This was important in the psychology of battle. Arrian’s final orders for battle against the Alani were: ‘When the troops have been drawn up like this there should be silence until the enemy come within weapon range. When they have come within range, everyone should utter a huge and ferocious war cry.’76 It seems that the normal Roman practice was to advance silently until the moment of charge, as Dio describes in the defeat of Boudicca. ‘The armies approached each other, the barbarians with much shouting mingled with menacing battle songs, but the Romans silently and in order until they came within a javelin throw of the enemy’.77
A trumpet or horn often gave the signal for hostilities, and in the thick of battle signals were best given by these instruments, which attracted the men’s attention to the standards.78 They also added to the din and could serve to disconcert the enemy. Battle began with the sound of spears being thrown and arrows and other missiles fired, and the noise of impact on armour or flesh and bone. Then came the clash of steel as the armies met with swords and shields, and the groans of the wounded and dying. New recruits were terrified by this din, according to the anonymous account of Caesar’s victory in the civil war in Spain. ‘So, when the uproar of groans mingled with the clang of swords fell on their ears, inexperienced soldiers were paralysed with terror.’79
For men in armour carrying shields, a prolonged infantry battle fought in southern Mediterranean lands will have been hot and dusty. In Rome’s campaigns against Parthia flies were sometimes a further hazard. Some battles went on all day, or were resumed the next day, as in the battle of the River Medway during the conquest of Britain.80 Yet it is reckoned that a man wielding weapons can fight effectively for about fifteen or twenty minutes before he needs a rest.81 In the second battle of Bedriacum, which dragged on into the night, soldiers apparently withdrew from the battle line and even sat down for a rest and carried on conversations with their opponents.82 Lulls in the battle were probably common and would allow wounded men to withdraw or be carried away, and fresh troops moved in.
Skilful generalship could make the best use of atmospheric conditions, so that the enemy had the sun in their eyes or showers of hail blowing into their faces. At the battle of Issus in 194 in the civil war between Septimius Severus and Pescennius Niger, Severus’ forces found a sudden thunderstorm at their back helped them overcome their opponents, who were directly facing it and who felt that even heaven was against them.83 In the second battle of Bedriacum in ad 69 the moon shone in the faces of the Vitellian soldiers, making them an easy target. At the same time, since it was behind the Flavians it exaggerated their shadows and made the enemy gunners shoot short.84 Elsewhere, the troops fighting under Caecina in Germany in ad 15 were caught in marshy conditions and suffered badly from cold and damp and their inability to get a firm grip; they could not throw their pila while standing in water.85
The inability of our sources to give a clear picture of battle in Roman times may in part reflect the fact that they were often confused, bloodthirsty melees, even though the actual fighting might be confined to relatively small numbers of the first ranks who could get to grips. Of course, those in the rear ranks would be moving forward and in a way pressing the combatants together. In Greek phalanx warfare, when one side eventually gave way it was difficult for the slow-moving phalanx to pursue the enemy rapidly while keeping its formation. By contrast, the commander of a Roman army could rapidly detach cohorts for independent work, and had at his disposal reserves, lightly armed troops and cavalry who could pursue defeated enemies ruthlessly. For example, at Mons Graupius, when the defeated British fled into woods, Agricola ordered his troops to ring them like hunters.
He ordered strong, lightly armed infantry cohorts to scour the woods like a cordon, and where they were thicker dismounted cavalry and where they were thinner mounted cavalry to do the same. But the Britons turned tail when they saw our troops resuming the pursuit in good order with steady ranks.86
Despite the difficulties in distinguishing fact from literary exaggeration and invention in ancient battle descriptions, in my view we must take account of what ancient writers had to say about entire sequences of combat.87 I am interested in what they thought were the crucial features of battle and how the Roman army operated. Therefore I have decided to set out the firsthand accounts of Josephus and Tacitus, describing respectively the Roman army in defeat at Jerusalem in ad 66 and in victory at Mons Graupius in ad 84 (Figure 3.3).
