Ramesses II, the son of Sety I, met Muwatallis, the king of the Hittites in an encounter that was the climax of the attempt to retake southern Syria (Kitchen 1982: 53-62; von der Way 1984; Goedicke 1985; Murnane 1985; Spalinger 2002). The episode started as one of the many flare-ups that occurred in the borderlands since the time of Thutmose III, but this military encounter became the decisive battle in which Ramesses, though meeting a surprise attack by the Hittite king, managed to rally and send the Hittites back across the River Orontes. On the second day’s fighting, however, Ramesses could not remove the Hittite army from the field. Kadesh, despite his father Sety’s earlier success, remained pro-Hittite. Ramesses’ campaign against Kadesh demonstrated that, despite twenty thousand foot-soldiers, archers, Sherden mercenaries, chariot warriors, and the nick-of-time arrival of yet another division of elite warriors, he did not have enough troops to defeat Muwatallis. Ramesses’ departure from the battlefield indicates a tactical defeat, but continual skirmishes afterwards were fought to a standstill, and Ramesses was unable to redraw his political boundaries.
The accounts of Merneptah and his Twentieth Dynasty successor, Ramesses III, are noteworthy for the defensive actions of the Egyptian monarchs (O’Connor 1990; Kitchen 1990; Manassa 2003). Threats upon Egypt’s integrity were now a problem. Merneptah also had to face an invasion from the west by tribes-people whose intent was to settle in Egypt, and, although they lacked bronze weapons and a significant chariotry, they came in large numbers. The Egyptian monarch rapidly brought forward his elite troops and marched to the western periphery of the Delta. There he met and defeated the Libyans close to the fortresses that his father had erected in the western desert. An identical situation arose under Ramesses III, and again the armies met west of the Delta where the Libyans invoked the same formation of a massive group of foot-soldiers and archers. The Pharaoh successfully repelled the enemy, but not without a strain upon the Egyptian economy.
The fortifications in the west, as others, were built for control and were not geared to invasion. They served to prevent small numbers ofoutsiders from entering the lush Delta or possibly hindering any infiltration further south. They could not, however, be used for any large offensive operation. Hence, these garrisons were closely similar to those of the Middle Kingdom Second Cataract fortresses and the later Ramesside forts at the entrance to the East Delta. Both Merneptah and Ramesses III had to
Figure 23.6 Hittite chariotry in action against the Egyptians at the Battle of Kadesh. Note the heavier build of the Hittite chariots and the three-man crew as against two in their Egyptian counterparts. Temple of Ramesses II at Abydos. Courtesy E. J. Gooding.
Marshal their troops at a considerable distance from the scene of the invasion. Indeed, Merneptah’s Karnak War Inscription provides a striking parallel to the subsequent Libyan war records of Ramesses III at Medinet Habu (Spalinger 2005: 249-55). In the long run the Egyptian war machine was unable to stop the Libyan migration.
The strongholds of the Sherden, who were originally mercenaries in the pay of the Egyptian state, further reveal that these elite troops had become part of the permanent standing army. Indeed, their presence now as agricultural workers in Egypt, ‘‘settled’’ mainly in the north under Pharaonic authority, indicates as well that these elite troops had become similar in occupation to the ordinary native foot-soldiers and minor officers. These former mercenaries, now paid through their land-holdings, had in essence become local troops. They could be called out by Pharaoh in an emergency but seem not to have provided any logistic support to the border garrisons.
The Egyptian territories in Asia had fallen away owing to major political and social stresses in the north. A land-based attack by a confederacy of northerners, called ‘‘Sea Peoples’’ by the Egyptians, moved down along the coastline of the eastern Mediterranean (Oren 2000 for most recent studies). Operating on land with support from their ships, they managed to topple a number of kingdoms, and by the time Ramesses III got his large army into Palestine the enemy had effectively eradicated the Hittite Empire and taken the coastal regions of Syria. The pictorial and written war records at Medinet Habu document Ramesses III’s counter-attack. While he
Figure 23.7 The defeat of the Sea Peoples by Ramesses III. Medinet Habu. Courtesy Robert Patridge.
