In 51, the chief opponent of Caesar was the consul M. Claudius Marcellus. Early in the year, Marcellus called upon the senate to annul the citizen rights of the colonists settled by Caesar at Novum Comum, a town at the foot of the Alps, in Transpadane Gaul, the region of Cisalpina north of the Po River (Suet. lul. 28.3). Marcellus asserted that Caesar had exceeded the authority granted to him under the lex Vatinia of 59, but action by the senate was apparently blocked by the veto of a pro-Caesarian tribune (Cic. Att. 5.2.3). The issue was a volatile one because residents of native communities north of the Po, unlike their citizen counterparts in Cisalpina to the south, lacked full voting privileges in Roman assemblies and could not hold political office in Rome. Instead, the Transpadanes enjoyed a status known as Latin rights (ius Latii), a half-way house to Roman citizenship, and as early as around 68 (see MRR 3.106) Caesar had supported the aspirations of the Transpadanes to gain full Roman citizenship (Suet. lul. 8). In May 51, there were even rumors, which proved false, that Caesar was going to encourage the Transpadanes to lay claim to this status illegally (Cic. Att. 5.2.3; Cael. Fam. 8.1.2).9 To keep up pressure, in June Marcellus took the bold step of seizing a citizen of Comum and ordering this visitor to Rome to be flogged, a punishment that was not legally permitted against a Roman citizen (Cic. Att. 5.11.2). Marcellus did so, apparently, on the grounds that in his view Caesar’s citizen colony was illegal and so its members were entitled only to Latin status. This will explain why Cicero in his letter raises the issue of the status of Marcellus’ victim as a possible ex-magistrate since magistrates of a Latin community gained by virtue of their office full Roman citizenship. Cicero judged the matter an ‘‘ugly’’ affair (foede) in either case, one that was bound to offend both Caesar and Pompey.11
Meanwhile the consul M. Marcellus kept demanding that Caesar give up his provinces and dismiss his army on the grounds that there was no longer any need for such a large military force (ten legions) after the fall of the rebel stronghold Alesia in the autumn of 52.12 Caesar’s decision to spend the winter of 52-51 north of the Alps demonstrated, however, the need for vigilance and for further action against potential trouble spots. Indeed, in May 51 there was briefly a rumor, which proved to be false, that Caesar was once again in difficulty and under siege by a rebel uprising that had resulted in the loss of his cavalry (Cael. Fam. 8.1.4). Marcellus’ agitation to have Caesar recalled was blocked by his consular colleague, Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (Suet. lul. 28.2; App. B Civ. 2.26; Dio 40.59.1; Liv. Per. 108; cf. Fam. 4.4.3), but Marcellus kept pressing his case. As part of the strategy of Caesar’s enemies to undermine his strength and detach Pompey from his political alliance with Caesar, Pompey was urged at a meeting of the senate on 22 July to set a date for the recall of the legion that he had loaned to Caesar in January 53 (see above, p. 46). Pompey refused to commit himself to a specific date, but he did agree to reclaim the troops, and thus reduce the size of Caesar’s army, at some future date (Cael. Fam. 8.4.4). Later, by early September, Pompey let it be known that he was adamantly opposed to any decision being taken in 51 concerning Caesar’s succession (Cael. Fam. 8.9.5), but at the same time Pompey’s father-in-law, Metellus Scipio (sending a signal on Pompey’s behalf?), sponsored a motion calling upon the senate to give priority to a decision on the Gallic provinces on March 1, 50 BC (ibid.). This motion caused Caesar’s agent Balbus to remonstrate with Scipio (ibid.), but on September 29 a compromise was struck. The senate decreed that on and after March 1, 50 priority should be given to a decision on all consular provinces (de consularibus provinciis), not just Caesar’s provinces of Gaul (Cael. Fam. 8.8.5). However, at the same meeting on September 29, three tribunes friendly to Caesar blocked an attempt by Caesar’s enemies to make the future debate not subject to a tribune’s veto. And so, when the time came, Caesar could, and did, ward off any decision unfavorable to his interests by having action by the senate vetoed.
