CONCLUSION

From the first century BC to the early third century AD, Rome’s military presence in the Near East resulted in the formal organization of territory that had previously been under Roman influence. It was not until the middle of the first century AD that a permanent Roman military presence was established on the banks of the Euphrates, by which time the river’s role as a symbolic boundary had given way to a more practical one. It is reasonable to conclude that a section of the river acted as a boundary between Roman and Parthian interests up to this time and that it continued to do so until the middle of the second century AD. The Euphrates as a boundary was not a line at which Rome considered that its power stopped, but it represented a boundary negotiated with Parthia following conflict or in times when the two empires wished to negotiate. Before formal organization into provincial territory, Roman influence was often exercised in economic terms. This is demonstrated at Dura Europos even when the city was under some form of Parthian control, and it is also shown at Palmyra where Rome exercised power initially by controlling tariffs. When the Palmyrenes and the territory of Palmyra itself emerged as militarily important, the nature of Rome’s power at Palmyra began to change and eventually became more formalized early in the third century AD.

The immediate purpose in establishing fortifications on the Euphrates under Vespasian was directly associated with the tensions between Rome and Parthia over Armenia. These fortifications were clearly useful for offensive purposes in Armenia, and they became increasingly useful in Osrhoene and Mesopotamia, but there were times that they came to play an important defensive role. This was expressed in some sources of the latter half of the first century AD. In the middle of the second century AD the war between Rome and Parthia showed that the presence of a large number of Roman troops in fortifications on the upper and middle Euphrates allowed their fast deployment to the section of the Euphrates that flowed closest to Antioch. With a concentration of troops on the Euphrates close to Armenia, difficulties with the Parthians could be dealt with more effectively and any

Problems further down the Euphrates could also be addressed quickly. The successes under Lucius Verus were eventually built on in a significant way by Septimius Severus. In his reign, Syria was reorganized and territory over which Rome had less formal power and influence since 165 became organized provincial territory.

It is tempting to see Rome’s extension of control to the Euphrates and beyond as steady, deliberate and organized from the first century BC to the early third century AD. It is also inviting to connect this approach with the requirements of the defence of Syria. An important question, however, hinges on the extent to which this approach was organized and deliberate over the long term. The immediacy of the problems in Armenia and the success of the Jewish War gave Vespasian the opportunity to establish a strong military presence on the upper and middle Euphrates. The more immediate motives in this case appear to have been offensive, but in the longer term these garrisons played both offensive and defensive roles. The three Parthian campaigns of the second century AD were immediate responses to Parthian activity in Armenia. Trajan, Lucius Verus and Septi-mius Severus took the opportunity to gain glory from a Parthian campaign in the process of responding to attacks on their power in Armenia. The ramifications of these actions had long-term territorial implications, but there is no evidence that this was the main aim at the time of the prosecution of these wars. Victory over the Parthians in each case allowed the extension of informal and, in some cases, more formal power, which in turn became beneficial from both an offensive and defensive perspective. Septimius Severus recognized this when he established the province of Mesopotamia, which took formal Roman power to the banks of the Tigris. The extension of formal power along the Euphrates and to the Tigris strengthened what had become the traditional routes by which Parthia was invaded, and at the same time fortifications on the Tigris were meant to act as a shield of the empire.

The situation at Palmyra needs to be analysed in this context. The Palmyrenes developed the ability to protect and expand important trading links further east and their ability to supply products highly demanded by the Romans saw them prosper. At the same time, Rome exercised its power over Palmyra by controlling the tariff structure, primarily to limit the effects of tariffs on prices. The initial aim of Rome’s exercise of power over Palmyra might have been economic, but over time this involvement, and developments in the region more broadly, had the effect of drawing Palmyra and the Palmyrenes more into Rome’s military orbit. The success that the Palmyrene archers came to enjoy in their protection of the caravans was a crucial component in Palmyra’s trading success. This organization and professionalism clearly impressed the Romans, and in the second century Rome’s power at Palmyra extended to the recruitment of the archers for use in other parts of their empire. The initial motive for this recruitment seems not to have been associated with the territory of Palmyra itself, and there were clear benefits in Palmyra retaining some autonomy. Over the longer term, however, the recruitment of auxiliaries drew Palmyra and the Palmyrenes into the Roman military structure. After the extension of power and control along the Euphrates and into Mesopotamia, the territory of Palmyra and the Palmyrene auxiliaries became important to the consolidation of this extension of power. In the reign of Septimius Severus or perhaps before it, Roman power at Palmyra became formally established with the inclusion of Palmyra in Roman provincial territory. What appears as a deliberate approach, which developed in intensity and had a clear outcome, was actually the result of a series of more immediate decisions that served to build on each other over time.

