At this point a few remarks on the original meaning of the word “tyrant” in Greek will assist the exposition. Tyrannos is not a native Greek word, but rather an import from another language. Its first attested use in Greek comes in a poem by the mid-seventh century BC poet Archilochus who used it to denote - in a positive context - Gyges, the King of Lydia (Fr. 19 West). All the early uses of the word can be interpreted as positive; none is demonstrably negative. The positive connotation of the word still appears in later Greek literature, most noticeably in the works of the tragedians who use tyrannos as their standard word for “king” (Fornara, Nr. 8). Herodotus too uses tyrannos (and its derivatives) as an occasional synonym for “king” or “ruler.” Thus, Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, exhorts his son Lycophron to receive the “tyranny” and to become “king” (Hdt. III 52,3-4). Another example: “Philo-cyprus, whom of (all) tyrannoi Solon. . . praised the most” (Hdt. V 113,2). This Philocyprus ruled as an hereditary king over the Cyprian city of Salamis, yet Herodotus can include him, in an obviously positive context, among the “tyrants.” Conversely, Herodotus can refer to rulers traditionally classed as “tyrants” with the word for “king” (V 44,1 and VI 23,1). For Herodotus the two words still function as synonyms, and on the basis of Herodotus’ usage no one could possibly distinguish between two classes of rulers - “kings” on the one hand and “tyrants” on the other. That distinction is fully on display in the work of the Athenian Thucydides who consistently uses “king” for hereditary monarchs who lawfully hold their position and “tyrant” for that class of rulers who form the subject of this chapter.
Defining that class was and is difficult, however. Aristotle attempted an analytical definition and distinguished two basic kinds of “tyrant” in Greece, the “elective” tyranny (whereby a “tyrant” was lawfully appointed to his position) and the more normal kind (whereby a “tyrant” gained his position by an unlawful act of his own) (Pol. 1285a and 1310b). For the latter Aristotle distinguishes three such unlawful methods of becoming a “tyrant”: an ambitious man secures high office for himself and misuses it to make himself a tyrant; a military leader takes advantage of his command and establishes a tyranny; a lawful king oversteps his legitimate authority and so becomes a tyrant. This last method highlights, incidentally, the difficulty in distinguishing “kings” from “tyrants” - Pheidon of Argos was apparently a lawful king (Ephorus, BNJ 70, Fr. 115) whom many viewed as a tyrant (e. g., Hdt. VI 127).
However, Aristotle failed to mention one way in which a fair number of Greek tyrants obtained their position: they inherited it from their fathers. Well-known tyrants such as Hippias of Athens and Periander of Corinth came to power in that way. In fact, Aristotle seems completely to have missed one fundamental characteristic of Greek tyranny: its general heritability. When the tyrant had no son, his nearest male relative (a nephew - as in the case of Psammetichus of Corinth who succeeded his uncle Periander [Arist. Pol. 1315b]; a brother - as in the case of Hiero of Syracuse who succeeded his brother Gelon [Arist. Pol. 1315b]) often assumed power after his death. Moreover, the dynastic nature of the tyranny was apparent to non-Greek observers such as the Persians: When the Persians conquered Samos in the late sixth century, its tyrant Polycrates had been dead for a few years and the tyranny deposed. The Persians promptly appointed a new tyrant, Polycrates’ nearest surviving male relative - his brother Syloson (Hdt. III 139sqq.; see also chap. 9). Syloson’s son, Aeaces II, would eventually succeed to the tyranny as well (Hdt. VI 13). More tyrannies than the Samian evince this dynastic nature: the Orthagorids, the family of Orthagoras, for example, ruled for a century in Sicyon (Arist. Pol. 1315b) - from circa 650 to 550 on the “high” or from circa 610 to 510 on the “low” chronology.
“Tyranny” and “kingship” have this dynastic nature, this heritability, in common. That is to say, etymology and practice coincide in this important point; and from this point discussion should now proceed.
World History