In July of 51, the elections did not produce results favorable to Caesar. One of the new consuls, C. Marcellus (a cousin of the consul of 51), was the husband of Caesar’s grand-niece Octavia (sister of the future emperor Augustus) but not a Caesarian (Suet. lul. 29.1; Dio 40.59.4; App. B Civ. 2.26). Marcellus’ colleague, L. Aemilius Paullus (brother of the future Triumvir M. Lepidus), had no fondness for Caesar, but his great need for cash to carry out his lavish rebuilding of the Basilica Aemilia (Paulli) on the north side of the Forum, just to the east of the senate-house, made it possible for Caesar to purchase his loyalty in exchange for Gallic gold: 1,500 talents (= 36 million sesterces) according to Plut. Caes. 29.3 and App. B Civ. 2.26. The elections in 51 also elevated to the tribunate an inveterate enemy of Caesar, C. Scribonius Curio (Cael. Fam. 8.4.2). Curio’s political leanings at the time of his election, and as late as October 51 (Cael. Fam. 8.8.10), were judged to be decidedly anti-Caesarian, as they had been throughout the decade. It was even said that Caesar had shown his contempt for Curio by not attempting to purchase his support (Cael. Fam. 8.4.2). To everyone’s surprise, however, Curio did a sudden about-face in the spring of 50 (Cic. Att. 6.3.4) and turned into Caesar’s staunchest supporter. The tradition in later sources is that Caesar won Curio to his side by settling his enormous debts.13
When the senate took up the consular provinces in March 50, Curio used his veto to prevent any decision to name Caesar’s replacement, and he opposed Pompey’s proposal in April that Caesar leave his province on the Ides (13th) of November (Cael. Fam. 8.11.3). If, as argued previously, the lex Pompeia Licinia of 55 envisaged granting Caesar five further military campaign seasons (those of 54, 53, 52, 51, and 50), it is quite easy to see how Pompey could have represented the Ides of November as a fair and reasonable terminal date ( aequum), one in keeping with the spirit of the extension of Caesar’s command in 55. The Ides of November was a time of year by which it would have been normal to disperse legions to winter quarters and for warfare to be suspended.14 On the other hand, it could, of course, be objected by
Caesar and his supporters that he was being deprived of his command approximately one year ahead of the schedule that had been projected in 55, when succession by one of the consuls of 49, in late 49, would have been anticipated (see above, pp. 48-9).
About May 50, alarm was raised over the possibility of a Parthian invasion on the eastern frontier, and the senate decreed that Pompey and Caesar should each contribute one legion to bolster forces in Syria. Pompey, who had been pressed by Caesar’s enemies to do so earlier (see above, p. 51), now demanded back from Caesar the legion that he had loaned to his partner in January 53, and Pompey offered it in fulfillment of the requirement that he furnish a legion.15 The result of this action, therefore, was to subtract not merely one but two legions from Caesar’s available forces since, in addition to sending back Pompey’s legion, Caesar had to contribute one of his own (BG 8.54.3; Plut. Caes. 29.3, Pomp. 56.3; App. B Civ. 2.29; Dio 40.65). The two legions were sent to Capua for trans-shipment to the Middle East, but when the threat of danger from the Parthians evaporated (Cic. Fam. 2.17.5) the troops remained stationed in Italy to serve as a defense in case Caesar invaded from the north.
Clearly this maneuver of Pompey in May, which deprived Caesar of two legions, coupled with Pompey’s proposal in April that Caesar be required to hand over his army and province on the Ides of November, signaled a serious rift in relations between the two former partners. By early August, Pompey was said to have made up his mind not to allow Caesar to be elected consul, unless he first surrendered his army and provinces, whereas Caesar was equally convinced that he could not escape destruction by his political enemies unless he retained his army (Cael. Fam. 8.14.2). Cicero’s correspondent M. Caelius (aed. 50) was certain that Caesar would call up his army and come to the defense of his tribune Curio, if Caesar’s political enemies presumed to ride roughshod over Curio’s veto (Cael. Fam. 8.11.3).
