For a long time, limited war technology prevented the Egyptian state from annexing very much foreign territory. The army consisted of foot-soldiers and marines, who were equipped to control no more than the lands immediately flanking the Nile River. Thus, while we learn from sources such as the Palermo Stone of many attacks upon non-Egyptian enemies, we do not detect any geographical expansion. There was no imperialistic policy (Kemp 1989: 46-53; Davis 1992; Campagno 2004). Expeditions entered into the vast and distant territories of the western desert and the lands south of Libya, but their purpose was to extract ores and stone and to secure the transportation of needed goods. The forays under Khufu and his son Djedefre to the southwest were not military campaigns (Kuhlmann 2002; Kuper and Fcirster 2003; Shaw 2000; Fischer 1991 for the Old Kingdom routes). The diorite quarry expeditions in Lower Nubia, nonetheless, indicate that this land was in the Egyptian sphere of control. Most of this area was probably devoid of population until the Late Old Kingdom, so there was no opposition to Egyptian quarry activities. On the other hand, the Egyptian campaigns of the Fourth and Fifth Dynasties most certainly devastated the region (Gratien 1995).
Egypt had close commercial relations with the Levant, especially with Byblos and the coast (Redford 1986). Perhaps Asiatics from Lebanon were in the service of the Egyptians as early as the Fifth Dynasty (Bietak 1988). The evidence from Sahure’s mortuary temple and Unis’ causeway reliefs indicates that expeditions without military intent traversed the eastern Mediterranean as caravans did on land south of Aswan and west oftheNile (Kemp 1991). Sahure’s record of 200,000 large and small cattle brought back to Egypt from Nubia is dubious since this figure is a nicely rounded and exaggerated number intended to make an impression.
Inti’s tomb at Deshasha depicts a siege in south Palestine or Lebanon (Yadin 1963: 54-5, 146-7; Partridge 2002; Schulz 2002; Vogel 2004: 43-5). The Sixth Dynasty Saqqara mastaba of Kaemhesi shows a siege ladder in use, having been wheeled to an enemy fortress (Vogel 2004: 41-3). These must have been land operations; for no marines appear in the action. Interestingly, at this time there was an ‘‘Overseer of Bowmen’’ who was in charge of the transport boats and who interacted with non-Egyptians (Fischer 1993: 91-5).
Weni’s Sixth Dynasty biography reflects the state’s interest in removing the threat of trade interruptions or incursions (Goedicke 1963; Lichtheim 1975: 18-23). He would have led his large army along the Sinai coast to Gaza and then
Figure 23.1 An attack on a walled settlement during the Old Kingdom. Scene from the tomb of Anta, Deshasha, Courtesy EES.
Inland, but the details of the operation are sparse (Fischer 2002: 38-9). The troops, composed of Egyptians and Nubian mercenaries, moved against the peoples of southern Palestine, but, because food and water had to have been carried by donkeys, especially in the Sinai, the advance was slow. The land ‘‘was hacked up,’’ its strongholds were taken and smashed, its vines and fig trees ravaged, and captives certainly brought back to Egypt.
The depiction of the Libyan wars of Sahure, later copied by Pepi II, provide us with important pictorial accounts, but it remains unclear where the enemies were situated and why they posed a threat. Later, during the Sixth Dynasty, the Dakhla oasis and Balat became the main centers of Egyptian control (Giddy 1987: 174-212; Kaper and Willems 2002). The expeditions of Harkhuf at the close of this era intermingled commercial and military issues: by the reign of Pepi II there were embryonic states in Lower Nubia (Edel 1955; Lichtheim 1973: 23-5; Jenkins 2000), and Lower Nubia was now a threat to direct Egyptian trade to the south and to the west (Edel 1955).
Travel overland through the western desert was common, with frequent stops at oases (Goedicke 1981; Darnell 1997a; 2003; 2004). Harkhuf mentions that on his third expedition there were three hundred donkeys loaded with exotic produce. He had traveled westward along the oasis road and discovered that the ruler of Yam in
Nubia had departed for Libya in order to smite it. Although no map can be drawn, it seems that Harkhuf rendered the king of Yam impotent. Libya, Tjemeh in this case, may have been in need of Egyptian support. Significantly, he prepared carefully for his return trip to Egypt on the Nile by including troops of the king of Yam.
Later, Sabni, an expedition leader who lived under Pepi II, points out that he went forth to Wawat (in Lower Nubia) with five divisions of foot soldiers. One of his tomb inscriptions relates that he pacified southern countries including Wawat. Pepinakht fought in Nubia on at least two separate occasions, and his title of ‘‘Overseer of the Foreign Countries’’ indicates a deeper strengthening of Egyptian control over the south. First came Pepinakht’s successful attack, one that involved Wawat and Irtjet, two Nubian lands known from Harkhuf’s accounts, whilst a second expedition was a pacifying foray that ended by taking two Nubian chiefs back to Egypt.
Various naval expeditions were made into Nubian territory in order to show the flag and to insure that the Nubian ‘‘statelets’’ did not interrupt, on a permanent basis, Egyptian trade from the south. The relative freedom with which the Egyptians moved upstream was later challenged by the C-Group People who resided north of the Second Cataract (O’Connor 1993: 26-37) when Irtjet and Satju, now unified Nubian chiefdoms, formed a single unit (O’Connor 1993: 31-7).
World History
