Modern commentators and theorists, who are interested in the links between warfare and social and political change, have developed methodologies that might be useful in an analysis of the political role of armies. The so-called ‘military participation ratio’, that is, the proportion of the citizen body involved in military service, is particularly relevant.34 Military participation affects social stratification; and, if participation becomes restricted and military service professionalized, this can lead to a more steeply stratified society. In his theoretical analysis Andreski referred to six ‘ideal’ types of military organization. The ‘mortazic’ type, which combines a low level of participation with high levels of cohesion and subordination, could be applied to the Roman imperial army. In his view this often led to praetorianism or the domination of the military in one form or another, exercised not along customary or legally recognized constitutional channels, but through mutinies and coups d’etat. This is characteristic of professional troops who have no particular ideology. Soldiers are more likely to be the arbiters of politics if they are the main plank of the government’s authority, and military might is liable to be decisive in politics in a society where there are no clear and universally accepted beliefs about the legitimacy of power.35
Some of these generalizations may be applied to the Roman empire. The army was professional and the troops had no strong political beliefs beyond the preservation of the source of their service and benefits. There was no dynastic succession or undisputed mechanism for selecting a successor. But the situation in Rome was far more complex than this. Although all emperors adopted the attributes of a Roman commander in dress and titles, they also displayed other civic attributes, and many did not take the field in person. They were not expected to be great warriors, still less to fight in battle. The military did not dominate political life in Rome. Even in the case of an emperor like Domitian, whom senators regarded as a tyrant, it was not military domination that Tacitus and others complained about, but his failure to find a working relationship with the senate. The army was not singled out as the main plank in the government’s authority, which also depended on the senate and the people, and the rule of law. Augustus had expressed the hope that he had created the foundations of government that would last long after him.36 Indeed, the system he established proved a workable and relatively stable means of preserving a government in which the emperor and the upper classes collaborated.
Nevertheless, the emperor was in total control of the army, and depended ultimately upon its armed support, however much he might try to conceal this. He kept a bodyguard, which from early in the first century ad was stationed permanently in Rome. Augustus had tried to keep the praetorians out of politics. He saw that they had potentially great political influence since they were the only substantial military force at the centre of power. Therefore at the start of his reign he based the bodyguard in several Italian communities, did not appoint an overall commander until 2 BC, and when he did so he appointed two commanders of equestrian rank (praetorian prefects). But the praetorians were drawn into the political intrigue that inevitably surrounded the emperor. The guard commander became closely associated with the emperor personally and became a major player in imperial politics. Since in practice on many occasions only one praetorian prefect held office, the scope for intrigue was greater. The career of a prefect like Aelius Sejanus under Tiberius revealed that the prefect could exercise an influence far beyond his formal legal powers.37 Gradually the power and attributes of the prefect came to match his latent influence as guard commander; he was a confidant and imperial adviser, was often given special military responsibilities on campaign and gradually acquired legal jurisdiction. Indeed, the prefect became such an important officer of state that when Constantine abolished the praetorian guard in ad 312 the office of praetorian prefect remained.
