If the dynastic principle was central to the conception of power in the empire, the persistent failure of emperors to establish dynasties, taken with the root cause of that failure - the instability of power and the inability to control the frontiers - undermined the imperial ideal (see the discussion in Peachin’s chapter). For centuries Roman provincial government had been based on the notion that each city within a province would negotiate its status individually with the ruling power, with the result that each province was a sort of administrative quilt (Ando, this volume). If anything, this process was accelerated in the course of the third century as the rapid turnover of emperors gave cities a chance to negotiate favors for themselves at the expense of their rivals (Ziegler 1985). The value of the rewards gained under one emperor was called into question if he did not last; links established with a dynasty that passed away were no links at all. So too might military failure undermine any favors that Rome had provided. It did a city like Palmyra little good to have been recognized as a colonia by Septimius Severus if the Roman state could not help it maintain its control of the desert. Cologne could, perhaps, still celebrate its foundation as a colonia in honor of Nero’s mother, but that did it little good if the reigning emperor could not prevent the Alamanni from crossing the Rhine and ravaging its territories. In the middle of the third century we suddenly begin to see efforts at self-help. A provincial militia is mentioned on an inscription from Augsburg. At Emesa in 253 a local aristocrat named Uranius Antoninus had repulsed some Persian raiders; we do not know if he is the same person as the unnamed ‘‘hero’’ who called upon a local god to repel the enemy at a place called Qal’at al-Halwys in the same period (AEi 1993 no. 1231; IGLS 1799, with Baldus 1971: 250-2). In 268 we are told that the cities of Greece assembled an army to repel Gothic invaders from the sea who sacked Athens despite the best efforts of its citizens (who evidently rallied in the countryside and inflicted some sort of reverse on their enemies). The efforts of the larger Greek contingent are reflected in an inscription honoring a man from Gytheion in Laconia saying, ‘‘they fought in the front rank of the Greeks, they repulsed the enemies of the Athenians with our ships and our infantry, we died at sea under the swords of the barbarians. My brother prepared this tomb for me. I am Epaphrys, I lived twice ten years and twice six years’’ (IG 5.1 n. 1188). In cities where walls had not been maintained, they were repaired, and we are told that in the absence of Roman garrisons, the citizens were forced to defend themselves (Mitchell 1993: 1: 235-6).
The principal benefits of Roman rule were political stability and peace; when Rome could no longer guarantee either, it was up to the inhabitants of the provinces to defend themselves. There was a series of revolts against the power of the central government in the immediate aftermath of Valerian’s debacle, and there had been quite a few in the decade before he had taken the throne. Few of these revolts involved direct threats to the emperor - to have such ambitions one needed to be a member of the establishment. Many of these revolts seem to be protests against imperial inefficiency, against the failure of emperors to maintain the implicit contract that they had with their subjects. The local governing classes of the empire would return loyalty for security.
In the wake of the first Persian raids into Mesopotamia under Ardashir, we hear that the garrison of Mesopotamia murdered its governor, and at least one more mutiny occurred when Alexander came east (Dio 80.3.4; Herod. 6.4.7). His movements were slow, and it may well be that the troops felt that they had been needlessly exposed to danger - a view that was evidently current amongst the troops brought east from the northern frontiers, who felt that their families were imperiled by their service in the east. In addition to the mutinies, there is also record of two ‘‘usurpers’’ in the east who are unconnected with the legions (Potter 1990: 20 n. 55). They may be seen as local notables undertaking local defense. This model certainly fits the case of Uranius Antoninus of Emesa, mentioned above, as well as the Palmyrene response to Sapor’s invasion in 260. In addition to these people, we know, albeit only from coins, of two men with Celtic names in the west, and of two more men in the east, Jotopianus and Mariades, who led insurrections in Syria under Philip and Decius. Jotopianus may have been engaging in some sort of protest (Potter 1990: 39-40). Mariades seems to have been a highly successful brigand with connections in the ruling class of Syria. He is said to have had supporters who betrayed Antioch to Sapor in 252 (FHG 4.192 F. 1). Breakdowns in imperial control of this sort would continue into the 270s: we have evidence, both from literary and archaeological sources, of a revolt in Cilicia, as well as record of a civil war in Lower Egypt, in which one group in the province called in the Blemmyes, a Nubian tribe, to attack Coptos (Mitchell 1995: 177-217; Zos. 1.69.1-71.1).
