The relationship between Egypt and Hatti at the time of the Hittite Amqu-campaign and the Dakhamunzu affair was tense, and tensions were only heightened by the Syrian campaigns of Sety I. At the start of Ramesses Il’s reign it seemed that the time for the decisive battle had arrived. The Egyptian sources report an enemy contingent of more than a dozen allies, which then, as now, must have been an organizational masterstroke. Apparently, 37,000 infantry and 3,500 chariots were sent to Syria. The strength of the Egyptian force is unknown, but they are estimated to have been not more than c.20,000. When two Bedouin informed Ramesses that the Hittites were to be found near Aleppo, he crossed the Orontes and marched north with the division of his army named after the god Amun. Three further divisions (Pre, Ptah and Seth) followed him at a distance of half a day’s march. On the evening of May 12, 1274 bc he had made camp to the west of Kadesh. Two Hittite prisoners provided the true location of the enemy, which was not, as expected, to the north, but on the other side of the city. Ramesses had hardly sent for the rest of his troops, when the Hittite chariots broke through the lines of the still marching Pre-division and immediately attacked the Amun-division with Ramesses. The ensuing fight is described in epic terms by the so-called Poem of Pentawer, known from almost a dozen Hieroglyphic and Hieratic versions (von der Way 1984). Ramesses prepared for battle, but his soldiers failed and fled. According to this myth-riddled Egyptian account Ramesses stood completely alone against the first Hittite wave of 2,500 chariots and made a quick prayer to heaven, which Amun heard. With the god’s help the king drove the enemy back into the river, but the Hittite king did not want to give up and sent the remaining 1,000 chariots into the battle. Ramesses beat these off as well and called out to rebuke his fleeing army. A second battle on the next day ended finally with the Hittite king sending a request for peace, which was approved by the Egyptian officers (on the battle, Kitchen 1997: 50-64).
The problems of the reconstruction of the events arise from the availability of parallel accounts which for once are available. Along with the Poem, we have the Bulletin and finally the battle reliefs with their captions, which contradict the version of the Poem and supplement its account with further details. For example, according to the reliefs Ramesses was not completely alone, as the Poem purports. Just as the battle was at a high point, the Ne‘arin arrived. They were perhaps an Egyptian advanced unit, which had been in the area already for some time. It is possible that their appearance on the battlefield caused the deployment of the second wave of the troops of Muwattalis.
Despite the claims of the Egyptian sources, Ramesses does not seem to have achieved a victory. Kadesh was not conquered, and northern Syria remained Hittite. The highly idealized Egyptian representations of the battle of Kadesh on the temple reliefs contain an iconographic anomaly, which is in striking contrast to the highly exaggerated rhetoric of the textual accounts. The victory scene of the Levantine town of Dapur shows complete submission with two specific iconographic characteristics: (a) Semites burning incense and (b) torn Hittite standards. The representation of the battle at Kadesh, on the other hand, lacks these two iconographic elements. Their absence can be explained as a reflection of the historical situation. In a certain sense this representation pays tribute to the historical truth, but it is likely that the average Egyptian observer would not have noticed this detail and would not have recognized the depiction of the battle scene of Kadesh as more than a simple representation of victory.
The campaign was followed by a nearly unique series of diplomatic letters between the two royal houses, the goal of which was to ensure peace between the two states.
A
B
Figure 6.4a and 6.4b A. Dapur surrenders; B. Kadesh survives. After Wreszinski 1923-38.
The high point of this effort occurred in the 11th Year of Ramesses II’s reign, when both states agreed to a peace treaty (Edel 1997). In structure and form it was quite unlike earlier Hittite treaties, and it is worth emphasizing that it was the first peace treaty in the history of the world that was formulated on the basis of parity. That is to say, it was made between two equal states. The originals, which were engraved on silver tables, are no longer preserved, but we have copies of the Egyptian version (in a Hittite copy) and the Hittite version (used in the west external wall of the court de la cachette at Karnak). The most important aspect of the treaty was concerned with the treatment of prisoners of war and the return of those who had deserted to the other side. It does not deal with questions about the frontier between the two powers. The contract was sealed by a diplomatic wedding between Ramesses and a daughter of Hattusili III, the Hittite king, but the marriage requested by Hattusili for himself to an Egyptian princess did not take place. According to Assmann (1983a) the diplomatic efforts described above were also aided by the Poem; in his effort for peace Ramesses the only obstacle was the influence of the military, so he defamed them in order to reduce their influence. Fecht (1984: especially 49), however, has opposed this interpretation on the grounds that it would have been suicide, in terms of foreign politics, to emphasize the cowardice of the military. The function of the Poem, in which the Egyptian army can hardly be seen as covering itself in glory, is still under discussion.
In the light of the new relationship with the Hittites Ramesses’ other efforts in the realm of foreign affairs seem pale indeed, at least in the eyes of later judgements. Moreover, during his reign problems which should have heralded the end of the Bronze Age simply faded away. As a result of the increased maritime trade relations of the New Kingdom the Egyptians had been obliged to deal with a hitherto unknown phenomenon at the latest by the pre-Amarna period: piracy. Amenhotep, son of Hapu, the building master of Amenhotep III, tells us that he secured the Delta against intruders ( Urk. IV, 1821,13-14). Ramesses II defeated a group of these pirates, the Sherden, and integrated some of them into the Egyptian army as his bodyguard. However, the respite was short-lived. His son and successor Merneptah had to face the threat of the Sherden again, as well as other groups, the Lukka, Tursha, Shekelesh and Aqaiwasha, who had allied themselves with Libyan tribes and threatened Egypt once again. The era of the invasions by Sea Peoples had begun.
The last phase of the reign of Ramesses II is largely marked by building activity and a lack of military campaigns. During his remarkably long reign of 67 years he outlived 12 of his sons who were placed in a collective grave (KV 5) in the Valley of the Kings. His successor was the thirteenth in line to the throne, Merneptah.
World History
