Paying for the army

In his famous analysis of Roman government set in a fictional debate in the reign of Augustus, Dio expressed the dilemma: ‘We cannot survive without soldiers, and men will not serve as soldiers without pay.’ However, he also argued that a standing army could at least be funded in an organized and planned way, avoiding the chaos and disruption of special levies.52 Augustus himself was deeply concerned about these matters. On his death he left a memorandum for his successor in which he set out the numbers and dispositions of the armed forces as well as all the tax revenues of the provinces.53 Augustus arranged service conditions for soldiers in 13 bc and again in ad 6, including rates of pay and discharge gratuities. Writing about this, Dio reveals the real anxiety of the upper classes, and notes that ‘in the rest of the population the measures aroused confident expectations that they would not in future be robbed of their property’.54 Of course, in his own day in the early third century, some of his fears had been realized. The emperor Caracalla was fond of spending money on his soldiers, ‘many of whom he kept in attendance upon him, alleging one excuse after another and one war after another. But he made it his job to strip, rob, and wear down all the rest of mankind, and most of all the senators.’55 According to Dio, he said that no one in the world should have money but him, and that he would give it to the soldiers.56 Caracalla’s successor Macrinus lamented that he found it impossible to give the soldiers their full pay, which Caracalla had dramatically increased, as well as the hand-outs they expected.57 The succeeding emperor Elagabalus was heard to complain how he had failed to find favour with the praetorians ‘to whom I am giving so much’.58 The spiralling cost of the army under the Severan emperors is also picked up by Dio’s contemporary Herodian, who alleges with some exaggeration that ‘in one day he [Caracalla] extravagantly squandered all the monies that Severus had accumulated in eighteen years and confiscated as a result of the calamity of other people’.59 The last member of the Severan dynasty, Severus Alexander, was overthrown partly because of his perceived miserliness towards the soldiers.60

The pressure of army expenditure remained inexorable. The emperor needed the soldiers’ support first of all to sustain himself in power, and therefore he had to ensure that they were content. The admittedly shortlived mutiny after the death of Augustus in ad 14 was a warning because some of the soldiers’ complaints concentrated on low rates of pay.61 It is in this context that we need to examine the day-to-day annual cost of the army. By his decision to create a professional standing army which was at least in theory ready to meet any military eventuality, Augustus committed his successors to enormous annual expenditure, which would be hard to curtail except by reducing the number of soldiers. That, of course, could make a bad impression. It was alleged (probably falsely) that Domitian regretted the cost of his increase in military pay (see below) and was forced to reduce the number of soldiers, bringing great danger to Rome ‘because he made its defenders too few’.62

The cost of the army cannot be calculated accurately since we do not know clearly the total number of soldiers, their proportions in various pay grades, the pay rates of officers, the rate of auxiliary pay, and the rate of legionary pay in the late second century.63 With allowance for this we may estimate that in the reign of Augustus the annual cost of the army and fleet was in the order of 370 million sesterces.64 This is a conservative view and takes no account of irregular payments (donatives), the cost of ordnance and transport, payments to higher officers, and is based on the assumption that discharge payments (praemia) were not extended to auxiliaries and the fleet.65 On the other hand, military units were probably not always kept at full strength, and the government retrieved some money in compulsory deductions from soldiers’ pay to cover costs such as food, clothing and weapons.

Domitian increased military pay by one-third, from 900 to 1200 sesterces. Since by the end of the second century ad the legions numbered thirty, and the auxilia had probably increased at a higher rate than the legions, the annual cost of the army will now have been around 600 million sesterces.66 From this alone we see how difficult it was for the Roman emperor to consider raising army pay. Yet at the end of the second century there were substantial pay increases, first by Septimius Severus and then by his son, Caracalla. This surely indicates the political difficulties of these times.67 We do not know the exact amount of Severus’ increase, and unfortunately later increases are expressed by our sources as a percentage of the earlier sum. Therefore there are widely differing modern estimates of military pay at the end of the second century. However, even on a conservative view, it seems that in the reign of Caracalla the wage bill of the legions alone amounted to more than 370 million sesterces annually.68 The pay rises in the Severan period probably outstripped inflation and represented a significant improvement in the conditions of military service that perhaps encouraged more volunteers.69