The less well attested disorders of the period provide a background for the two most serious insurrections of the 260s and 270s, those of the so-called imperium Galliarum and of Palmyra. The Palmyrene insurrection needs to be seen as a two-phase operation. In the first phase, Odaenathus, the leading man of Palmyra, and commander of the local army, allied with two rebels from within the imperial command structure, Macrianus and Callistus, who had rallied the remnants of imperial forces after the capture of Valerian. Odaenathus joined with these men in their resistance to Sapor, but, when they failed in an attempt to overthrow Gallienus, Odaenathus betrayed his former allies. Gallienus then brought Odaenathus within the imperial command structure in the east by awarding him the title of corrector totius orientis, which gave him the right to command Roman troops (Potter 1996a). Gallienus retained the authority to appoint governors to the eastern provinces, a reasonable solution from the Palmyrene point of view, as there is no reason to think that Palmyra possessed the people with the experience necessary to take up these responsibilities. The stability of this arrangement is reflected by the fact that Odaenathus chose Antioch as the site for the celebration of his subsequent victories over Sapor and the elevation of his eldest son to the position of King of Kings, a title that Odaenathus also claimed for himself (Schlumberger 1942-3: 36-50). An extraordinary lead token discovered at Antioch depicts Odaenathus’ son wearing a crown modeled on that of an Arsacid king (Seyrig 1963: 159-72). The combination of the title and the physical representation reveal that Odaenathus perceived himself as the defender of the region against the Sasanians, and as the rival of Sapor. He felt that there was no contradiction between his title and his position within the government. Odaenathus’ desire was evidently to control the border region, and, possibly, to reverse the Sasanian control over the desert tribes. He was a figure deeply embedded in the power politics of his region in which Rome was but one of a number of players.
Events in the west during the 260s had numerous parallels to those in the east. The revolt of Postumus, who would establish the imperium Galliarum, seems to have broken out as a result of a dispute over property recaptured from the Alamanni. Gallienus’ personal representatives in the region, his young son Saloninus and the praetorian prefect who was ‘‘advising’’ him, demanded full restitution of booty to the provincials (Zos. 1.38.2). This Postumus, possibly driven by the interests of his troops, refused to do. Instead he attacked Cologne, where Saloninus and the prefect resided, killing both. In the summer of 260, when these events took place, it must have appeared likely that Gallienus himself had little time left (Konig 1981: 43-57; Christol and Loriot 1997: 223-7). The authority of his regime had been shattered by the capture of his father, and he was faced not only with the emergent regime of Macrianus in the east, but also with a pair of revolts in the Balkans. That he survived these challenges is a reflection of the self-interest of the officer corps that supported him.
The murder of Saloninus made it impossible for Gallienus to make any arrangement with Postumus, whose revolt could not be ameliorated as had the earlier rebellion of Odaenathus by any signal service. Still, although he won the support of the garrisons of Spain and Britain, Postumus would make no serious effort to invade Italy. Instead, he built a regime that appears to have been largely based upon the loyalty of the Gallic aristocracy (Konig 1981: 102-11). He secured the support of that group by concentrating his efforts on protecting the Rhine frontier. An invasion by Gallienus failed when Gallienus was wounded, and a rough equilibrium set in. Postumus ruled his part ofthe empire, while Gallienus maintained direct control over Italy, Africa, Egypt, the Balkans, and Asia Minor, keeping the peace on the eastern frontier through the agency of Odaenathus. In theory, the combined power of the eastern and central provinces should have been sufficient to crush the imperium Galliarum. This would not be the case, however; Gallienus had to allow Odaenathus to look after his own interests. Instead of sending troops west, Odaenathus conducted a series of successful actions against the Persians. At this point it is no longer reasonable to think of a single Roman Empire. It is preferable to see the administration of territory that had once formed the unified empire as having broken down into three parts, each one defined by the need to counter specific threats with its own local power structure: the Gallic empire controlled the Rhine frontier; the regime of Claudius II, who succeeded Gallienus in 268, had the Danube as its primary area of interest; and that of Palmyra held the east. These geopolitical facts might be disguised by later regime changes, but they remain at the heart of later restructurings of imperial power into the fifth century. The Roman Empire could no longer control the frontiers with a unified administrative structure based at Rome.
World History
