One Roman historian believed that it was the number and valour of Rome’s soldiers and the skills of her generals that, with the help of fortune, had made Rome unconquerable.4 Now, the willingness of any state to go to war surely depends in part on the expectation of success, and past experience of war and its consequences. So, in developed societies, determination to fight wiU be centred on the nature of the army and its organization and command, which in turn depend on the nature of society and the political structure. Consequently war decisions were taken which embodied the motives of governments and assemblies, or groups or individuals within those bodies, and such decisions were closely linked to the success of government itself. Therefore Cicero could refer to ‘the institutions of our ancestors which experience and the long duration of our government vindicate’.5
In fact most wars in the Roman world depended on the decision of a relatively small number of important people, or, in the imperial period, of the emperor. In the early Republic the Roman army was effectively a peasant militia, in which Roman citizens took up their arms for the duration of a campaign. Warfare tended to follow a routine pattern, with mobilization in early spring for campaigns against neighbouring communities. At the end of the summer the soldiers were discharged. Citizens were habituated to warfare as an annual event and continued to be available for call-up while they were of military age. But there was also a property qualification; thus fighting for the state was a duty and responsibility, but also a kind of privilege associated with citizenship.6
The same citizens who took up arms for the state also constituted the people’s assembly, which controlled decisions about war and peace.7 Therefore, when proposals were put to the assembly, the leaders might need to take account of the feelings of the ordinary citizen-soldiers and their willingness to serve in person and go into battle. Many factors applied here: the soldiers’ confidence in their commander, their hope of booty and the profitable acquisition of land and slaves, and perhaps the prospect of an exciting change in the usual humdrum routine of peasant life. Doubtless patriotism also played a part, in that what they fought for could be represented as the defence of Rome. It is likely that at least down to the 150s bc Roman citizens were not reluctant to engage in regular warfare.8
Although popular opinion remained important, in that the people were theoretically sovereign, in my view the preponderant influence in deciding all questions of foreign policy lay with the senate, which under the guise of offering advice issued instructions to senatorial magistrates or army com-manders. These officials, because of the difficulties of communicating quickly with Rome, often exercised considerable discretion and could significantly influence policy. Of course, army commanders also had to justify their conduct with reports or displays of military success. Therefore decisions were subject to the prevailing emotions and opinions of the upper classes, and the traditional structure of Roman society and government.9 Many of the aristocrats who sat in the senate were attuned to a militaristic outlook and experienced in military service, and had warfare firmly implanted in their mindset. Moreover, military success could be personally advantageous in bringing enrichment, prestige, and even political advancement. Collectively, senators might compete to vote for more wars to enhance their own glory and also to enrich the state by expanding the empire. Strategy and longterm planning may have taken second place to greed and imperialist aggrandizement. Of course they could readily convince themselves that what was in fact personal gain was to the advantage of the Roman state.10
There was also the effect of a gradual habituation to war and the possession of a successful army, and in particular the contribution from Rome’s Italian allies. Every year they were obliged by their treaties with Rome to contribute a considerable body of infantry and cavalry, in lieu of taxes. There may have been a perceived need to find something for them to do, to convince the allies of Rome’s worth and power.11 It is also true that the Romans did not always win their battles and sometimes encountered a real threat to their success or even their existence, notably during the invasion of Hannibal. Fear that powerful neighbours might be able to do them serious damage could be a factor in decisions to go to war, even if this fear was often irrational. Finally, as an established state Rome doubtless found it relatively easy to wage war on less militarily developed communities.
However, even if the social and cultural context in the mid-Republic was conducive to the unrestrained waging of war, we may still exaggerate the single-mindedness of Rome’s devotion to war and her greed and imperialist aggression. Especially in the second century BC the level of warfare fluctuated and the momentum of Roman conquest was inconsistent as her military commitments changed. There were also constraining factors. For example, rivalry among the upper classes for military glory may have been two-edged, in that it could restrict war, as successful senators tried to prevent others from benefiting by denying opportunities for military command.
Furthermore, for a time in the late second century there were increasing worries about the availability of sufficient manpower. Therefore it may be argued that the Roman senate was sometimes able to reach decisions on war and peace dispassionately, in the light of the general public good, although that of course was in line with entirely selfish Roman interests.12
The causes, character and intensity of Roman warfare changed throughout the first century bc, and by the late Republic the senate and upper classes were increasingly sidelined and decisions on war and peace were taken to satisfy the ambitions of a few great military commanders, who aimed for wealth and personal aggrandizement to secure their political dominance. Thus Marcus Crassus, who dragged Rome into a disastrous war against Parthia in the hope of winning military glory, said that no man could call himself rich unless he was able to support an army from his own pocket.13 Julius Caesar’s conquest of Gaul, in which he built up a deep personal rapport with his army, was partly motivated by a desire to win wealth, renown and political standing.14 Nevertheless, the underlying intention was to win glory by conquering through war and adding territory to the empire.15
The army, too, had changed. Men now joined up in the expectation of enrichment in the successful campaigns of a distinguished commander, served for longer (sometimes stationed in a permanent base), and looked forward to a satisfactory pay-off, usually in the form of land that would set them up for the rest of their life. Therefore a bond of personal loyalty was created with their commander rather than with the state.16 In the eighteen years after Caesar crossed the River Rubicon, invaded Italy and initiated civil war, Roman life and society were convulsed until the Republican establishment was finally overthrown with the emergence of Octavian as master of the Roman world in 31 BC. Taking the name Augustus in 27 bc, he established an autocracy that lasted until the fall of the city of Rome itself.
World History
