In the past much, even too much, attention has been paid to Cicero’s ‘‘sources,’’ as May and Wisse (2001: 38) rightly observe; there is hardly a line in his rhetorical and philosophical works that has not been traced to some (lost) Greek ‘‘original.’’ Here I confine myself to the outlines; my earlier treatment (Leeman et al. 1989: 190-204, with references to older literature) is more speculative.
To begin with, there seems to be at least some justification for an attempt to trace back Cicero’s excursus on humor to Greek sources. Twice in his treatment Caesar mentions Greek writings on humor, both at the beginning and at the end of his discourse. Unfortunately, he does so without citing the authors’ names (the only Greek authority referred to in the excursus is Democritus, De Or. 2.235). What he mentions are tracts de ridiculis (2.217), and it is clear that there was little in these theoretical treatises to laugh about, except perhaps the insipidness of their authors. On the other hand, they evidently contained many funny remarks made by Greeks from various regions. Caesar does not say where he came across these funny remarks, but it seems logical to take the word inveni (‘‘I found’’) to refer to the Greek books mentioned a little earlier. At the end of his treatment (2.288) Caesar again touches upon the Greeks. He concludes his long list of categories of jokes that depend on content with the following remark: conliguntur a Graecis alia nonnulla. . . sed haec ipsa nimis mihi videor in multagenera discripsisse (‘‘here the Greeks add some other categories... but perhaps my classification is already too detailed as it is,’’ 2.288). The very least that can be deduced from this is that Cicero was familiar with one or more Greek books on wit in which the jokes were classified in (a large number of) categories (cf. also Fam. 7.32.2, where Cicero, while referring explicitly to De Oratore, quotes some Greek terms indicating categories of jokes). Combining the inferences from both passages the conclusion seems inevitable that the heavily criticized Greek treatise(s) looked somewhat like the main part of Cicero’s excursus (2.235-89): a theoretical expose, including (among other things?) a list of categories, illustrated by means of examples that were ascribed to historical persons. Such books have not survived, although the type itself is well known to us from textbooks on other subjects, for example, the section on figures of speech in the Rhetorica ad Herennium.
Not surprisingly there has been much speculation regarding the identity of Cicero’s source, the implicit presupposition being that the excursus is exclusively or to a large extent based on Greek material now lost, perhaps the very books alluded to in De Oratore 2.217, or again a different source not mentioned at all. Scholars have predominantly focused on authors from the Peripatos; in Solmsen’s words (1931: 263), the Peripatetics more or less hold the monopoly for this subject. In the first place it has been supposed that Aristotle’s theory of comedy is - directly or indirectly - at the basis of our excursus. The publication of Umberto Eco’s 1980 novel The Name of the Rose has made it common knowledge that the lost second book of the Poetics is supposed to have contained this theory (see Arist. Rh. 1.11.28-9, 3.18.7). Scholars have tried to reconstruct this book from excerpts, especially the so-called Tractatus Coislinianus. However, arguing against the most recent and consistent attempt at reconstruction, that of Janko (1984), Nesselrath (1990: 102-49) has shown that, although the Tractatus is of Peripatetic origin, it does not reach back immediately to Aristotle (or to Theophrastus); therefore no reconstruction is possible.
Furthermore, the following lost works by Peripatetic authors are known to us (in some cases apart from the title small fragments have been preserved): Theophrastus, Peri Geloiou ( On the Laughable), in one book; the same, Peri Charitos ( On Grace), in one book; Demetrius of Phaleron, Peri Charitos. However, the last two may actually be ethical instead of rhetorical treatises. Neoptolemus of Parium (third century bce?) wrote a book Peri Asteismon ( On Witticisms); perhaps this was one of the treatises that followed the pattern found in Cicero (categories illustrated by examples: the single surviving fragment is metrical, therefore probably a poetical quotation). The most influential and best-founded attempt to trace Cicero’s discussion back to Peripatetic sources is by Arndt (1904: 25-40), although he posits a book that perhaps never existed (Demetrius of Phaleron, Peri Geloiou; cf. Corbeill 1996: 21 n13; Grant 1924: 34, 71; Desbordes 1998: 307). Apart from the sources mentioned earlier, he also makes use of Demetrius’ On Style (163-72) and Plutarch’s Quaestiones Convi-vales (2.1, 629 E-634 F).