In AD 66, Cestius Gallus, the governor of Syria, marched against the Jewish rebels in Jerusalem, taking legion XII Fulminata and detachments from the other three legions in Syria, six auxiliary infantry cohorts and four cavalry alae, as well as soldiers supplied by friendly kings.88 But, unable to press home his attack, he decided to withdraw to Syria.
On the following day, by continuing with his retreat, Cestius encouraged the enemy to further opposition, and pressing closely round the rearguard they killed many men; they also advanced along both sides of the road and pelted the flanks with spears. The rearguard did not dare to turn to face the men who were wounding them from behind, since they thought that an immense throng was on their heels, and they did not try to repel those who were attacking them in the flanks since they themselves were heavily armed and were afraid to break up their ranks since they saw that the Jews were lightly equipped and ready for sudden incursions. Consequently, the
Romans suffered a lot of damage without being able to strike back against their enemies. For the entire journey, men were being hit, or dislodged from the ranks, and falling to the ground. After many had been killed, including Priscus, commander of the sixth legion, Longinus, a tribune, and a prefect of an ala called Aemilius Jucundus, with great difficulty the army reached Gabao, the site of their earlier camp, after abandoning much of their baggage. . . .To speed up the retreat he [Cestius] ordered the disposal of everything that hampered the army. They therefore killed the mules and asses and aH the draught animals except those that carried missiles and artillery pieces, which they kept because they needed them and also because they were afraid that the Jews might capture them and use them against themselves. Cestius then led the army towards Beth-horon. The Jews made fewer attacks on the open ground, but when the Romans were packed together in the narrow defile of the descending roadway some of the Jews got in front and prevented them from emerging, while others drove the rearguard down into the ravine, and the main body positioned above the narrowest part of the road pelted the column with missiles. In this position even the infantry had great difficulty in defending themselves, and the cavalry’s situation was even more dangerous and precarious, since under the bombardment of missiles they could not advance in order down the road, and it was impossible for horses to charge the enemy up the steep slope. On both sides there were cliffs and ravines down which they fell to their death. Since no one could discover a means of escape or of self-defence, they were reduced in their helplessness to lamentation and groans of despair, to which the Jews responded with war cries and yells of intermingled delight and rage. Indeed, Cestius and his entire army would almost certainly have been overwhelmed if night had not fallen, during which the Romans were able to escape to Beth-horon, while the Jews encircled them and watched for them to come out.
Cestius now gave up hope of continuing on the march openly and planned to run away. Having selected about four hundred of his most courageous soldiers, he stationed them on the roofs of houses with orders to shout out the watchwords of the camp sentries so that the Jews would think that the entire army was still there. He himself with the rest of the army advanced silently for three and a half miles. At dawn when the Jews saw that the Romans’ quarters were deserted, they charged the four hundred men who had deceived them, quickly killed them with their javelins, and then went after Cestius. He had got a considerable start on them during the night and after daybreak quickened the pace of his retreat with the result that in a terrified panic they abandoned their artillery and catapults and most of the other war engines, which the Jews then captured and then subsequently used against the men who had left them behind. . . .They [the Jews] had suffered only a few casualties, while the Romans and their allies had lost 5300 infantry, and 480 cavalry.
This is one of the best accounts of an ancient battle, from a man experienced in military affairs.89 Josephus carefully describes the different units in operation and the particular problems of the cavalry in this battle, as they struggle with the terrain and the lightly armed Jews. He explains the motivation and decisions of Gallus, noting where correct military procedures were followed (including even a classic stratagem to conceal a retreat) before complete panic set in. He also vividly evokes the combination of terrain, weaponry, noise and confusion, and produces a convincing psychological portrait of a battle where the legion was unable to use its skills to their best effect. He is meticulous in recording casualty figures and naming the senior officers killed.