Emperors also made irregular payments (donatives) to the troops, and these became increasingly frequent, representing an important addition to military pay and the annual cost of the army. The donative soon lost much of its original association with military campaigns and visits to the troops, and was more commonly used to mark the accession of an emperor, or his birthday, or the crushing of a conspiracy.70 Although Augustus avoided large donatives, other emperors were less restrained. For example, Claudius paid out 15,000 sesterces per man to the praetorians at his troubled accession, at a cost of 135 million sesterces, to say nothing of the additional expenditure if the donative was awarded in proportion to the legions.71 Marcus Aurelius, respected by senators and praised for his prudent conduct of affairs, paid 20,000 sesterces per man to the praetorians at his accession, at a cost of about 240 million sesterces for the troops in Rome alone.72

We can put into context the scale of the sums expended on the army by observing that at the end of the Republic about 4.8 million sesterces would have been enough to feed around 10,000 families at subsistence level for one year.73 Furthermore, if the annual revenue of the empire in the early first century ad was between 800 and 1000 million sesterces,74 up to 40 per cent of the disposable income of the state was being spent on military affairs. This burden must have been sustained by the empire’s regular taxes, the poll tax (tributum capitis) and the land tax (tributum soli), levied on the population of the provinces but not in Italy. We do not, however, have enough information to understand precisely how they correlate, or how accounts were kept, and how far calculations of requirements were made. Roman citizens in Italy had been exempt from direct taxes from 167 BC, until Augustus introduced two new taxes in ad 6/7 to help fund the new military treasury (aerarium militare), which he set up to deal with soldiers’ discharge payments. These taxes, a 5 per cent death duty on the estates of Roman citizens (except for near relatives and the very poor), and a 1 per cent tax on auctions, were resented at the time, and Augustus had to smooth the way by asking the senate if it could put forward a better suggestion.75 He also contributed 170 million sesterces of his own funds. Senatorial resentment at taxes for military expenditure continued. Dio complained about Caracalla’s generosity to the army because it led to new taxes, or tax increases; death duty was increased to 10 per cent, and all exemptions were removed.76

Since most military expenditure was recurrent it would be unaffected by the need to fight a major campaign; but war must have put some extra pressure on the system. For example, the recruitment of extra troops to bring the legions up to strength will have added to the cost of the army, while enemy incursions into Roman territory or serious revolts might cause devastation and reduce the number of available taxpayers. More directly, Dio’s complaints about extra taxes were directed against Caracalla’s military expeditions, which he considered unnecessary. Of course, the extra cost of war might rather unpredictably be recouped by booty, as in Augustus’ conquest of Egypt or Trajan’s victory over Dacia. On the other hand, during Marcus Aurelius’ long wars against the marauding German tribes on the Danube, he refused the soldiers’ request for a donative, on the grounds that whatever they got beyond their normal pay ‘would be wrung from the blood of their parents and kinsmen’.77 This suggests that the emperor had few funds for additional military expenditure. Later, when Marcus again ran short of money, rather than impose a new tax he sold off imperial furniture and his wife’s jewellery.7® The proceeds were immediately given to the troops. The sale was presumably a gesture to encourage public support, but there is a clear connection between major wars and a need to find extra sources of revenue.

Apart from the burden of direct taxation, the army had to be supplied, fed and moved around the provinces. The provision of grain, weaponry and clothing could be part of a tax requirement on individual communities.79 Indeed, cities in the east may have minted coins to pay troops marching through their territory.®0 Soldiers and other government officers also had the right to demand hospitality and accommodation (hospitium) while on official business, and to requisition the necessary means of transport, including draught animals, carts and guides (angaria). Responsibility for the maintenance of the extensive road network, which was so important for the movement of troops within the empire, was often placed on individuals or adjacent communities.®1 Obviously those living close to main roads or military bases and camps suffered most, and demands from soldiers will have been extremely burdensome even if the rules concerning exactions were properly followed; unfortunately soldiers were frequently violent and grasping, and oppressed the local population.®2

