In the first half of the second century, evidence emerges to indicate that Roman power on the Euphrates and across it continued to expand, It is argued that as a consequence of Palmyrene control of sites on the lower middle Euphrates, the Romans controlled the Euphrates below Dura in the district of Anatha because they controlled Palmyra in the first century AD, Datable evidence demonstrates that there was a Palmyrene presence at the islands of Anatha, Bijan and Telbis on the Euphrates as early as 98, and this is used to argue that the Palmyrenes were in military control of these sites,76 By implication, therefore, fortifications at Anatha and its environs were under Roman control, but Dura Europos, further up the river, was under Parthian control as the papyri of this period demonstrate, If this was the case, the Euphrates below its confluence with the Khabur was under partial Roman and Parthian control, possibly indicating that the situation as Strabo described it late in the Augustan period still maintained a century later, The nature of Roman control over Palmyra and its territory at this time, however, is not necessarily as obvious as current scholarship suggests, meaning that conclusions about Roman control of sites in the vicinity of Anatha are difficult to make, The complexities of the relationship between Rome and Palmyra with respect to the situation on the Euphrates are considered in more detail in Chapter 2,
Following the reign of Vespasian the garrisons of Satala, Melitene, Samosata and Zeugma on the upper and middle Euphrates remained in their locations until Trajan’s Parthian invasion 40 years later, They also appear to have remained at these locations after Trajan’s gains were
Figure 1.3 Remains of the triumphal arch of Trajan at Dura Europos (ad116).
Largely given up by Hadrian. Trajan’s Parthian war of 114-117 saw a brief extension of Roman control along the Euphrates to Dura Europos and almost certainly beyond, but it is well known that his gains were shortlived and barely survived the last year of his reign.77
While the outcome of Trajan’s campaigns saw little added to Roman territory, the campaigns had some important long-term ramifications in the eastern provinces. A part of Trajan’s army had marched all the way to Seleucia-Ctesiphon, and even beyond to the Persian Gulf. Trajan himself visited Spasinou charax, the capital of characene, a kingdom largely independent of Parthia that had important connections with Palmyra.78 Dio argued that the motive for Trajan’s invasion was ultimately a desire for glory, but Fronto referred to the economic motives for Trajan’s invasion when he described the emperor’s reorganization of the customs dues (portoria) on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, a move possibly directed at controlling the price of goods when they arrived in the cities of the empire.79 It is probable that Trajan’s war weakened the Parthian presence on the middle Euphrates, giving the Palmyrenes the opportunity to strengthen their presence at sites on the river.80 If this was the case, Palmyra developed the mechanism through which Rome would come to control the middle Euphrates more directly between the reigns of Lucius Verus and Septimius Severus, and then formally in the early decades of the third century ad.
Of particular importance in the invasion of Parthia was Trajan’s use of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers as effective invasion routes. Indeed, addressing Lucius Verus in 163, Fronto referred to Trajan advancing the Roman Empire beyond the hostile rivers, possibly referring to the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.81 In the centuries that followed, numerous Roman invasions of the Parthian/Persian empires followed the same routes and were often undertaken in conscious emulation of Trajan.82 The brief establishment of the province of Mesopotamia under Trajan was probably also an example later followed by Lucius Verus and Septimius Severus.83 The formal establishment of Roman control across the Euphrates to the upper Tigris, together with the glory that would be gained from defeating the Parthians, became increasingly important to emperors later in the second century and beyond.
If there was any link between Vespasian’s provincial reorganization in the 70s and the invasion of Parthia under Trajan it was in the form of concerns over Parthian activity in Armenia. The Parthian failure to seek Trajan’s consent before crowning a new king of Armenia, by virtue of the agreement between Rome and Parthia made during the reign of Nero, was what had brought Trajan to the East in the first place.84 The first year of Trajan’s eastern campaign was spent establishing a section of Armenia as a Roman province under the authority of the governor of Cappadocia.85 The garrisons at Satala and Melitene on the upper Euphrates in cappadocia, established in Vespasian’s reign, probably played an important role in pressing Roman claims in Armenia under Trajan while Parthian activity in Armenia potentially threatened the provinces of Syria and Cappadocia.86 The problems between Rome and Parthia over Armenia were central to conflict between the two great powers in the first century AD, and this continued for centuries afterwards.87
The activity begun by Vespasian on the upper Euphrates was continued to some degree during the reign of his sons and was strengthened and consolidated under Trajan and Hadrian.88 Legio XVI Flavia Firma, which had been the garrison at Satala, was transferred to Samosata after Trajan’s death, while Legio XV Apollinaris formed the new garrison at Satala.89 There was also a fortification constructed during Trajan’s reign at Zimara on the upper Euphrates.90 By the reign of Hadrian there were not only the legionary bases at Satala and Melitene but also a legionary vexillation at Trapezus on the Black Sea. Further to this an eight-metre-wide, largely unbroken stretch of ‘military’ road has been traced along the right bank of the Euphrates north from Melitene for a distance of approximately 160 km.91 According to Mitford, ‘a series of auxiliary forts seems to have stood on, or at points east of, the road at intervals of a day’s march’.92 This is held to be indicative of a strongly fortified line connected by a major road from the Black Sea to Melitene running through Cappadocia and western Armenia.93 With regard to archaeological evidence for fortifications, however, Mitford admitted that ‘most of the sites hitherto proposed... should be dismissed, but genuine sites have proved elusive. Only at Dascusa has excavation been possible, to reveal fourth-century work, rather than the original fort’.94 Some reservations, therefore, should be expressed regarding this road as representative of a line of fortifications in the early second century but it is clear evidence of the longer-term military presence on the upper Euphrates.
Given the disputes that had taken place over Armenia between Rome and Parthia since the middle of the first century BC, and particularly in the reign of Nero, this military organization strengthened Roman power in Armenia considerably and Trajan formally established Roman power there by setting up a short-lived province of Armenia.95 If there were smaller fortifications between the legionary bases, and if the road traced by Mitford was built by the early years of Hadrian’s reign, the fast movement of troops into Armenia could be achieved and the defensive potential of these fortifications should also not be underestimated.
World History