There was one brief moment, however, in the late spring of 50 (May-June) when fate nearly took a hand to prevent Pompey and Caesar from coming to blows. On a visit to Naples, Pompey fell seriously ill, and for a time it appeared that he was likely to die. The glorious rejoicing and public sacrifices of thanksgiving throughout Italy that celebrated his miraculous recovery doubtless served to give Pompey a false sense of invincibility and of devotion on the part of the Roman people (Vell. 2.48.2; Plut. Pomp. 57.1; Dio 41.6.3-4). Something of Pompey’s puffed-up state of mind is revealed by the boast that he is said to have made at that time when he asserted that merely by stamping his foot on the ground he could raise vast armies in Italy (Plut. Pomp. 57.5). Later, when in the first few months of 49 Caesar’s rapid advance from the north forced Pompey to carry out a strategic retreat from Rome and Italy because he lacked seasoned troops, Pompey had these words cast back at him by his impatient senatorial backers (Plut. Pomp. 60.4).
At about this same time (May?) Caesar sent his quaestor of 51, Mark Antony, to Rome to stand for a vacancy in the augurate and for a tribunate in 49. Antony was successful in both elections, and his defeat of Caesar’s inveterate enemy L. Domitius (consul 54) for the augurate must have given Caesar great pleasure. We are told that the proconsul wrote to the citizen communities in Cisalpine Gaul south of the Po to solicit support for Antony’s candidacy. Caesar even returned to Cisalpina (probably in July) for the first time since the winter of 53-52 (Hirt. BG 8.51.2) in order to canvass on Antony’s behalf, but before he could use his influence, he learned the successful outcome of Antony’s candidacy (Hirt. BG 8.50.3). Quite a different outcome, however, greeted Caesar’s candidate for the consulship of 49, his former legate Ser. Sulpicius Galba. At the elections of 50, Galba failed to gain office despite a strong showing at the polls,16 and the two consuls chosen for 49 were bitter, irreconcilable enemies of Caesar: C. Claudius Marcellus, brother of Caesar’s implacable foe M. Marcellus (consul 51), and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus. There was briefly a rumor that Caesar had been able to win Lentulus Crus to his side (Cic. Att. 6.8.2 of Oct. 50), but in the end Caesar’s chief allies among the magistrates of 49 were restricted to three praetors (ibid.), one of them M. Lepidus, the future Triumvir, and the two tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.
As the year 50 drew to a close, it became increasingly evident that the vast majority in the senate wanted to avoid open conflict. On December 1, Curio proposed a motion calling upon both Caesar and Pompey to dismiss their armies, and it drew support from 370 senators against a mere 22 naysayers (App. B Civ. 2.30; Plut. Pomp. 58.3-5, Caes. 30.1-2), but the consul C. Marcellus dismissed the senate before any formal resolution could be certified (Hirt. BG 8.52.5). On the next day, Marcellus tried to pass a motion summoning to Rome as a defense force the two legions that had been withdrawn from Caesar and stationed at Capua. When that proposal was vetoed by Curio, Marcellus, on his own authority, presented Pompey with a sword and urged him to take command of the two existing legions and enroll additional troops (Dio 40.64.4; Plut. Pomp. 58.6; App. B Civ. 2.31). After his last day as tribune on December 9, Curio hastened off to join Caesar at Ravenna (App. B Civ. 2.31; Dio 40.66.5), by which time Caesar had already summoned two of his eight legions in Transalpina (the 8th and the 12th) to join him south of the Alps, where he had at his disposal one legion, the 13th (Hirt. BG 8.54.3). See Carter 1991: 165-6.
From December 10 onwards, the chief role in defending Caesar’s interests fell to the daring tribune Mark Antony, who on December 21 delivered at a public meeting a blistering invective against Pompey (Cic. Att. 7.8.5). By the end of the first week of January 49, the attempt to reach a compromise in the senate had broken down. On the night of January 7-8, perceived threats against their safety caused the tribunes Antony and Q. Cassius to flee from Rome in disguise and join Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul (BC 1.5.5), where he was poised to launch a blitzkrieg against his woefully unprepared enemies in Rome. Four days later, on the night of January 11-12 (BC 1.8.1), Caesar crossed the tiny river Rubicon, which served as a boundary between his province and Italy on the Adriatic coast. He thereby set in motion a civil war that was to rage intermittently for two decades, until an end was finally marked in August 29 BC by the triple triumph of his grand-nephew Octavian Caesar, the future emperor Augustus. It was a desperate act, in a desperate situation, aptly encapsulated in the famous remark that is attributed to Caesar: ‘‘Let the die be cast.’’17
World History
