It is commonly accepted that history was not included in the disciplines that moved towards exact knowledge, truth in the philosophical sense of the term, and that the results of historical research were part of doxa {opinion). This arrangement of history as foreign to philosophy was consolidated specifically in the great systematic philosophies of the fourth century and the Hellenistic age. The Greek and Roman philosophers did not dedicate themselves to historiography and did not elaborate historiographical theories {Finley 1975: 12). The sole exception is Posidonius, who also wrote history, but I would be very cautious before attributing to him {and by extension to Stoicism) a complete philosophy of history that incorporates the study of the past into a philosophical system {Pani 2001: 66 speaks of Posidonius’ systematic conception ofhistory, but cf. Nicolai 2003b: 689-691). It was only with Christianity that history became a part of a vision of the world and the destiny of man: on the one hand, the faith founds itself on the historical veracity of the coming of Christ, of his death and resurrection, while, on the other hand, history had for the first time a goal and an end, the second and definitive coming of Christ for the final judgment (from the enormous bibliography, Press 1982: 61-119 is useful for a terminological start). After Christianity imposed a theological conception onto history, many metaphysical and political philosophies elected history as their foundation and, as a consequence, many diverse philosophies of history were elaborated. But this perspective is completely foreign to Greco-Roman antiquity, just as the idea of history as a science is foreign. A view of history as a science is wrong in its assumptions because the historical event is not only in itself subject to doubt but above all not repeatable, according to the required principle of modern science, and it cannot be anachronistically projected onto classical antiquity in the search for a scientific method in historians such as Thucydides and Polybius: both in a way satisfy the standards of modern historiography for very different reasons. The only system which historiography was always part of was the literary system, and not only because historiography was labeled as literature. Herodotus and Thucydides, as we have been suggesting, were the first historians to confront epic and to introduce epic narrative techniques into their works (the most outstanding being the speeches given to various characters; below, Ch. 9).
If we investigate the history of historiography as the history of a literary genre we find at the outset the problem of deciding what should be included and what excluded. Traditionally, modern histories of historiography concentrate on the great authors and on the two main lines, one inaugurated by Herodotus, the other by Thucydides (Strasburger 1975; Momigliano 1990: 29-53). All the rest are either relegated to forerunners (as in the overvaluation of Hecataeus’ alleged rationalism) or placed in the indistinct limbo of minor historiography (including, to hint at only a few kinds, local and regional historiography, antiquarianism, monography, and biography). This outlook is wrong in two aspects: what has survived is due to the tastes of the public in several crucial ages and to the fortuitous chances of destruction; the number of authors and works belonging to so-called minor historiography is an indication of their success with the public, in many cases limited in terms of time and place, but an indication nonetheless of a more complex and varied reality (Gabba 1981; Schepens forthcoming). And what is the border separating historiography from genealogy, from ktiseis, from antiquarian peric0e:seis and even from the narrations to which we give the modern name of novels, such as the works under the names of Dictys of Crete and Dares of Phrygia from the Trojan saga, or those on the fortunes of Alexander the Great? One cannot deny that these narratives have some historiographic characteristics (Canfora 2003: 15; on the boundary between historiography and novel see Treu 1984; below, Ch. 56). The typical answer is that the difference lies in method, but this seems an ambiguous response leaving wide swaths of uncertainty. Another possible response could come from examining the expectations and reactions of the public, trying to understand what was considered authentic and authoritative narration, but in this case too the results are not secure. Let us only consider the fact that for ancient history the poets were considered repositories of tradition, and this is true not only for Homer and the archaic poets but also for relatively recent poets: Strabo cites Callimachus and Euphorion, putting them on the same level as Homer and Aeschylus; the scholiasts compare Lycophron with Homer on the number of ships sent to Troy. Citation of poets in controversial cases had the validity of testimony rendered at a trial, and the poets were often cited as a source of international law. In this case as well, the key lies in detecting what ancient conceptions of historical truth were, and how much these overlap with modern conceptions. If modern historiography tends to be more or less aware of an absolute truth (which can be the foundation of philosophical thought) or a scientific truth (which is independent of any subjectivity), the truth of ancient historians generally rested upon the impartiality and honesty of the historian, viz. on subjective and relative values (Woodman 1988: 83, 197ff.; cf. Vercruysse 1984 on the importance of the subjective aspect in historiography and on the care in confronting truth and lies). Next to the truth of the authoritative historian exists another recognized truth, the paradigmatic truth of traditional narrations and history used by orators (for the exemplary value of traditions handed down by poets see Cic. Leg. 1.3-4, with Nicolai 2001a). But if these are the main ancient conceptions of the true historian, it is evident that neither the criterion of method nor that of public reaction to the authority of the narrations can be used with any hope of success. The only possibility is to leave open the borders of the historiographical genre, distinguishing from time to time the goals of individual authors and judging their works not in terms of a canon, either Thucydidean or modern as it may be, but in the context that produced them and that they served.
World History
