Of Oligarchy

Although in the Greek world constitutions based on a restricted franchise probably were more frequent than democracies, we are poorly informed about oligarchies. The short-lived Athenian oligarchies of 411/10 and 404/3 are the only reasonably well-documented cases, and even there many questions remain open. That they maintained their power by oppressive terror and did not rule out, or even depended on, collaboration with Sparta tainted them forever. The oligarchies imposed by Macedonian intervention in the late fourth century differed in nature and collapsed as soon as outside support vanished (Lehmann 1997). Scattered references (most notably the description of the Boiotian constitution in the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia, mentioned earlier) and Aristotle’s discussion in Politics offer additional information. Overall, though, little can be said about oligarchic theory or constitutional thought (Whibley 1896; Larsen 1955; Ostwald 2000). Again, the evidence forces us to focus on one case: oligarchy in Athens. But a warning is in place: Thucydides’ portrait of the Athenian oligarchy of 411/10 shows us only the contorted face of a political system fighting for its survival in a hostile environment; so do his analysis of civil war on Kerkyra and Xenophon’s description of the ‘‘tyranny of the Thirty’’ in 404/3. No historical source survives to tell us how a stable and ‘‘normal’’ oligarchic or aristocratic system was perceived or justified itself. Thucydides offers no oligarchic equivalent of Perikles’ Funeral Oration, and - a remarkable but perhaps telling shortcoming of his History - he neglects to scrutinize thoroughly the social and political system, the decision-making processes, and the relations between leaders and citizen body in

Sparta (the report about how the Spartans and their allies decided for war in 432 remains unique, 1.66-88), although he is clearly impressed by Sparta’s long-lasting domestic stability (1.18; Rawson 1969: 20-4; Hornblower 1987: 161-5).

The oligarchic coup in 411 occurred rather suddenly, after a short time of open agitation and preparation (Thuc. 8.45-70; Ostwald 1986: ch. 7; Munn 2000: ch. 5; on the sources, Gomme et al. 1945-81: vol. 5 184-256). Scholars often surmise, therefore, that before the acute crisis that prompted it opposition to democracy was minimal and ineffectual. The latter may be true but does not mean much (Wolff 1979; Bleicken 1994: 371-9). For good reasons, opposition to democracy did not operate in the open: democracy was protected by laws against subversion (Ostwald 1955), and politicians consistently opposing popular leaders and their policies (and thus not even the system itself) risked ostracism or denigration as would-be tyrants. Opposition therefore was forced underground; those unwilling to collaborate with democracy had no choice but to withdraw into an internal exile and become, in Perikles’ words, useless to the community (Thuc. 2.40.2; cf. 8.68.1; Xenophon Memorabilia 3.7; Euripides Hippolytus 986-9, 1016-18; Heftner 2003: 7). If the breakthrough of democracy in the reforms of 462-450 was already violently contested (Thuc. 1.107.4-6; Ostwald 1986: 177-81), from then on a core of elite persons probably stood in constant opposition; their numbers fluctuated according to the level of democracy’s success and political tensions caused by its policies. Such opposition must have been substantial in the 440s, during a protracted power struggle between the factions of Perikles and Thoukydides son of Melesias that ended in the latter’s ostracism, and again in the late 430s, when Perikles (apparently against strong resistance) prevailed with his intransigent political strategy that accepted the inevitability of war with Sparta. In the mid to late 420s, when the war dragged on and peace opportunities were debated emotionally and squandered frivolously, Kleon, as Aristophanes attests (Henderson 2003), fostered a climate of fear of tyranny (a shorthand for any threat to democracy: Raaflaub 2003) - perhaps not entirely without reason. In 415, on the eve of the departure of the armada to Sicily, religious scandals raised the specter of a conspiracy aiming at tyranny or oligarchy (Thuc. 6.27-8, 53, 60.1; Furley 1996). In the crisis after the destruction of this armada, increasing financial pressure on the elite caused rapidly growing dissatisfaction; combined with Alkibiades’ promise of Persian assistance that was tied to constitutional change, this swelled the ranks of oligarchic sympathizers.

Probably in the 420s, the Old Oligarch made no secret of his antipathy to democracy. Although he sees no real possibility yet of overthrowing it, he knows exactly what this would entail: the incompetent and ‘‘crazy’’ masses must be eliminated from politics, power and government restricted to the few, the elite. He was hardly alone in thinking like this. In the 420s as well, Herodotos’ and Euripides’ constitutional debates attest to the issue’s importance in public discourse: the Athenians were familiar with criticisms leveled against democracy and arguments used to defend it. Moreover, some sophists (itinerant philosophers and teachers) were explicitly critical of democratic egalitarianism (Wallace 1998). In theoretical discussions of law, they contrasted laws founded in nature (physis) with man-made conventions (nomoi). They emphasized the right of the strong to rule over the weak and the natural entitlement of the most capable to ignore the fetters imposed on them by the cumulative will of the weak (Kerferd 1981: ch. 10; Hoffmann 1997: ch. 3).

Disgruntled young aristocrats took this to heart, apparently causing a veritable ‘‘conflict of generations’’ (Thuc. 6.12.2, 18.6, 38.5; Forrest 1975).

