Aristotle names three functions for the epilogue: to dispose the audience favorably to the speaker and unfavorably to the opponent, to stir the audience’s emotions (pathe), and to recapitulate the main points of the speech (Rhet. 3.19.1). He places a certain emphasis on recapitulation, as he suggests that the epilogue can sometimes be omitted in a short speech (Rhet. 3.13.3). Other authors consider emotions the most salient part of the epilogue; for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to to pathikon, ‘the emotional part’ (Demosthenes 13).
Like the prooimion, the epilogue tends to be thick with commonplaces, which differ somewhat according to whether the speech is for the prosecution or the defense. One very common closing sentiment expressed by prosecutors is that they have done their best, and now obligation lies with the judges, as in the pithy closing of Antiphon 1 (On the Stepmother): ‘Now I have told my story and come to the aid of the dead man and the law. It is now up to you to look out for yourselves and to rule justly. I think those who have been wronged are a care to the gods below’ (21; cf. Lys. 14.46-47, Aes. 1.196, Lyc. 1.149-50, Din. 1.114, Arist. Rhet. 3.19.5). Similarly, prosecutors might remind judges of their oath to vote in accord with the laws (Lys. 10.32, Dem. 20.167, 55.35), that the community or the gods is watching how they vote, and they should be ashamed to acquit ([Dem] 25.98, Lyc. 1.146). They might also suggest that the laws will be invalid if the defendant is acquitted (Dem. 19.342, 21.224-225, 56.48, Aes. 1.192), and claim that conviction will be in accord with both the laws and what is just ( ta dikaia), and sometimes also that it will also serve the interests of the city ( ta sumpheronta). The following example from Apollodorus’ speech Against Neaira (= [Dem.] 59) is a less than perfect example of an epilogue, as it lacks a formal recapitulation of the case.39 It nevertheless illustrates some of the key themes of a prosecution epilogue:
Gentlemen of the jury, it was to avenge the gods against whom these people have committed impiety and to avenge myself that I brought them to trial and subjected them to your vote. With the understanding that the gods, whom they have offended with their crimes, will observe how each you casts his ballot, you must vote for what is right and bring vengeance - in the first place for the gods and then for yourselves. If you do this, all will think that you have well and fairly tried this case that I have brought against Neaira, that she is a foreign woman who lives as though married to an Athenian.40
In the prooimion, a prosecutor sometimes needs to state his personal stake in the case; in the epilogue, he emphasizes its consequences to the community. Apollodorus reminds the judges that he is avenging himself (having been wronged by Neaira’s husband), but he stresses that the defendant’s offense was against the gods and the city, and hence against the judges as well.41 It has been suggested that the most important emotions in the epilogue are anger and pity. Apollodorus surely stirs anger, but his invocation of the gods was surely meant to arouse fear as well.
Defendants often appeal to pity or favor (charis), though neither is completely limited to defense speakers. They remind judges of the severity of the penalty they face and note the unfairness of the unequal risks faced by the defendant and the prosecutor (e. g., Lys. 4.20, Dem. 57.70, Aes. 2.180-183); they could also display their children from the podium (e. g., [Dem.] 44.81-84). Such measures are mocked in Attic comedy (cf. Aristoph. Wasps 568-574), and Plato (Apology 34c-d) makes Socrates reject the idea of calling his sons to the podium (though not before mentioning that he has sons). Plato would have us believe that such passionate appeals must be inextricably tied to the character of Athenian democracy, but we should remember the equally if not more flamboyant practices in Rome under both the republic and the empire.42 In asking for charis, speakers would remind the jury of past services they or their relatives had performed on behalf of the polis, such as funding construction of warships or outfitting dramatic choruses (Lys. 3.47, 18.27, [Dem.] 50.64). Modern readers are often struck by how openly litigants appeal to considerations that are essentially irrelevant to the judicial question at hand (such as whether the defendant broke the law, or violated the contract, and so on), but Athenians saw no contradiction. At Hyperides 4.40-41, for example, a defense advocate tells the judges that they should disregard the speeches, and focus only on the law and the indictment. He then immediately beckons the defendant to bring his family to the podium. D. Konstan (Chapter 27) makes an observation that is helpful for understanding such passages: pity (eleos) for the Greeks was an emotion felt for the innocent victims of misfortune. It is thus for a good reason that appeals to pity appear in the epilogue, for they must be preceded by an argument for the defendant’s innocence.
Epilogues in oratory differ from theorists’ descriptions in a number of ways. Powerful emotional appeals are not limited to the epilogue but can be diffused throughout speeches.43 Aristotle suggests that the length of the epilogue should be proportional to the speech, but long speeches of the orators can have short epilogues, and short speeches long ones.44 Theorists also say very little about the advantages of being abrupt, though in the orators it is common tactic. Aristotle suggests that asyndeton (the omission of conjunctions) is a figure especially well suited to the epilogue, for the logical connections between the speaker’s points have been established, and it is now enough to simply remind the audience. He cites an example very similar to the ending of Lysias 12 (‘I have spoken; you have listened, you have the facts, you judge’) but says nothing about the force of such a closing. Two speeches of Demosthenes (36.62, 38.28) produce a similar effect when the speaker ends by expressing faith in the judges and then ceding his time: ‘I don’t know what reason there is for me to say more; for I believe nothing I have said has escaped you. Pour out the water clock’. Handbooks also fail to remark on the rather common practice of ending speeches with readings of documents, especially depositions (Lys. 14, Is. 3, 8, Dem. 36, [Dem.] 47, 50). Apparently the clerk’s reading lent an air of authority. It is not uncommon for the orators to omit a formal epilogue (e. g., Lys. 16, Dem. 30, 40, 54, 55, 56), a possibility not mentioned in the Rhetoric in Alexander, and mentioned by Aristotle in the Rhetoric merely to underscore his point that only prothesis and pistis are essential.
World History
