A dynamic legacy: progress and crisis

Alongside the static and structural acquisition of elementary forms, the history of the Ancient Near East also presents the problem of the general interpretation of historical developments, namely, the impact of dynamic and evolutionary factors. In this regard, it is possible to identify two models of development. The first one is that of exponential growth through gradual accumulation at an increasingly fast pace. This model is the result of the historiographical approach of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (ad). These were the earliest phases of the systematic reconstruction of the history of the Ancient Near East, and were dominated by the concept of ‘progress’.

This idea came out of the development of European culture after the Industrial Revolution and modern colonialism. The latter brought a significant economic and political growth (though limited to the Western World) through the exploitation of the non-Western world. For decades, this seemingly unstoppable growth led to the illusion that this progress was never-ending, almost like a steep curve in a graph. This optimistic view, centred on the idea of progress, naturally led to the appreciation of the technical and cultural developments of the Ancient Near East. The latter, then, became the distant originator of this progress. From this perspective, the Near East was seen as a sequence of cultural and technological inventions and innovations, of increasingly efficient modes of production, of increasingly complex political formations, and of freer and higher forms of human expression.

Then, the concepts of crisis and catastrophe, and of the ‘limits ofprogress’ were introduced (or re-introduced) in the study of Ancient History. This was due to the global crises following the First World War, the economic depression and the political recessions. Moreover, the spread of these issues to the rest of the world, and the more recent demographic, productive and energy crises continue to enforce this view. In other words, these historical developments led to the idea of an upward and downward development determined by the difficult interaction between various factors, eventually causing regressions. The negative elements of crisis, then, are not seen as accidents within a largely exponential growth, but structural traits (equal to elements of growth) of the overall system. Today, this growth can be simulated through information technologies and systems theory.

The over-exploitation of the land, the depletion of resources, the economic cycles, the difficult relations between centre and periphery within an integrated global economy, all contributed to a radical change of our worldview. Therefore, the simple (and more optimistic) historical interest in the cultural achievements of the elite, the urbanised and imperial centres, technological innovations and the developments of ever-profitable systems expanded to include less sophisticated areas, phases of stalemate and recession, and the so-called ‘dark ages’ and ‘intermediate periods’. In other words, historical interest began to consider all those submerged areas (especially in terms of evidence) of that ‘iceberg’ of ancient cultures.

However, it would be far better to suggest a composite model. The latter would still focus on progress in terms of long-term effects, but would be more cyclical in the short-term. The history of the Ancient Near East covers some of these cycles, roughly one for each part of this volume. Our interest in this phase should not be limited to positive accomplishments. It should not consider growth as the only factor providing us with information, or as a premise of our own progress. We should focus on the variety of development strategies (which depend on different ecologic and historical contexts) and especially on the different outcomes, some ‘winning’ and others more ‘regressive’, leading to the marginalisation and disappearance of entire communities.

This enlarged model also shows how the real legacy of the Ancient Near East is not the progressive type of sequence starting from Greece to Rome, the Christian Medieval Age and Modern Western Europe, but the following phases of the Near East itself. These later phases also had their sequence of growth and were affected by socio-political, technological and economic decline. Moreover, there were issues such as the de-population, desertification and destruction of the landscape, cultural dogmatism, political dependence and subsistence economies in critical zones. Ah these factors are not secondary in an overall evaluation of the history of the areas under analysis.

This new historiographical model allows a better understanding and a more reliable interpretation of the past. Unsurprisingly, the old Eurocentric point of view was based on the tripartite division of history into Ancient, Medieval and Modern history. All three phases were seen as developing along the same lines. Now, however, history has overcome the issue through the historical evaluation of prehistoric phases. In addition to that, there is the introduction (once impossible to apply) of the concept and study of contemporary history, as well as the historical understanding of future developments. Another addition is the renewed interest in other cultures, whose history is relevant, but often neglected. Finally, there is also the sociological development of the history of marginal social classes, of women, of ah sectors that remain unattested in the evidence, and of daily life.

In order to make this enlarged and empowered model effective, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of progress and recession, and of cultural evolution in its broadest connotations. Unfortunately, this is only possible with a balanced and sufficient set of evidence. This is not the case for the Near East, and it is likely that the problem will never be fully fixed. Therefore, it may seem that the positive consideration of the Near East as a useful source of ‘elementary forms’ does not apply for an interpretation of its dynamic legacy. However, our historical investigation appeared well equipped for the study of these elementary forms. This was due to their intrinsic simplicity and proximity to the phase in which these various phenomena were introduced, and to the fact that they are extraneous (which allows us to not get too involved in the interpretation), yet similar to ‘our’ own forms. In this regard, then, the study of the dynamic legacy of the Near East, far from being able to provide anything transferable elsewhere, has to depend on models developed elsewhere. These other models can rely on more statistical documentation, and support the study of the Near East by interpolation, allowing us to make sense of the surviving evidence.

What remains is the great contribution that the Ancient Near East can give to history in general. It expands our perspective in terms of time and space, and of types of phenomena. This new perspective is now part of ‘our own’ culture, which remains the first one to be able to provide interpretations that are not excessively self-centred. This prevents the presentation of other cultures as mirrors of our own culture. These cultures, then, are presented as autonomous entities. Much has been done towards a ‘normalisation’ and ‘simplification’ of the earliest Eurocentric and finalistic histories of the Ancient Near East (whose approach now survive in high school textbooks). However, there is still much to be done.