The Asiatic campaign began in spring 334: in fact, it was a continuation of the initiative launched in spring 336 but postponed by Philip’s murder and the unrest in Greece. The advance force under Parmenion, Attalos and Amyntas had faltered and was now clinging to its bases on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont. Attalos’ execution had doubtless undermined the morale of the army, but the setback had as much to do with the vigorous resistance by the forces of Memnon the Rhodian (Judeich 1892: 302-6; Ruzicka 1985 and 1997: 124-5). Cities that had proclaimed their support of Philip - some with extravagant honours for the Macedonian king - reverted to a proPersian stance (R&O 83; 84; 85), and it was doubtless the lacklustre performance of the first Macedonian wave that persuaded Dareios III that a coalition of satraps from Asia Minor was sufficient to confront the invaders. For Dareios, in addition to securing his claim to the Persian throne, had been preoccupied with an uprising in Egypt (Anson 1989; Garvin 2003: 94-5; but Briant 2002: 1042 urges caution; on Khababash see Burstein 2000).
The army that crossed the Hellespont comprised 12,000 Macedonian heavy infantry, along with 7,000 allies and 5,000 mercenaries; the light infantry were supplied by Odrysians, Thracians and Illyrians, to the number of 7,000, as well as a thousand archers and the Agrianes, for a grand total of 32,000. To these were added 5,100 cavalry (thus Diodoros 17.17.3-4; but other estimates range from 34,000 to 48,000 in all). At the Graneikos River, to which the coalition of satraps had advanced after their council of war in Zeleia, the ‘allied’ forces confronted a Persian army that included a large contingent of Greek mercenaries. By choosing to stand with the Persian forces they had disregarded an order of the League and committed high treason, and Alexander was determined to make an example of them (Arrian 1.16.6). Distrusted by their employers, the mercenaries were not engaged until the battle was already lost (McCoy 1989). Nevertheless, they paid a heavy price in the butchery that followed, and those who surrendered were sent to hard labour camps in Macedonia, stigmatized as traitors to a noble cause and denied whatever rights might be granted prisoners-of-war. This stood in sharp contrast to Alexander’s clemency on other occasions, and it would be almost three years before he relented and authorized their release. For their part, the Persian cavalry and light infantry fled as the victors turned to deal with the mercenaries. Arsites, in whose satrapy the disaster had taken place, escaped and thus bought enough time to die by his own hand. Panoplies from the battle were sent to Athens with the dedication, ‘from Alexander son of Philip and all the Greeks, except the Lakedaimonians’, maintaining the pretence of a common cause while directing criticism at the Spartans for their refusal to join the League.
Victory at the Graneikos cleared the path for the conquest of the Aegean littoral. Many states came over voluntarily, while others were prevented by the presence of Persian forces from declaring for the Macedonian conqueror. This should not be seen as enthusiasm for Macedonian ‘liberation’ but rather as an opportunity for the enemies of the existing regimes to overthrow their political masters. Far different was the case of Mithrenes, the hyparchos of Sardis, who surrendered the city despite its superb natural defences (Briant 1993: 14-17). The death of Spithridates at the Graneikos had left Lydia without a satrap (cf. Egypt after the death of Sauakes at Issos), and Mithrenes, making a realistic appraisal of the Persian military collapse in Asia Minor, was motivated by self-preservation and the hope of favourable treatment. Alexander received him honourably, although it would be late 331 before he reaped as his reward the unenviable task of ruling Armenia. To the Aeolic cities, not directly in the army’s path, the king sent Alkimachos - a prominent Macedonian and, apparently, a brother of Lysimachos - to establish democracies. Alexander meanwhile turned his attention to Miletos and Halikarnassos, where resistance continued; for the Persian navy still dominated the eastern Aegean and Dareios’ general Memnon had concentrated his forces in that area. Miletos was taken with relative ease, when the Macedonians controlled the access to the harbour before the Persian fleet could arrive. Nevertheless, Alexander decided at this point to disband his fleet - its strength, quality and loyalty were all suspect - and concentrate on engagements by land. The decision, though baffling to some at the time, would prove to be a wise strategic move and an economic blessing.