Hence intellectually, ideologically, and politically, the ground was well prepared for rising oligarchic opposition against democracy. Institutions capable of supporting a coup had long been in place: hetaireiai (groups of followers of elite leaders) were a traditional feature of aristocratic society; xynomosiai (conspiratorial ‘‘clubs’’) had spread as well. Such groups had long been used ‘‘for mutual support in lawsuits and in elections’’; now they served to organize revolutionary cadres (Thuc. 8.54.4; Gomme etal. 1945-81:vol. 5 128-31). When the time came, they were ready to strike. Political murders ofdemocratic leaders and other persons opposed to the oligarchic cause spread terror and paralyzed the supporters of democracy (8.65-6). Overall, then, led by a group of committed leaders (Thuc. 8.68.1 singles out Antiphon, but there surely were others), uncompromising opponents of democracy had long been waiting for their opportunity. When it arrived in the crisis of 413-411, they seized it with ruthless determination. The oligarchic coup of 411 was so well prepared and supported by ‘‘so many intelligent men’’ (Thuc. 8.68.4) that it succeeded despite great difficulties and serious resistance (Thuc. 8.53-54; Lehmann 1973; Heftner 2001).

Still, the oligarchs’ ideas about the constitution they hoped to realize were surprisingly vague. Understandably, they advertised their plans cautiously and spoke more about ‘‘not having the same kind of democracy’’ (Thuc. 8.53.1), seeking out an ‘‘ancestral constitution’’ or the ‘‘ancestral laws’’ of Kleisthenes’ time, that is, returning to an earlier, less corrupted type of democracy (Thrasymachos 85 B 1 Diels-Kranz, trans. Freeman 1948: 141-2; Aristotle Ath. Pol. 29.3), or, as is attested elsewhere, establishing a responsible and moderate ‘‘government by the best men’’ (Hdt. 3.81.3; Thuc. 3.82.8). They also made sure that the suspension of the democratic constitution was sanctioned by a legitimate decree passed - although under great pressure - in the assembly (Thuc. 8.53-4, 67). The exclusion of the crazy and irresponsible masses (advertised by the Old Oligarch) was realized by restricting full citizenship to those who contributed most with their bodies (somasin) and money ( chremasin), that is, the wealthy bearing arms, the horsemen and hoplites (Thuc. 8.65.3, Aristotle Ath. Pol. 29.5), as opposed to the poor who manned the ships (Pseudo-Xenophon Ath. Pol. 1.2). Pay for military service remained intact, that for political functions was, with few exceptions, abolished (Thuc. 8.65.4; Aristotle Ath. Pol. 29.5).

The execution of this program left much to be desired. The franchise was restricted to the 5,000 wealthiest citizens. This number was much smaller than that of the hoplites (of whom a few months later more than 9,000 were registered; Lysias 20.13); the criterion thus probably was the ability to make major contributions to communal expenses known as liturgies (such as funding for warships or performances at festivals). The democratic council was replaced by a smaller Council of Four Hundred consisting of members co-opted by an initial core of oligarchs. This is essentially all we know. The oligarchic constitution adopted at the time in Boiotia was based on a rotation among four councils drawn from among the wealthiest citizens (Hellenika Oxyrhynchia 16.2-4) and probably influenced the conceptions discussed among the Athenian oligarchs, but it is unclear how the ‘‘constitution for the future’’ sketched in Aristotle Ath. Pol. 30, which shows such influences, is related to the moderate oligarchy of the Five Thousand established after the fall of the Four Hundred (Gomme et al. 1945-81: vol. 5 8-26). What is clear is that the ‘‘radical’’ core among the Four Hundred aimed at ruling autocratically and preserving their power by any means necessary, that their methods and aims were soon opposed by a more moderate group, and that they were deposed and, if they had not fled the country, convicted and executed. In this effort the moderates enjoyed the support of large numbers of hoplite-citizens, although others initially were prepared to defend the radical regime (Thuc. 8.89-98).

The oligarchy of the Five Thousand received Thucydides’ qualified approval: he describes it as ‘‘a moderate mixture (xynkrasis)’ that took the interests of the few and the many into account; ‘‘the initial period (of this regime) was one of the periods when the affairs of Athens were conducted best, at least in my time’’ (8.97.2; trans. Andrewes in: Gomme et al. 1945-81: vol. 5 339, with commentary at 331-9). The idea that a mixture between, or collaboration of, extremes (here oligarchy and democracy) was necessary to establish balance and lasting stability occurs in other authors of the time (Euripides F 21 Nauck) mentions a xynkrasis between rich and poor, and Alkibiades in Thuc. 6.18.6 urges the collaboration of young and old and all types of citizens). The concept of a mixed constitution was developed further by Plato and Aristotle and received its fullest elaboration in Polybios (von Fritz 1954; Nippel 1980). It is related to another proposal to strengthen stability and cohesion of a polis torn by civil strife: to enhance the role of the mesoi (‘‘those in the middle’’; e. g., Euripides Suppliants 238-45; de Romilly 1975: 138-40); unfortunately, as Thucydides observes (3.82.8), it was precisely the moderates in the middle that tended to be destroyed in the fights between the extremists. Other proposals (stressing the traditional constitution, concord, or commitment to the common good) were no less idealistic and unrealistic (Raaflaub 2001: 99-117). Real solutions became possible only after several more years of infighting, a defeat and capitulation following upon terrible losses, famine, and complete exhaustion, an even more radical and terroristic oligarchy, and civil war. As pointed out earlier, the fourth-century democracy, somewhat more regulated and less immediate, proved remarkably stable and enduring.