Thus Augustus failed to isolate either the guard or its commanders from the politics of the imperial family. The praetorians’ most significant intervention in politics came in ad 41, when in the confusion after the murder of Caligula they escorted Claudius to the praetorian barracks. From here he exploited the backing of the troops, who wanted another emperor of the Julio-Claudian line, and used intermediaries to negotiate with the reluctant senators. His proclamation by the soldiers, encouraged by a generous payment, was a public demonstration of his military support, and ensured that there could be no serious opposition. Coins minted in the early years of the reign showing Claudius shaking hands with a praetorian, and bearing unique legends, ‘The Reception of the Emperor’ and ‘The Reception of the Praetorians’, emphasize the debt he owed to the praetorians.38 Nevertheless, we cannot say that after the initial phase Claudius was especially indulgent towards the army or that the general tenor of his government was disturbed by a pro-military bias.39
When the succession was resolved by civil war the implications of the army’s intervention were even more damaging. Tacitus analyses the events of AD 68 to 69, a time of battles, extreme violence, murder, destruction of property and the disruption of the normal process of administration. The army was of course at the centre of this, but it was what Tacitus calls the ‘madness of the leading men’, that is, the ambition of important men for power and profit, that sustained the conflict.40 Of course, everyone would have agreed that autocratic government must continue; the fight was over who should be emperor. The troops who survived the fighting gained some benefits; they had opportunities for plunder, they received donatives, a relaxation of discipline, and in some cases the chance to serve in the praetorian guard or to choose their own officers; the victors had the prestige associated with winning. But nothing really changed as a result of the fighting in 68 to 69. The same system of government remained; Vespasian reimposed military discipline, and there was not even a pay rise for the troops, who had no more real or formal political standing than before. The unseen, long-term consequences are another matter. The overthrow of Nero and the subsequent civil wars demonstrated the success of appealing to the army to overthrow the existing government, and they also showed that a provincial governor in command of an army could march on Rome and seize power. It is probable that everyone in public life in Rome had known this, but the public confirmation of it set an example for the future. Tacitus summed up this political truth in a famous epigram: ‘The secret of ruling was revealed. An emperor could be made outside Rome.’41
The stability of the Augustan system and the difficulty of winning over the soldiers from their loyalty to the emperor contributed to the fact that it was not until the late second century that a reigning emperor was again overthrown by a provincial governor marching on Rome. In ad 193 Pertinax was murdered by the praetorians because they thought that he was parsimonious and a strict disciplinarian. His death was followed by the notorious ‘auction’ of the empire, in which two senators, Didius Julianus and Sulpicianus, father-in-law of Pertinax, made rival offers to the praetorians for their support. Julianus, who was outside the camp, shouted out the sums he was offering, even counting out the amount on his fingers, and was eventually proclaimed emperor by the troops. When Julianus first appeared in the senate he was surrounded by praetorians in full armour carrying their standards. Contemporary sources thought that the whole episode was disgraceful and tended to blame the praetorians, forgetting that it was the two senators who exploited the troops, who simply went with the highest bidder and took no further interest in politics.42 However, Julianus had little authority, and the mood in Rome was exploited by ambitious provincial governors, first Septimius Severus in Pannonia and Pescennius Niger in Syria, and then Clodius Albinus in Britain. The civil wars lasting from 193 to 197, in which Septimius Severus eventually secured power, were the worst that Rome had experienced since the late Republic, and involved unprecedented ferocity, loss of life, and damage to provincial communities, although Italy escaped the worst of the violence. What were the political consequences of these tumultuous events?
It is possibly in this period that theories of military participation rate and praetorianism have most relevance. Scholars have identified a sinister watershed during the reign of Septimius Severus, the development of militaristic tendencies, the undermining of the senate and traditional practices of government, and the upsetting of the balance established by Augustus. Perhaps Severus’ open reliance on the support of his army helped to bring about a fundamental change in the way the state was run and in the ways of winning military support, even if Severus himself did not intend this or recognize what was happening. He was perhaps eager to inspire a committed loyalty that did not ask too many questions, which we see in the inscription set up in Poetovio in Pannonia by a tribune of the praetorians ‘setting out to suppress the Gallic faction’ (that is, the emperor’s rival, Clodius Albinus).43 Indeed, Severus had disbanded the praetorians in 193, replacing them with legionaries. There were good reasons for this in that they had murdered Pertinax, sold their support to Didius Julianus and then abandoned him. They could not be trusted, and Severus also needed to reward the soldiers of his own legions who had first supported him. However, symbolically this highlights the political relationship between emperor and praetorian guard that Dio had pointed out in respect of Augustus’ creation of the guard in 27 BC.44 On his deathbed Severus allegedly said to his sons,‘Stick together, enrich the soldiers, and despise the rest’, which suggests that he was well aware of the political reality of the army’s power.45
