Xenophon quotes verbatim the text of an edict from King Artaxerxes II:
King Artaxerxes considers it just that:
1 The “cities” (poleis) in Asia and, of the islands, Clazomenae and Cyprus should be his;
2 But that the other Greek “cities” (poleis), both small and large, should be left “autonomous” -
3 With the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros which should be the Athenians’, as in the past.
4 And whichever party does not accept this peace, I together with those who desire these things will wage war against that party both on the land and by sea, both with ships and with money.
(Xen. Hell. V 1,31; the numbers of the clauses are added for the sake of greater transparency in the following discussion. Diod. XIV 110 contains an abbreviated version of the edict.)
This edict formed the basis of the treaty eventually sworn. In the case of Athens, a special clause was added to the effect that the Athenians were to take down the gates at the entrance to the Peiraeus. The absence of these gates left the Peiraeus open to attack such that an enemy of Athens, at the outbreak of a new war, might seek to seize the Peiraeus and thus prevent the Athenians from supplying themselves by sea in the event of a siege. In other words, the Athenians were requested unilaterally to deactivate a portion of their defenses in the interests of peace, and they did so (on this, see Cawkwell 1973: 54). The case of Athens shows that clauses tailored to the specific situation of individual states may have existed in other cases as well.
The king’s edict contains a number of specific details and brief discussion of them is in order. Clause 1 establishes Persian control of the mainland of Asia Minor and in lawyerly fashion clarifies two potential points of dispute. The island of Cyprus, which fleets from mainland Greece had attacked on several occasions in the past, belonged to the king. Next, the small Greek town of Clazomenae had been for purposes of defense physically relocated from the mainland onto some small islands just off the coast (Strab. XIV 1,36, p. 645). The Clazomenians’ fields still lay on the mainland, so there was potential for dispute - was Clazomenae an island or part of the mainland? The edict mentioned Clazomenae specifically to achieve clarity in the matter.
Clause 3 lists some specific exceptions to Clause 2. The exceptions concern three islands currently in Athens’ possession, but which in the past had evidently been “autonomous” in the terms envisaged by the treaty. However, the preAthenian inhabitants of the islands were long gone, and no one had any interest in bringing them back. So the treaty confirms Athens’ continued possession of the islands in case any objection on the basis of Clause 2 were to arise. Clause 4 makes provisions for the treaty’s enforcement. King Artaxerxes undertakes - at least officially - to enforce the treaty, but accepts all help which others may give. This last would have practical consequences as the Lacedaemonians took it upon themselves to enforce the treaty or rather their interpretation of it.
Clause 2 was the explosive part of the treaty. The treaty spoke of poleis - “cities,” “city-states,” or, freely, just “states.” All poleis were to be “autonomous” - but which definition of polis did one take when deciding which communities the treaty was speaking of? That the word itself was ambiguous becomes clear when representatives of the Boeotian League desired to swear the treaty. King Agesilaus insisted that polis be taken as “city” - the cities within the Boeotian League, which had never been city-states in the way in which Athens, for example, clearly was, were now supposed to be “autonomous.” Then there was the question as to what “autonomy” was concretely. Its most literal definition was “to make one’s own laws for oneself.” By this view a league-state such as Boeotia was depriving the poleis within it of their “autonomy” by making laws for them.
Agesilaus wielded the Lacedaemonian interpretation of Clause 2 against the Boeotians with devastating effect. He isolated them diplomatically by threatening them with a continuation of the war (by virtue of Clause 4) against them alone. The other Greek states declined to get involved as Agesilaus began to mobilize the full Lacedaemonian army for a campaign against the Boeotians. Bereft of any support, the Boeotians capitulated. They dissolved the centuries-old Boeotian League, and over a dozen cities became autonomous city-states. Duly authorized representatives of each one swore the treaty (Xen. Hell. V 1,32-33). It was a policy of “divide and conquer” - the newly autonomous city-states were much smaller and consequently much weaker than the old Boeotian League. Most importantly, the Lacedaemonians could play them off against each other.
It was the Corinthians’ and the Argives’ turn next. Agesilaus isolated the sympolity of those two states and insisted that if the sympolity were not dissolved, then Sparta would mobilize against them - and them alone. Once again, all others stood by and did not get involved, and once again Sparta got its way. Corinth regained its “autonomy.” Concurrent with this process, those Corinthians who had objected to the sympolity and had, as commonly happened when a faction lost out in a power struggle, gone into exile, now returned and evidently with Lacedaemonian support formed the new government of Corinth. The Lacedaemonians had succeeded in taking a formidable political entity and splitting it into fragments which they could far more easily deal with. In the case of Corinth the factionalism of internal politics actually delivered a new ally (Xen. Hell. V 1,34 and 36).
Duly authorized representatives from both Corinth and Argos now swore the King’s Peace. It was the first so-called koine eirene or Common Peace in that it was a multilateral treaty which, in theory, encompassed the entire Greek world and established peace throughout it. According to an Athenian decree, Persian representatives swore the Peace as well (Harding, Nr. 31). However, it raised a number of new issues, most prominently how to define “autonomy” concretely as well as what political entities could be recognized under such a Peace. Those issues would vex Greek diplomats for some years to come.
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