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19-06-2015, 15:59

The Proof

In the context of ancient rhetoric, the term pistis has two meanings. It refers to a part of the speech, but it is also a general term for argument or means of persuasion, as in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as ‘the ability, in each situation, to find the available pisteiS (Rhet. 1.2.1). This ambiguity creates a certain difficulty for delimiting the proof section as a section of the speech. The means of persuasion that rhetoricians describe as pisteis, such as arguments from probability or citations of documents, do indeed cluster in the proof section. But they are not limited to that section, nor do they comprise all of it.



Pisteis (in the sense of means of persuasion) are classified by Aristotle into two categories: artless proofs (pisteis atechnoi), that is, those that are not provided by the speaker but are pre-existing, and artistic proofs (pisteis entechnoi), that is, those that are created by the speaker. The Rhetoric to Alexander employs essentially the same distinction with different terminology. Artless proofs include witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, laws, contracts, and oaths, which, at the time of Aristotle’s writing, were all forms of documentary evidence. Artistic proofs for Aristotle fall into three categories: ethos, or persuasion generated by the speaker showing good character, pathos, or appeals to emotions, and logos, or logical argument.34



Aristotle’s distinction between artistic and artless proofs is seminal, yet in oratorical practice the distinction is blurred, for artless proofs are handled quite artfully. The periodic introduction of documentary evidence, which required the speaker to stop while a clerk read, apparently served to punctuate the speech. Speakers could also introduce artless proofs not obviously relevant to the legal matter at hand in order to make broader claims, such as to show their civic-minded, law-abiding character or to illustrate the ‘fact’ that the opponent despises the laws in general.35 We find Demosthenes, for example, citing the law of hubris (‘humiliating violence’) not for the purpose of building his legal case, a suit against his enemy Meidias for having punched him at a public festival, but for a variety of emotional reasons (21.48-50).36 Indeed, he expects that the very sound of the clerk reading it will have an emotional impact on his audience: ‘Nothing is like hearing the law itself!’ In the proceeding discussion of the law, he focuses on its protection of slaves, a provision that has nothing to do with his case against Meidias. For Demosthenes, though, the law functions as evidence of the Athenians’ generous and humane character. In this, he not only flatters his audience but also amplifies Meidias’ crime. If the Athenians are so generous as (theoretically) to protect slaves from hubris, how ‘unAthenian’ must Meidias be to have punched a citizen?37 Pisteis atechnoi could be used in other inventive ways not described in handbooks. From the early fourth century on, witness testimony was presented as written depositions. Since litigants themselves drafted the depositions and then had the witnesses swear to them, there could be considerable art in how the testimony was phrased.38



As for the proof as a part of the speech, speakers sometimes use transitional phrases at the end of narrative sections to mark a shift from telling to showing (e. g., Isoc. 17.24, Lys. 3.21, 19.23), which in some respect makes the proof a distinct section. But the contents of that section are quite diverse and, for a variety of reasons, often consist of large portions of narration. The introduction of documents, for example, might require the speaker to relate additional background. The speaker might also recount a story to impeach an opposing witness’ credibility (e. g., Dem. 54.38-39), cite historical events ([Dem.] 59.94-103), simply assert damaging ‘facts’ pertaining to the opponent or his supporters (e. g., Dem. 40.57-59), or hurl invective at them directly (Dem. 45.79-80). The proof section in practice is thus something of a catchall category. Perhaps it was in an effort to account for its diverse contents that theorists devised ever more subdivisions within it.



 

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