Did the army now have a more dominant political role to play and, if so, how was this manifested? Is there any real evidence that Septimius Severus brought about an increase in militarism? We must look first at the criticisms of Cassius Dio, a contemporary senator, which are echoed by another contemporary writer, Herodian. Dio was angered at the cost of the army (Severus granted a pay rise) and frequent military campaigns, and the burdensome presence of so many troops in Rome.46 These criticisms seem to relate to the immediate situation, but perhaps more significant is his analysis of the emperor’s relationship with his troops. Severus placed his hopes of secure government on the strength of the army rather than on the goodwill of those around him, by which he means those members of the upper classes who could assist his rule.47 This might indeed suggest a changed balance of power with more open reliance on the army, or even some kind of military participation in government, but Dio may be reflecting on the early part of the reign immediately after the coup of 193 when the emperor’s intentions were still unclear. Dio’s general verdict on the reign is rather more favourable.48
However, it is possible that a greater reliance on the army, greater specialization in military affairs and the frequent military campaigns of this era promoted social mobility. Perhaps the emperor, spending more time in the company of soldiers, turned to them or their junior officers for advice and guidance, accepted their militaristic outlook and tried to use them in various levels of government. But, so far as we can tell, Septimius Severus seems to have employed henchmen and advisers drawn from the usual quarters, that is, senators and equites. He was supported by his fellow governors of the Danube provinces, notably C. Valerius Pudens, governor of Lower Pannonia, later destined for high honours, and Severus’ brother, P. Septimius Geta, governor of Lower Moesia. In charge of the food supply for the march to Rome was M. Rossius Vitulus, a former equestrian officer, while the commander of the advance guard was Julius Laetus, possibly a legionary legate or governor of Raetia or Noricum. In the campaign against Niger several senators who were old friends of Severus played a leading role, especially Fabius Cilo, Tiberius Claudius Candidus and Cornelius Anullinus. Claudius Claudianus, a man of equestrian rank, was brought into the senate, made praetor and soon sent as legionary legate in Dacia.49
Men like Claudianus were doubtless absorbed into the senatorial ethos, but it is possible that, as the regime settled down, the greater military experience or aptitude of equestrians persuaded Severus to ignore the usual social conventions and promote equites to jobs of major responsibility, and encourage them to edge out senators. The emperor then would have devoted henchmen from outside the top social class who had talent, a more professional attitude to military service and a hard edge of military thinking. In time this could change the character of government. Most striking is the appointment of an equestrian to the governorship of the new province of Mesopotamia, the only person of this status to be permanently in command of legionary troops apart from the prefect of Egypt. But this was probably not part of any policy to promote equestrians. Severus was always concerned with security, and he may have wished to break up the pattern of five armed provinces in the area, all governed by senators.50 Or he may have found it difficult to find a suitable senator willing to serve in a newly conquered province that might prove fractious. The legionary commanders in Mesopotamia were necessarily of equestrian rank because it would have been unthinkable even at this date to ask a senator to be subordinate to an equestrian. In this Severus was protecting the interests of senators. The newly recruited legion (II Parthica) stationed in Italy at Albanum was also under an equestrian prefect, but it was traditional for troops in Italy to be commanded by equestrians, and in any case it may have been under the ultimate authority of the praetorian prefects.
We must ask if Severus pursued a more subtle approach by trying to infiltrate equestrians quietly into posts normally held by senators, so that gradually the position of senators in the administration was undermined. Inscriptions recording the careers of individual office-holders provide the only evidence and there are not enough to give a clear answer. From the reign of Severus we have about seven cases where a man of equestrian rank was appointed to a post of governor that would normally have been held by a senator. This is only a small number of examples, and the title usually held by these men (‘acting in place of the governor’) suggests that they were intended to be temporary appointments. In one instance there was clearly an emergency, since the governor had died suddenly in office. The men appointed to these temporary positions rarely commanded troops, and there is little to suggest a sinister motive. Severus was not the first emperor to think of using equites as temporary replacements for senators, a practice attested at least as early as the reign of Domitian. In a way typical of Roman administration, the emperor was making an ad hoc response to immediate circumstances. In general, it made sense to exploit fully the talents of equestrians and promote them as required, as Augustus had done.
