It is indeed conviction which must lie at the heart of any religious system. This conviction need not take the shape of dogmatic certainties - how often have we been told that the Greeks had no creed, no sacred books even? It need not even suppose that human beings are capable of knowing very much about the Gods. What we see in the religion of the classical period (and this persists later, with certain modifications) is a twofold conviction: first, there is the sense of the rightness of religious practice; second, there is the feeling that the existence of the Gods and their relationship with human beings is a necessary, even central, part of the way the universe is. Neither of these points was without difficulties, but still they acted as foundations to which, consciously or unconsciously, thought would keep returning.
The first point is simple: any set of rituals carried on with more or less universal acceptance and potential participation will carry a strong authority. In Greece, this effect is complicated because of the high value placed on doing things kata ta patria, in accordance with ancestral custom, and because of the integration of so much of religious ritual with the city and its sub-groups. But essentially a process of circular confirmation is going on: the high value placed on the performance of rituals lends authority to the belief that the Gods will respond, and hence to the assumptions about the Gods which we reviewed at the outset; in turn, these assumptions will naturally entail the performance of ritual. Criticism and puzzlement over the procedure of animal sacrifice seldom involved non-performance. Even some of the Pythagoreans may have made an exception to their habitual vegetarianism to allow them to taste sacrificial meat - the tradition is unclear and divided on this point.
The second point is related to the first, for in the mutuality of the exchange between the Gods and their worshippers lies much of the perceived sense of the way things are. ‘In return for this give wealth and long-lasting health’ and ‘make it possible for me to set up another offering’ say fifth - and fourth-century dedications. Sokrates has little difficulty in leading Euthyphron to a position where he agrees that to hosion, piety, is a kind of emporike techne, exchange and bartering (Plato Euthyphro 14E). It is when this system of exchange appears to break down that its function as sense-provider is most clearly seen. Thus the chorus in Sophokles’ Oedipus Tyrannus (863-910) observe crimes going unpunished and ask what point there is now in forming a chorus for the Gods. A whole system of explanation, based on the Gods and their unwritten laws, seems to be collapsing around them. Usually, the system reasserts itself. The chorus’s disquiet at the apparent non-fulfilment of oracles is seen to have been misplaced, though with consequences that are no happier for them. Even Hekabe’s cry at the destruction of Troy, ‘In vain we sacrificed’ (Euripides Trojan Women 1242), is eventually tempered - like all the disturbing elements of tragedy - by its appearance at a festival honouring the Gods. And Thucydides’ observation (2.47.4) that during the plague at Athens people in despair ceased worshipping the Gods demonstrably cannot have held for long. ‘What’s the point?’ is perhaps a natural reaction, but it is unlikely to be a permanent one.
Paradoxically, the Gods explained not only order, but the lack of it. Natural phenomena such as floods or earthquakes, and the sudden shattering of human expectations, were as a matter of course referred to divine action, which Herodotos famously calls ‘envious and full of disturbance’ (1.32.1). Most societies have comparable mechanisms for dealing with disasters and disappointments, but a pervasive Greek view created a further system out of the simple point. Too much of anything had to be levelled. Too much good luck or prosperity sooner or later would lead to disaster, either of its own accord or by leading its possessor into arrogant behaviour which demanded punishment. For natural disasters too, the explanation tended to be sought in some human wrongdoing which had angered the Gods. The apparent disorder and confusion was really a reaffirmation of order.
Another system which is often seen by moderns as explanatory caused the Greeks themselves a lot of difficulty. I refer of course to mythology. It is highly unlikely that there was ever a time when stories about the Gods were apprehended as ‘true’ in the same way that an account of what you did yesterday might be true. But by the classical period such stories were already an embarrassment. Xenophanes’ caustic reference to Homer and Hesiod describing the Gods’ indulgence in activities which were ‘shame and disgrace among humans’ (21 B 11 Diels-Kranz) sets the scene for a whole history of later criticism, from Pindar’s self-conscious refusal to say unfitting things of the Gods ( Olympian Odes 1.52) to Euripides’ ironic, even metatheatrical (see especially Hercules Furens 1340-6) games with the absurdities of myth, to Plato’s wholesale rejection of divine mythology and banishing of the poets {Republic 377E-92A). An alternative route, which flourished in the hellenistic period and later, but was already known to Plato, was to take the stories not as representing the actual doings of the Gods, but as allegories of some higher truth. Popular though this approach became, it was not enough to prevent a pervasive feeling that father-beating, theft, deception and adultery were not appropriately portrayed as pursuits of those who could be expected to punish bad behaviour in mortals. Whatever mythology might once have ‘explained’, by this stage it had been so heavily problematized that it raised more questions than it answered. In fact, for many thinkers, the Gods were better apprehended in quite other ways. Xenophanes posits ‘one God... not like mortals in form or in thought {21 B 23 Diels-Kranz), and Herodotos reports with evident approval the Persians’ supposed view that the making of statues, temples and altars is ‘foolishness’, ‘because they do not habitually consider { enomisan) the Gods as having human form, as the Greeks do’ {Hdt. 1.131.1).
We are thus brought back to the paradox with which we started: apparently radical ideas, and radical uncertainty, alongside equally apparent conservatism and certainty. But labels such as ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ may be misleading, no more than an accident of our particular historical perspective, giving us in the fifth century and again in the fourth a sudden increase in the amount and change in type of evidence available. Just as in religious practice cults of Bendis, Adonis and Sabazios took root and flourished - with or without official approval - alongside those of Zeus, Artemis and Dionysos, so in thought, conceptions of the Gods flourished which were quite different from those of poetry, of assumptions about the city and its Gods, and to an extent those implied in cult, without, however, supplanting the latter in their appropriate contexts. It may equally be a mistake to see these alternative conceptions as a product of ‘fifth-century enlightenment’ or the sophistic movement, briefly anticipated by the Presocratics. It seems much more likely that Greek religion of its nature was, like most polytheisms, an open, pluralistic system able to ‘contain multitudes’, to accommodate many different, even seemingly incompatible, viewpoints and practices. In the fifth and fourth centuries we have simply a close-up view of the process at work, as it produces kaleidoscopic images which defy a simple summary.