At Halikarnassos, Memnon and Orontopates directed a stubborn defence, inflicting casualties on the besiegers and setting fire to their siege-towers (Fuller 1960: 200-6; Romane 1994: 69-75). But the city was quickly cordoned off and eventually taken; for Alexander found a less costly, political means of gaining control of Karia. He had received envoys from neighbouring Alinda, where Ada, the ageing sister of Maussolos, and rightful queen of Halikarnassos, was residing. Some time after the death of her husband (also her brother), Idrieus, Ada had been deposed by yet another brother, Pixodaros (Hornblower 1982: 41-50; Briant 2002: 706-7; for Ada in particular OOzet 1994). When Pixodaros died shortly before the Macedonian invasion, the administration of the satrapy was given to Orontopates, who appears to have married the younger Ada, a bride once offered to Alexander’s half-witted sibling, Arrhidaios (Plutarch Alexander [all references in this chapter are to Alexander unless another work by Plutarch is referred to] 10.1-3; French & Dixon 1986). By restoring the former queen to her kingdom, and by accepting her as his adoptive mother, Alexander earned the goodwill of the Karians. Sufficient forces were left with Ada to compel the eventual surrender of Halikarnassos, thus freeing Alexander to proceed into Pamphylia. But the act of reinstating Ada, like the king’s treatment of Mithrenes, was a departure from the official policy of hostility to the barbarian. Few in the conquering army will have cared about the Hekatomnid record of philhellenism.
Over the winter of 334/3, Alexander campaigned in Lykia and Pamphylia, rounding Mt Klimax where the sea receded, as if it were doing obeisance (proskynesis) to the future king of Asia (Kallisthenes FGrHist 124 F 31), just as the Euphrates had lowered its waters for the younger Kyros in 401 (Xenophon Anabasis 1.4.18). This apparent foreshadowing gained credence in spring 333 when Alexander slashed through the Gordian knot with his sword and claimed to have fulfilled the prophecy that foretold dominion over Asia for the man who could undo it. While prophecies could be carefully scripted by the spin-doctors, mastery over Asia would require military victory over Dareios III, who, by the time Alexander had entered Kilikia, had amassed an army on the plains of northern Mesopotamia at Sochoi. Alexander’s own advance had been methodical, aiming clearly at the coastal regions that might give succour to the Persian fleet and the satrapal capitals with their administrative centres and treasure houses. Near Tarsos he fell ill, collapsing in the cold waters of the River Kydnos, perhaps stricken with malaria (Engels 1978b: 225-6). That Dareios interpreted the Macedonian’s failure to emerge from Kilikia as cowardice (Curtius 3.8.10-11) may be attributable to the sources who wished to depict the Persian king as a vainglorious potentate whose actions in the field belied his boastful pronouncements. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that the Persians had a genuine expectation of victory - after all, a larger army under the younger Kyros had been crushed at Kounaxa in 401 despite the valour of the Ten Thousand (Xenophon Anabasis 1) - and underestimated both the Macedonian army and its youthful commander. Impatient and eager to force a decision upon an enemy he regarded as shirking battle, Dareios entered Kilikia via the so-called Amanic Gates and placed himself astride Alexander’s lines of communication. By doing so, the Persian king had abandoned the more extensive plains which offered him the chance of deploying those mobile troops that could most harm the enemy and negated his numerical superiority by leading his forces into the narrow coastal plain between the Gulf of Issos and the mountains.
Alexander, who had advanced south of the Beilan Pass (Pillar of Jonah; for the topography see Hammond 1994) and approached what would in the Middle Ages be known as Alexandretta (Iskenderum), now turned about to confront the Persian army, marching first in column and then spreading out to occupy the plain south of the Pinaros River. Despite his initial error in allowing himself to be lured onto a battlefield more favourable to the smaller Macedonian army, Dareios made good use of the terrain, which he strengthened in one spot by means of a palisade. The Greek mercenaries gave a good account of themselves, as did the cavalry posted by the sea, but the battle was decided on the Persian left, where Alexander broke the Persian line and advanced directly upon Dareios. The Great King was soon turned in flight, a move that signalled defeat and sauve qui peut. The slaughter was great, but the enemy leader escaped, ultimately, to the centre of his empire to regroup and fight another day (Seibert 1987: 450-1 dismisses charges of‘cowardice’).
World History
