The evidence on Median kingship and its possible Zoroastrian links are uncertain. In fact, the evidence partly comes from elements attested in the Persian empire that were seen as originally Median, largely from linguistic similarities. A certain degree of similarity and continuity between the structure of the Median kingdom and the one of Cyrus (thus prior to the substantial innovations under Darius) can be surmised. The latter could have exploited these Median features to ensure the automatic acceptance of Persian hegemony by the other Iranian ‘nations’. Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind that the Greeks continued to call the Persians ‘Medes’ and their Greek supporters ‘medising’.
As mentioned above, the Classical (and in part the modern) tradition tends to conceive the state ruled by Cyaxares and Astyages along the same lines as the one ruled by Cyrus. This led to the definition of the Median kingdom as a bona fide empire. Nonetheless, the short span of Median supremacy, its decline, and the gap in the documentation seem to support a more reductive interpretation of the Median kingdom. The Median kingdom, then, must have been more similar to previous examples, than to the following ones. Therefore, the Median kingdom should be seen as a political entity similar to the Mannaeans or Ellipi. The only difference was that the Medes extended their control much further, thanks to the military expeditions of Cyaxares and the resulting network of inter-dynastic relations. As a result, Median kingship ideology could not have been far from the kinship and military ideals characterising its Iranian hinterland. After all, Near Eastern models must have been too foreign for the Medes.
On the contrary, Achaemenid kingship was far more complex and can be distinguished into two types: one for Cyrus and one for Darius. Naturally, certain Iranian elements continued to survive. First, there was the military role of the king, which led to the emphasis on his physical, heroic and military prowess. Then, there was the emphasis on kinship and the fact that the king belonged to a privileged and distinguished Iranian clan. Finally, there was the ethical aspect of kingship, which led to the interpretation of clashes with enemies as a clash between good and evil. This resulted in the inevitable victory ofjustice and truth over falsehood (a typical aspect of Zoroastrian religion).
Elements derived from Assyrian and Babylonian kingship ideologies are equally evident. These provided the Persian kings with the most visible administrative and celebrative means to express their kingship: from royal titulature (Cyrus was ‘king of totality’, ‘great king’, ‘mighty king’, ‘king of Babylon’, ‘king of Sumer and Akkad’, ‘king of the four quarters of the world’) to the structure of the court, the central and provincial government, the system of tributes and the military. Even the idea of a universal empire and the expectation (or dream) to make it match with the size of the entire known world, was of clear Mesopotamian derivation.
Other relevant contributions, yet more difficult to detect, are the ones of those states that had already begun a cultural syncretism between Iranian and Mesopotamian traditions, namely, Elam, Urartu and even Media itself. These cultures combined the tradition of the Mannaeans with the one of the Assyrians. In this case, it may be worth mentioning two cases in point. The first is an anecdote reported by Herodotus on the way in which Darius (thanks to a trick of his charioteer) managed to win a ‘horse race’ for kingship. This account derives from an inscription left on one of his monuments stating how, ‘with the aid of his horses and his charioteer, his hands conquered the kingdom of Persia’. This inscription was clearly modelled upon the one by Rusa of Urartu, inscribed on one of his statues in the temple of Musasir and which Sargon found and copied. In turn, this inscription imitated far more ancient examples (as early as the second millennium bc) from Mitanni and north Syria (Idrimi). Therefore, Herodotus’ anecdote is not a reflection of Iranian ideology, but a Greek misunderstanding of a century-old Hurrian and Urartian motif attested in the Near East.
Another example is the topos reported by the historians of Alexander the Great, according to which the Persians went to war lavishly dressed. For this reason, then, they were considered unable to face their enemies (in this case, the Greeks), who were less opulent and elegant in their attire, but more practical and effective. This same topos is attested in Assyrian sources (such as Sennacherib regarding the battle of Halule) describing Elamite soldiers. The latter, then, were seen as the predecessors of the Persians not only geographically, but also in their tendency of going to war as if they were attending a sumptuous parade.
Therefore, as the Persians were gaining control over the other Near Eastern kingdoms, they also acquired their political and ideological models. This fact led Cyrus and his successors to present themselves as legitimate heirs to the local dynasties. They even promoted themselves as the restorers of these states at the expense of corrupt rulers, who were rightly removed from their thrones. This strategy led to the formation of the idea of a universal empire through acquisition rather than through the elimination of other centres of power. This was in marked contrast with the approach used by the Assyrian empire: it was a direct consequence of the considerably larger size of the Persian empire.
The Assyrians could still conceive a universal dominion built on the destruction of previous kingdoms and their capitals, the deportations of their ruling classes, the destruction of their culture and the elimination of their deities. In this regard, Esarhaddon emblematically stated: ‘Before me cities, behind me heaps of ruins.’ However, even the Assyrians had to revise their strategy in one particular centre (Babylon), whose cultural and religious importance prevented its destruction. The Persians, however, had to face the same problem on a far larger scale. Moreover, they had to deal with their cultural inferiority compared to kingdoms with more ancient traditions, more complex economic and social structures, and more sophisticated ideologies and cultures. Therefore, they preferred not to destroy, but rather to assimilate, implement and reformulate.
This Persian attitude is particularly significant with regards to local cults. It is certain that Darius, and possibly even Cyrus, were Zoroastrians. Therefore, their one and only god was Ahura Mazda. All other gods (turned into demons) were only his counterpart, representing the sphere of evil and falsehood. Despite this religious ideology, the Persians tolerated the cults and deities of the people they defeated. Cyrus tried to gain the approval of those he defeated by proclaiming himself a worshipper of Marduk when he conquered Babylon, and emanating an edict allowing the return to Jerusalem of Yahweh’s population (at least according to the Bible). Therefore, the Persians subscribed to the ideals of plurality and tolerance in their empire: each region and population had its own gods, and had the right to worship them; cult statues were returned to their original temples; religious festivals were celebrated; and temples were restored. In this view, then, the emperor of this universe acted as a benevolent patron of the various religions of his empire, although one is left to wonder whether the Mazdaist beliefs of the Persian kings clashed with this policy. In fact, what may appear to us as a just and fair policy, from a strictly Mazdaist perspective was essentially a surrender to falsehood.
Naturally, it is necessary to distinguish Cyrus from Darius. The former was more prone to syncretisms and more enthusiastic about adapting to each local tradition he encountered. Even his personal belief in Mazdaism is more of an argumentum e silentio. On the contrary, Darius visibly placed Ahura Mazda in a prominent position, without rejecting Cyrus’ strategy and concessions. Nonetheless, Darius acted with all that intolerance and ruthlessness typical of a dualistic ideology aimed at the repression of the ‘evil’ and ‘false’ ones, especially when they were threatening his position. The political and religious ideologies of the Persians formed the core of the Achaemenid imperial ideology. The tolerance displayed towards other cults was simply a reflection of an imperial ideology that envisioned dominion through accumulation rather than elimination. The official cult of Ahura Mazda, with its abstract features and dynastic exclusivity, was a reflection of the superior and unifying role of the ‘great king’ and his central administration. Finally, the Mazdaist dualism between Good and Evil, Truth and Lie, Order and Chaos, was a reflection of the dynamic and punitive aspects of the empire, its ambition towards further conquests and its repression of revolts and oppositions. The latter in particular were seen as attacks of evil peoples against the difficult and deserving success of the supporters of Good in their rule of the world.