Managed to prevent a total disaster, he still lost Asia and had to cede the coastal regions to the Peleset and other Sea Peoples; Egypt’s control over Asia was at an end. The Sea Peoples came in family groups with the intention of settling. The Peleset, who gave their name to Palestine, settled on the southern coast of Canaan and became federated allies of Egypt. Ramesses III further had to repel a second attack in the Delta, this time by sea. In this case, however, the naval battle consisted of enemy warriors alone.
The Egyptian army of the Late New Kingdom was polyethnic in composition, including Nubians, Sherden, Libyans, and possibly other groups. Maybe the population of Egypt had declined, but it is equally possible that by mid-Eighteenth Dynasty a stable population had reached its capacity for supplying able-bodied male warriors, so that the only way to increase the ranks was to accept foreigners (Spalinger 2005: 264-75). The locally based military strongholds and the Libyan settlement in the West Delta reflect a gradual turn to an internally oriented military. Furthermore, after the final wars of Ramesses III the army’s purpose became more concentrated upon the infrastructure of Egypt, which was slowly splitting into two parts. In the south, with its religious and military center at Thebes, the High Priest of Amun eventually became a generalissimo as well. In the north, the last Ramesside kings lost their grasp on the country until a new family arose at Tanis, a port in the Eastern Delta. Here, the leader, Smendes, first took over militarily and politically as a ‘‘Controller,’’ but, subsequently, he founded a new lineage of Pharaohs as the Twenty-first Dynasty. Eventually, the Libyan clan leaders solidified their strength in the north and married into the dynasty, while retaining much of their earlier military structure.
The last seven-hundred years of Egypt’s military history before the conquest by Alexander the Great is a tale of familiarity and difference (Lloyd in Shaw (ed.) 2000). Despite long periods of weakness the first four centuries saw a resuscitation of Egypt’s ambitions in Asia in attempts, albeit unsuccessful, to recreate past glories, and the Piyi (Piankhi) Stela provides ample evidence that Egyptian and Nubians were well abreast of the best current military practice. The Saite period (664-525) was a time of considerable military enterprise and success in all the traditional areas of military activity, designed fundamentally to guarantee the continued independence of the country (see above Chapter 8). In these efforts the Saites not only used their native Egyptian warrior class (the Machimoi) but were assisted by major contingents of mercenary troops, some from Asia, but the most significant forces derived from the Greek states of Asia Minor and the Greek islands. Indeed, so valued were these contingents that permanent camps were established in the country, e. g. at Tell Defenna (see above Chapter 18). The navy too benefited from foreign influence with the introduction of the trireme by Necho II (610-595 bc), a move which could only have taken place with Greek or Phoenician assistance. The conquest of Egypt by the Persians in 525 brought an end to Egyptian independence for some 120 years, but determined efforts were made to throw off the Persian yoke in which significant help was obtained from the Athenian Empire, though Egyptian efforts were denied any long-term success until 404 when the last period of independent Egyptian rule began. As in the great days of the Saite Dynasty, the military force needed to maintain independence was heavily dependent on Greek assistance, either in the form of alliances or the employment of mercenaries, and conspicuous successes were achieved in keeping the Persians at bay. In the end, however, the country fell once more under Persian control in 343 and remained in that position until the conquest of Egypt by Alexander the Great in 332. However, Egyptian forces continued to function as part of the Persian army and even saw action against Alexander at Issus in 333.
FURTHER READING
Egyptian warfare and military institutions have attracted much interest over the last thirty years. In general see Kitchen 1982; Shaw 2001, Bietak and Schwartz (eds.) 2002; Partridge 2002; and Spalinger 2005. On military organization consult Chevereau 1987; 1989; 1991; 1992; and Stefanovic 2006. On the navy see Berlev 1967, and for things maritime in general consult Fabre 2004-5. For the very important Middle Kingdom stela of Khusobek (Sobekkhu) see the excellent discussion in Baines 1987.
World History
