Vengeance had been the theme exploited, first by Philip and then by Alexander, and the war against Persia the justification for allied service under the Macedonian hegemon. The mandate of the League could be enforced before the troops even reached Asian soil. Thebes, which had a long history of Medism, was accused once again of collaboration with Persia, and indeed of advocating alliance with the Great King to overthrow the tyrant who was oppressing Greece, Alexander (Diodoros 17.9.5). The city’s destruction was at once an act of terror and vengeance. On similar grounds, Parmenion had destroyed Gryneion in the Hellespontine region and enslaved its population (Diodoros 17.7.8; Bosworth 1988a: 250). And, not surprisingly, Alexander’s propagandists depicted the crossing into Asia as the beginning of another chapter in the ongoing struggle between East and West. The king sacrificed to various gods and heroes associated with the Trojan War, including an apotropaic sacrifice to Protesilaos, the first of the Achaians to leap ashore and to meet his fate there. Thereafter he hurled his spear into Asian soil, and leaping onto the Asian shore, proclaimed it ‘spear-won land’ (Mehl 1980-1; Zahrnt 1996). The message was unmistakable: more than a mere punitive expedition, this was to be a war ofconquest, and it was to be a Panhellenic effort (Seibert 1998; cf. Flower 2000). But Alexander had no sooner embarked on this fine-sounding mission than it became clear to him that propaganda and expediency were destined to clash. Slogans might prove useful for the enlistment of troops or creating ardour amongst the rank and file, but victory over the enemies’ military forces did not guarantee the political acquiescence of the conquered peoples.
Hardly had he consigned Greeks who had served as mercenaries of the Great King to hard labour camps, for their collaboration with the enemy, before he accepted the surrender of Sardis by the Persian, Mithrenes, whom he treated with respect and kept in his entourage. It was a clear indication of what could be accomplished without recourse to battle, and the friendly treatment of the defector would induce others to follow his example. In the same campaigning season, Alexander dismissed the allied fleet. Militarily and economically, this was a good move, but the political implications were otherwise. The leader of the League of Korinth had rejected the participation of one of its most powerful members. Furthermore, he followed this gesture with an equally confounding one when he allowed Ada to return to Halikarnassos as its rightful queen and accepted her as his adoptive mother. From the very beginning, Alexander had recognized that he might conquer without reaching an accommodation with the barbarian, but he would do so more easily and rule the empire more securely if he did so. Hence, the orientalizing tendencies of the king, which were to cause so much anxiety in the years that followed Dareios’ death, were already in evidence in 334/3. But Alexander was doing little more than applying the methods of Philip to the Asiatic sphere.
For the conservative Macedonians and Greeks, it was a disturbing trend, but Alexander’s progressive moves reveal a political talent that rivalled his military genius. No opportunity was wasted. The decision to send the newly-weds back to Macedonia, where they could kindle the enthusiasm of their countrymen for the war and return with reinforcements, was a fine public-relations exercise, to say nothing of its impact on the Macedonian birth-rate. In spring 333, Alexander was quick to exploit the prophecy of the Gordian knot, even if his rashness forced him to find a desperate solution. After the king’s death there were those who said that he had cheated by cutting the knot with his sword, but no one said so at the time. The respectful treatment of the Persian women captured at Issos showed that Alexander was the consummate master of propaganda, whether it was directed towards the Greeks, the Macedonians, or the barbarians. Not every victory would be gained on the battlefield. So much was clear to the young conqueror, although the soldiers and the majority of their commanders failed to appreciate their leader’s approach. Whatever political advantages accompanied the king’s recognition as ‘Son of Amun’, the troops saw only the rejection of Philip II and the inflated ego of a man to whom success came too soon and too easily.
It would indeed be easy to reduce the king’s actions to those of a young man corrupted by fortune; for thus he is represented in some of the extant accounts. But this is to deny Alexander an awareness of the political reality. He more than anyone understood that the rhetoric which had fuelled the campaign in the first place must give way to a policy of rapprochement if the fruits of his military successes were not to be squandered. Nevertheless, he was prepared to employ different forms of propaganda in his dealings with two conflicting groups - the victors and the vanquished. But, when the fighting stopped, the consequences of this studied duplicity would confront him.
In truth, that confrontation occurred even before the war was officially ended. The flight of Dareios from Gaugamela and the surrender of Babylon and Susa made Alexander de facto ruler of the Persian Empire. Although one final attempt was made to impede the king’s progress at the Persian Gates, the capture of Persepolis was more or less symbolic. Indeed, for the Greeks, the entry into the city was, like that of the armies of the First Crusade into Jerusalem in 1099, the culmination of the campaign and the fulfilment of the purpose for which they had crossed into Asia. But for Alexander it was a public-relations nightmare. As long as Dareios lived and continued to be recognized as Great King, the war remained unfinished and the eastern half of the empire unconquered. Greek allies, mindful of the League’s propaganda, demanded the destruction of the city in the hope of sating their hunger for revenge and booty. Victorious and laden with spoils, they expected to be demobilized. To deny the soldiers of League, as well as his Macedonian veterans, the right to plunder would be a failure to acknowledge their sacrifices, but Parmenion rightly advised that Alexander should not destroy what was now his (Arrian 3.18.11). Hence the king compromised, allowing his troops to pillage while still reserving the greatest treasures for himself; for even in the suburbs there were enough spoils to go around. But, if the destruction of the palace was an act of policy, it was an unfortunate miscalculation. Alexander may have attempted to limit the physical destruction while satisfying the expectations of the Greeks back home; the symbolism of the act was, however, seared into the hearts of Iranians for centuries (Balcer 1978; Shabazi 2003: 19-20).
World History