Insufficient attention, however, has been paid to the fact that Cicero is giving a theory of humor and wit in a rhetorical treatise. Apart from a brief mention in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (1.10; cf. also 3.23 where a definition of iocatio, ‘‘jest’’ is found), no earlier treatment of the subject in this context - extant or lost - is known. A closer examination of the text, especially the section on the genera ridiculi starting in De Oratore 2.253, shows that the theory as espoused by Caesar has elements in common with other parts of rhetorical theory, especially the doctrine of figures of speech (cf. also Nesselrath 1990: 121). For instance, the definition of the difference between jokes depending on words and jokes depending on content already alluded to (2.252) is identical to the definition ofthe difference between figures ofspeech and figures of thought (cf., e. g., De Or. 3.201, Orat. 81). Many of the categories mentioned by Caesar are known to us as figures of speech or thought, not merely from De Oratore (3.202-7) itself, but also from various other ancient rhetorical treatises. This also holds for the three categories mentioned last (2.288), which, as we have seen, were found in the Greek treatises that Cicero knew. The fact that in 2.261-2, that is, at the end of the enumeration of the jokes based on words, three categories (allegory, metaphor, irony) are mentioned that are elsewhere described as tropes possibly also points to a rhetorical source: in some textbooks, including the Rhetorica ad Herennium (4.42 ff.), the tropes are dealt with immediately after the figures of speech. That there were some (otherwise unknown) authors that categorized the jokes according to the figures of speech and thought is certain from a remark of Quintilian’s (Inst. 6.3.70). The fact that these rhetorical elements seem to point to a much more ‘‘recent’’ rhetorical theory than that of Aristotle and Theophrastus is another indication against direct influence by these authors.
The relations between Cicero and the Peripatetic tradition seem to be much closer as far as the ‘‘ethical’’ (so to speak) prescriptions for making jokes are concerned, namely the rules concerning the admissibility of jokes, the correct subject of mirth, and the moderation required in making jokes. These problems had been the subject of discussion in Greek philosophy, starting as early as the Pre-Socratic philosophers (their statements have been collected and discussed by Grant 1924: 13-17). I have already pointed to the fact that there is a marked resemblance between Aristotle’s definition of comedy and Cicero’s remark in De Oratore 2.236. Nevertheless, proper account should be taken of the differences as well: whereas Aristotle’s discussion of comedy seems to be set in an ethical context (see also Eth. Nic. 4.8.1 ff.), Cicero’s entire discussion is dominated by the rhetorical category of decorum. In particular Cicero’s treatment of the bounds of making jokes (quatenus, De Or. 2.237-47) should be considered from this perspective (cf. Celentano 1995: 171-2; Corbeill 1996: 25-30). When Cicero preaches moderation in using jokes and wit he does not do so out of consideration for the ‘‘victims,’’ but because otherwise the audience might turn against the orator, who would then run the risk of losing his case. Or, in Caesar’s words: nos cum causa dicimus, non ut ridiculi videamur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid (‘‘we make [those witty remarks] with a purpose, not in order to seem funny, but to achieve something,’’ De Or. 2.247).
A theory of jokes in a truly philosophical context is to be found in Cicero’s last major prose work, De Officiis 1.103-4, the third important passage on humor in Cicero’s works (after De Or. 2.216-90 and Orat. 87-90). It is in large part devoted to the difference between jokes that are worthy of a free man and those that are not. In all likelihood, the passage is to be traced back to Panaetius (Zinn 1960: 43), although the distinction itself is certainly older and goes back to Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 4.8.5 ff., Rh. 3.18.7). It does not, however, play a role of any importance in Cicero’s rhetorical works. As we have seen, Cicero also pays much attention to toprepon or decorum in the excursus in De Oratore (2.237-8), but here it is described rather in terms of avoidance of extremes: neither very bad nor very pathetic people are fit as an object for ridicule.
The examples that Cicero uses to illustrate Caesar’s discussion are (almost) entirely of Roman origin. In most cases he indicates a source, not necessarily a direct one, or at least an author. The most important sources were, it seems, Lucilius’ Satires and the collection of dicta compiled by the elder Cato (cf. De Or. 2.271, Off. 1.104;
Quint. Inst. 6.3.105). It is interesting that jokes from Roman comedies (especially Plautus and Terence) are entirely lacking among the examples; only a few are taken from mimes. We may contrast the sections on elocutio and actio in the third book, where most of the examples are taken from Roman tragedy. It is also worth noting that two jokes (at De Or. 2.275-6) are also found in the late antique Greek collection known as Philogelos (sections 18 and 193). By assigning all jokes to persons and situations dating back before 91 bce, Cicero has avoided at least the appearance of anachronisms; obviously, this does not exclude the possibility that some of the examples are his own invention (thus also Monaco 1992: 163-4).
The later influence of the excursus on wit and jokes in De Oratore stretched as far as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when courtesy books, following treatises like Baldassarre Castiglione’s Libro del cortegiano (1528), still refer to De Oratore for their theory of wit (De Man 1993: 136). Such an afterlife is certainly in Cicero’s spirit, who has Caesar state that omnia haec, quae a me de facetiis disputantur, non maiora forensium actionum quam omnium sermonum condimenta sunt (‘‘everything I say about witticisms is seasoning for all conversations, not merely for forensic speeches,’’ De Or. 2.271; cf. 1.32). However, the first major author to be influenced by the excursus was that other major theoretician of rhetoric in Rome, Cicero’s great admirer Quintilian.
World History