When the Sasanian Persians overthrew the Parthians and took control of Iran, Mesopotamia had been an organized Roman province for 30 years and it had experienced less formal Roman power and influence for decades beforehand. The middle Euphrates and Khabur rivers contained numerous Roman fortifications so that the Roman military and administrative presence was experienced by everybody who lived in the vicinity of them. The Palmyrenes served as Roman auxiliaries for over a century before and had come to play an important role in the establishment of Roman authority on the banks of the Euphrates. Roman Mesopotamia was assuredly a defensive asset and this would be demonstrated particularly in the fourth century. Defence was important and undoubtedly one of the motives for the extension of power, but over the longer term Mesopotamia and the middle Euphrates became important as Roman territory, not just as acquisitions for defensive purposes. This is demonstrated most clearly by the evidence for the Roman military and administrative organization on the middle Euphrates and Khabur rivers in the third century AD.

The organization of the garrison at Dura Europos in the third century indicates that it was highly versatile. The establishment of the camp at the city early in the third century demonstrates the military role that the city was designed to play. While Dura and Parapotamia came under Roman control c. 165, it was not until the organization and annexation of territory under Septimius Severus that the city’s military role emerged more clearly. Until c. 211 the garrison at Dura was comprised mostly of Palmyrene auxiliaries, which were organized at some stage into a cohort from a nucleus of archers present at the city in the very early years of Roman control. When Dura came under Roman control many of the institutions present in the Seleucid and Parthian periods continued. The city had grown prosperous in the Parthian period mostly due to the stimulation of trade as a result of the Roman presence in the Near East. Dura was one of the beneficiaries of Palmyra’s growing trading strength. Dura Europos is an interesting case as it illustrates how Roman power was exercised and experienced at a number of different levels from the first century BC up to c. 165 when the city was clearly not under any form of Roman control. The Roman presence had a significant indirect impact on Dura through most of the city’s duration under Parthian control. In the first 50 years of Roman control, the Roman military presence took the form of Palmyrene auxiliaries and the government of the city remained mostly with its traditional institutions. When a major territorial reorganization took place under Septimius Severus the military presence, which was designed to bolster the recent organization of territory, became much stronger at Dura.

When the Sasanian Persians attempted to challenge Roman power in Mesopotamia, the Roman response was in the same terms as it had been when the Parthians had challenged the Romans in Armenia. There is no indication that the Romans recognized that the Persians were prepared to be vigorous in mounting this challenge. Nor do the Romans appear to have been prepared for the display of Persian military skill and determination that was required of them when they successfully overthrew the Parthians. There was never any question that Rome would seek to defend Mesopotamia and act to recover it, because it was Roman territory, but a Persian territorial claim to Mesopotamia could be shown to be historically valid. The rhetoric exchanged between Severus Alexander and Ardashir on this point is certainly believable.

When the Sasanians marched up the Euphrates and quickly overran Syria in the 250s, the Romans were unprepared for the attack and it was unprecedented in its scale and outcome. The large number of small fortifications and garrisons scattered all over the middle Euphrates and Khabur rivers could do little in the face of such overwhelming numbers. There were difficulties in other parts of the empire, and the economic problems that the whole of the empire appears to have faced did not help. Rome still managed to muster large forces to meet the Sasanian attacks, just as it had done in the preceding decades when undertaking its own offensive operations against Persia. The fortifications and their garrisons on the middle Euphrates and Khabur rivers were not suited or designed for defence against such invasions. The stark and grim evidence of the siege at Dura Europos is a vivid reminder.