The restored Republic was active in the early 60s. Numerous reforms were debated
And many were passed into law, always contentiously and nearly always raucously.12 It
Would be a mistake to make too much of that: Roman politics, simply put, were rough. The story of Rome’s final crisis, however, must concentrate on Pompey and must begin with the legislation of A. Gabinius, a tribune of 67, who proposed an extraordinary command to deal with the longstanding problem of piracy in the Mediterranean. Pirates represented a serious threat to the urban plebs: by 67 they had disrupted Rome’s vital grain imports.13 The tribune proposed that one man be assigned the task of eradicating them. His command, the term of which was to be three years, was to be based on a grant of imperium empowering him to act over the whole of the sea, over all islands, and along all coasts up to 50 miles inland. The actual commander was to be chosen subsequently to the passage of this law, but popular sentiment made it inevitable that he be Pompey.
The sheer amplitude of the command provoked bitter opposition: so much power and such an opportunity for glory must not be entrusted to one man, and certainly not to a man whose lightning career threatened to rise too high, thereby setting the remainder of the aristocracy in the shade. ‘‘Pompey is an illustrious man,’’ his opponent, Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78), conceded in a public speech, ‘‘but he is already too illustrious for a free Republic’’ (Vell. Pat. 2.32.1). Although some smaller fry, like young Julius Caesar, sided with Gabinius, the leading men were united in their opposition.14 But the People were equally forceful in their support for the measure. The Lex Gabinia was passed, and, on the very day of the great man’s election to this command, the price of grain in Rome fell. After three months the campaign was successfully concluded, and it was now beyond dispute that Pompey was Rome’s greatest military commander.15
In 66 one of the tribunes, C. Manilius, proposed a measure whereby Pompey should be assigned the provinces of Cilicia, Bithynia, and Pontus in order for him to assume command of the war against Mithridates, the Pontic king whom Sulla had failed to conquer in the 80s and who was once again at war with Rome (this time since the late 70s). By this one law, three provincial commanders, Lucullus, M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 67) and Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68), would be superseded by Pompey. Their supporters, and Pompey’s enemies, combined to resist the measure, but with little hope of success. Although Lucullus had won brilliant successes against Mithridates and Tigranes (the king of Armenia and Mithridates’ son-in-law), and had insisted that the war was all but over, the struggle thereafter had become more arduous. But by then Lucullus had put himself in a position to be accused of protracting the war. At the same time, his attempts to regulate the depredations of the publicani in Asia had made him hated by the equestrian order, which employed its clout to remove him from authority. Already in 69 the publicani had succeeded in arranging for the removal of Asia from Lucullus’ command; in 68, after an attempt was made to recall Lucullus, Cilicia was taken from him and assigned to Marcius Rex (cos. 68); and in 67 Bithynia and Pontus were transferred to Glabrio. Neither Glabrio nor Marcius Rex had accomplished anything remarkable during their tenures, and the collapse of Lucullus’ stature in Rome was evident in the disintegration of his com-mand.16 Catulus and Hortensius redeployed the argument that what Manilius proposed deposited too much power in the hands of one man, but this bill enjoyed broad support in the Senate: four distinguished consulars backed it, and proof of its inevitable passage can be observed in the speech delivered by the praetor Cicero (On the Manilian Law), himself keen to win Pompey’s favor.
Again Pompey triumphed. He drove Mithridates from Asia Minor and quickly dominated the region, reducing Tigranes to dutiful alliance and establishing a wary relationship with the Parthians. Throughout the east Pompey made detailed and lasting administrative arrangements (many lasting until late in the empire) - without the usual and traditional assistance of a senatorial delegation, thereby vindicating the anxieties of his enemies. At last Mithridates simply died, and what remained of his domains Pompey again settled without senatorial advice.17 By 62, he was ready to return to Rome.
World History