Thus, when it suited him, Severus was prepared to encourage this avenue of social mobility provided by service in the army, which in turn added a further dimension to the political culture in Rome.51
It would be particularly interesting if promoted soldiers were significantly better off in terms of career prospects in the reign of Septimius Severus. This would show how far social mobility had improved under the new regime. Many equestrian office-holders such as procurators had begun their career with military service of some kind, often holding one or more of the military posts traditionally held by men of their rank, such as military tribune or commander of an auxiliary cohort or ala. There was a gradual increase in the proportion of men who rose from the position of centurion to equestrian rank and were then promoted to hold further posts in the civil administration. Such men might be thought to represent a tougher, genuinely military influence. Perhaps indeed Severus aimed deliberately to change the basis of Roman government by appointing men with a tough military background to junior positions, and then ensuring that gradually they could be promoted to form a new group of administrators. However, on the available evidence, in the Severan period just over 30 per cent of equestrian procurators who had held some military post in their previous career were promoted centurions, while over 57 per cent had held traditional equestrian military posts.52 Furthermore, it is clear that the practice of employing ex-centurions went back at least to Hadrian and was well established before Severus. This is not likely to be a deliberate or longterm policy, or a sign of militarism. Rather, emperors were sensibly using more intelligent or well-educated soldiers to fill gaps in the administration.
To sum up, under Septimius Severus it seemed like business as usual for equites, although there was some increase in their status and responsibilities. The emperor certainly had many henchmen and confidants from the equestrian class. But so had Augustus, for example, Maecenas, and Cornelius Gallus, who was appointed as first prefect of Egypt in charge of legionary troops in defiance of precedent. In fact it does not appear that Severus had any preference for equestrians or trusted them more. When the Severan dynasty finally came to an end in ad 235, senators stiU held most of the major governorships and army commands. As for the army, when Severus died in ad 211 ordinary soldiers were of course financially better off, had been enriched by the plunder and donatives from civil and foreign wars, and could legally marry. Furthermore, the army did contribute to social mobility and offered a route to higher posts, but for a comparatively small number of soldiers, as before. The troops had no more legal privileges than previously. They did not dictate military policy, since the major foreign military expeditions were undertaken at the emperor’s personal decision. In fact soldiers had virtually no direct political influence under Severus, and had no impact on the succession he had arranged, or subsequently when Caracalla murdered his brother Geta.
It is striking that the high-ranking lawyer Ulpian, a contemporary of Severus, confirmed that a law still formally defined the emperor’s position: ‘Whatever the emperor has decided has the force of law; inasmuch as through the law which was carried concerning his power, the people confers all its power and authority on him and in him.’53 Indeed, in the Severan period the character and order of society are similar to that under the respected Antonine emperors, and Dio’s description of Severus’ daily routine and conduct of government business also suggests an emperor not untypical of previous years.54 There was always a balance to be found between the emperor’s civilian attributes and his military responsibilities, since he needed to preserve the loyalty and goodwill of the senatorial class, from which most of the governors and army commanders came. Indeed, Tiberius famously described the emperor’s task of dealing with a possibly seditious nobility, the senate, and the demands of the soldiers as ‘holding a wolf by the ears’.55
It is therefore impossible to sustain sweeping generalizations about militarism and praetorianism in the Roman world. There was no real military hierarchy or caste of generals, and it certainly cannot be said that the ‘Roman imperial guard stands as a classic example of the rule of soldiers’.56 Nevertheless, we can see that the balance of power was beginning to change and that important trends were slowly developing. Septimius Severus did not deliberately set out to increase the role of the army, and he would not have been at pains to define ‘militarism’. But the inevitable consequence of the first capture of Rome with an army for 124 years was a closer relationship between emperor and army, which made it more difficult to conceal the reality of an autocracy backed by military force. After Severus four emperors in succession were violently overthrown, three by military insurrection, though the mutinies were instigated by plotters among the imperial family or senior officials. Dio reflects on the increasing influence of the soldiery: ‘For whenever people, and especially the soldiers, have become accustomed to be contemptuous of their rulers, they feel that there is no limit to their power to do whatever they want; indeed they use their weapons against the man who gave them that power.’57 The army was now more important in politics and potentially less controllable, and the emperor’s position as a military leader and commander in war was more significant. The new relationship between emperor and soldiers was announced by Caracalla in a characteristically excitable way: ‘I am one of you and it is because of you alone that I want to live so that I can do all kinds of good things for you. For all the treasuries belong to you.’ An emperor must be willing to fall in battle, for ‘there a man should die, or nowhere’.
World History