In AD 84 Agricola aimed to lure the tribes of the Scottish Highlands to battle by threatening the populated, fertile areas bordering the Moray Firth, sometimes using sea-borne raids.90 The British gathered under the leadership of one Calgacus and took up position on higher ground with the first ranks on the plain and the rest rising in tiers up the slope of a hill. There were also war chariots on the plain. Agricola placed 8000 auxiliary infantry in the centre of his line, with 3000 cavalry guarding the flanks. The legions formed a line in front of the camp wall ready to intervene when required. He also had four cavalry alae in reserve for emergencies.
The battle began with an exchange of missiles, and the Britons displayed both valour and skill in parrying our soldiers’ javelins with their enormous swords or deflecting them with their little shields, while they themselves poured volleys on us. Then Agricola ordered the four cohorts of Batavians and the two of Tungrians to come to close quarters and fight it out at sword point. This was a well-practised manoeuvre for those veteran soldiers, but very difficult for the enemy, who were armed with their small shields and large swords. British swords lack a thrusting point, and are therefore unsuited to swordplay in fighting at close quarters. The Batavians began to rain blow after blow, shove with the bosses of their shields and stab at the faces of their enemies. They annihilated the soldiers on the plain and began to advance up the hill.
This provoked the rest of our units to smash in to their nearest opponents and massacre them. Many Britons were left behind half dead or even unwounded, because of the speed of our victorious advance. Meanwhile our cavalry squadrons, after the rout of the
Figure 3.3 Agricola’s battle formation at Mons Graupius
War chariots, now plunged right into the infantry battle. By their attack they brought new terror, but the closely packed enemy ranks and the uneven ground soon brought them to a halt. The battle now looked anything but a cavalry engagement, while our infantry struggling for a foothold on the slope was jostled by the flanks of the horses.91 And stray chariots, with their horses panic-stricken without a driver, often went plunging into the flanks or front.
The Britons who had taken up position on the hilltops had so far taken no part in the battle and, being unengaged, contemptuously noted the smallness of our numbers. They now began to descend slowly and surround the rear of our victorious troops. But Agricola had been concerned about precisely this move, and placed in the path of their advance the four alae of cavalry, which he was keeping back for emergencies. He therefore crushed and scattered them in a rout as severe as their assault had been spirited. So the tactics of the Britons were turned against themselves. The Roman cavalry squadrons, on the orders of the general, rode round from the front of the battle and fell on the enemy in the rear. Then followed an awe-inspiring and terrible spectacle over the open country. Our troops pursued, took prisoners and then killed them when more of the enemy appeared. Among the enemy each man now followed his own inclination. Some groups, though fully armed, fled before smaller numbers, while some men, though unarmed, charged forward and met their death. Weapons, bodies, and severed limbs were scattered everywhere and the earth was stained with blood.92
The aftermath of the battle was grim. During the night, while the Romans plundered, the Britons wandered through the countryside trying to recover their wounded and shouting for survivors. Many abandoned and set fire to their homes, and there was no longer any concerted resistance. In the morning the land was silent and deserted, and the enemy had dispersed in indiscriminate flight.93
Although Tacitus is more interested in the psychology than in the detail of the battle, this is useful, and doubtless Agricola could supply an account of the crucial incidents. We see how the general is in command of the battle, adapts his tactics, and gives the orders on the deployment of reserves and the conduct of the pursuit. We also see how the infantry and the cavalry had specific tasks to perform in relation to the terrain and the state of the battle, and we learn of the fighting methods and skill of the experienced veterans, who know how to use their swords in a confined space, stabbing at the face while shoving with their shield boss. The attack of the reserve cavalry was the turning point of the battle, and as the British lines broke their army disintegrated in the face of ruthless and well-organized pursuit, which witnessed the killing of prisoners. If Tacitus’ casualty figures are right, his unforgettable picture of the bloodstained battlefield is probably true enough.
These battle accounts dwell on the psychology of battle and the human drama of courage and fear. In popular opinion ancient hand-to-hand warfare was fragmented, and much depended on the courage and initiative of small groups or even of individual soldiers, and the fighting techniques and skill of the veterans. The personal leadership of the commander, the use of basic military procedures, and the organized deployment of cavalry and infantry to perform specific roles were all thought to be crucial.
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