Further reading
Possibly the best really introductory work on classical Greek religion, with extensive quotation from ancient sources and good illustrations, is Mikalson {2005). This should be followed by Price {1999), an important and more debate-oriented account. The best comprehensive survey, full of useful insights, is still Burkert {1985). Invaluable also is the short, bibliographically based, overview in Bremmer {1999). {There is some more recent bibliography in Mikalson 2005.) Specifically on Athens, whence comes most of our evidence, see Mikalson {1983) and especially Parker {1996; 2005).
On the place of the city, Sourvinou-Inwood {1988; 1990) are classic and powerful statements; elements of the approach are to be found in Easterling & Muir {1985), and especially in Bruit Zaidman & Schmitt Pantel (1992), another ‘introductory’ treatment. Different ways of conceptualizing the Gods are discussed in Kearns (1995); see also ch. 2 of Mikalson (2005). Mythology would require a separate bibliographical note, but a good place to start is Graf (1993).
For sanctuaries, see Mikalson (2005: ch. 1), Alcock & Osborne (1994) and Corbett (1970). The writings of Burkert on sacrifice (1966; 1983) have generated much discussion; a different approach is Bowie (1995). For dedications, see van Straten (1976; 1981); for prayer, Pulleyn (1997). There is no satisfactory up-to-date treatment of Greek priesthoods, but Garland (1990) will serve for Athens. The last decades have seen a great deal of discussion on specific rituals performed by women, for which see Dillon (2002), and rather less on gender issues in religion generally: some aspects are explored in the essays in Blundell & Williamson (1998). Burkert (1987) deals with Mysteries, while Parker (1995) is a fairly recent survey and tentative interpretation of the evidence for ‘Orphism’. Parker (1983) is fundamental on religious purity and its opposite.
Bibliography
Alcock, S. E., & R. Osborne (eds) (1994) Placing the gods: sanctuaries and sacred space in ancient Greece (Oxford: Clarendon)
Blundell, S., & M. Williamson (eds) (1998) The sacred and the feminine in ancient Greece (London: Routledge)
Bowie, A. M. (1995) ‘Greek sacrifice: forms and functions’ in Powell 1995: 463-82 Bremmer, J. N. (1999) Greek religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (G&R New Surveys in the Classics 24)
Bruit Zaidman, L., & P. Schmitt Pantel (1992) Religion in the ancient Greek city (trans.
P. Cartledge from the French original (11989)) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Burkert, W. (1966) ‘Greek tragedy and sacrificial ritual’ in: GRBS 7: 87-121 Burkert, W. (1983) Homo necans: the anthropology of ancient Greek sacrificial ritual and myth (trans. P. Bing from the German original (1972)) (Berkeley: University of California Press) Burkert, W. (1985) Greek religion: archaic and classical (trans. J. Raffan from the German original (1977)) (Oxford: Blackwell)
Burkert, W. (1987) Ancient mystery cults (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press)
Buxton, R. G. A. (ed.) (2000) Oxford readings in Greek religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Corbett, P. E. (1970) ‘Greek temples and Greek worshippers: the literary and archaeological evidence’ in: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 17: 149-58 Dillon, M. (2002) Girls and women in classical Greek religion (London: Routledge) Easterling, P., & J. Muir (eds) (1985) Greek religion and society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Garland, R. (1990) ‘Priests and power in classical Athens’ in: Beard, M., & J. North (eds) (1990) Pagan priests: religion and power in the ancient world (London: Duckworth) 73-91 Graf, F. (1993) Greek mythology: an introduction (trans. T. Marier from the German original (1987)) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press)
Kearns, E. (1995) ‘Order, interaction, authority: ways of looking at Greek religion’ in: Powell 1995: 511-29
Mikalson, J. D. (1983) Athenian popular religion (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)
Mikalson, J. D. (2005) Ancient Greek religion (Oxford: Blackwell)
Parker, R. (1983) Miasma: pollution and purification in early Greek religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press (reissued, with new preface, 1986))
Parker, R. (1995) ‘Early Orphism’ in: Powell 1995: 483-510 Parker, R. (1996) Athenian religion: a history (Oxford: Clarendon)
Parker, R. (2005) Polytheism and society at Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Powell, A. (ed.) (1995) The Greek world (London: Routledge)
Price, S. (1999) Religions of the ancient Greeks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Pulleyn, S. (1997) Prayer in Greek religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Sourvinou-Inwood, C. (1988) ‘Further aspects of polis religion’ in: Annali dell’Istituto Uni-versitario Orientale di Napoli, Dipartimento di Studi di mondo classico e del Mediterraneo antico, Sezione di archeologia e storia antica 10: 259-74 = Buxton 2000: 38-55 Sourvinou-Inwood, C. (1990) ‘What is polis religion?’ in: Murray, O., & S. Price (eds) (1990) The Greek city (Oxford: Clarendon) 295-322 = Buxton 2000: 13-37 van Straten, F. T. (1976) ‘Daikrates’ dream: a votive relief from Kos, and some other kat’onar dedications’ in: Bulletin Antieke Beschaving 51: 1-38 van Straten, F. T. (1981) ‘Gifts for the Gods’ in: Versnel, H. S. (ed.) (1981) Faith, hope, and worship: aspects of religious mentality in the ancient world (Leiden: Brill) 65-151 (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 2)
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