The pressure on local communities would, of course, be much worse during a military campaign when an entire army was on the move. The presence of extra troops in an area meant the provision of additional supplies, and this will in part have involved the extension of the usual supply mechanisms. Nevertheless, a significant burden will have fallen on local communities, in particular to make up any shortfall.83 An inscription from Tridentum in Raetia records how C. Valerius Marianus, a citizen and magistrate of the town, was placed in charge of the corn supply for legion III Italica, stationed in Raetia.84 The context of this is uncertain, but it seems that the government had pressed Marianus, who apparently had no military experience, into the job of finding supplies for the legion. By doing this he was perhaps able to take the pressure away from his own community. A community faced with the appearance of an army on its doorstep would certainly be eager for a rich citizen to help out. We hear how Julius Severus received Trajan’s army in winter quarters at Ancyra on its way to fight the Parthians.85

As well as the need to billet thousands of soldiers, important officers had to be looked after, and perhaps even the emperor himself. The effects of the visit of a high-ranking person can be seen from the edict issued by Germanicus, grandson of Augustus, in an attempt to deal with abuses concerning the provisions of animals, transport and hospitality during his visit to Egypt in ad 19.86 The presence of the emperor himself was of course a great honour, but it was Antoninus Pius who reportedly said that even the entourage of a frugal emperor was a burden to local communities.87 He would normally expect an official welcome. This is represented on Trajan’s column, where several scenes show the emperor passing through towns on the way to the front in the Dacian Wars. He is received by the magistrates and crowds of joyful women and children while sacrificial animals stand ready.88

To accommodate, feed and entertain the emperor was doubtless expensive and demanding. When Hadrian and his army visited Palmyra, one rich citizen made himself personally responsible for his entertainment, and also provided for the soldiers.89 The same emperor and his military entourage, while on the way through Lete in Macedonia, found that a local benefactor, Manius Salarius Sabinus, official in charge of the Gymnasium, had ‘provided for the supplies of 400 medimnoi of wheat, 100 of barley, and 60 of beans, with 100 metretae of wine at a much cheaper rate than the current price’.90 Inscriptions set up in Ephesus recording the visit of Lucius Verus probably on his return from the Parthian war in 166 provide the most detailed evidence for the reception of an emperor on campaign. The city was decorated for the imperial arrival, and individuals were appointed to organize the provision of food. Verus stayed for several days; and one citizen, Vedius Antoninus, took responsibility for his entertainment every day, sparing no expense and dealing with everything meticulously. The scale of Antoninus’ personal generosity may be judged by the fact that the men assigned to provide food gratefully set up a statue to him. His father-in-law, the sophist Damianus, who was also secretary of the city council, provided food for all the soldiers passing through the city over a period of thirteen months.91 Local dignitaries who took on the responsibility of looking after an emperor could find themselves called upon again, as in the case of Claudius Asclepiodotus who assisted the passage of Elagabalus and his army, as he had done with Septimius Severus and Caracalla.92

Whatever kind of gratification the emperor wished on his travels had to be provided. Lucius Verus, before he arrived in Ephesus, had visited Athens and expressed a wish to be initiated into the mysteries at Eleusis. The ceremony had to be repeated for him since it had been completed already.93 On the other hand, the city regarded it as a great honour to have the emperor take part in the rites, as we know from another inscription honouring a priest who mentions with pride the emperors whom he had initiated into the mysteries.94 Thus the presence of the emperor with his army was two-edged. Not only did individuals who entertained him have the opportunity to win imperial favour, but also whole communities could benefit, receiving buildings, gifts, privileges and the opportunity to present requests personally. When Trajan stopped in Antioch on his Parthian campaign in ad 115, people flocked from the surrounding areas with petitions and requests or just to sightsee. When an earthquake struck there was enormous loss of life in the crowded city.95 Indeed, Pizus in Thrace owed its existence to the personal initiative of the emperor Septimius Severus, who ordered the foundation of a small trading community with 171 settlers as he passed through the area on his return from the eastern campaigns.96

In the third century warfare became more intrusive, with frequent civil wars, rebellions and invasions of Roman territory. Life in the provinces was more precarious, and the government made ever greater demands on local communities. By the end of the third century army numbers had risen to about half a million, and more local resources were channelled towards the troops. A military subsistence allowance (annona militaris) established the collection of foodstuffs, wine, clothing and animals for the army. This was originally an extraordinary imposition but eventually became a regular tax, and stood in lieu of payment in cash to the troops (inflation having undermined the value of cash payments). The exploitation of the local population was made worse by the brutality and illegality that often accompanied the collection of the tax,97 and the army seemed less effective now in its crucial role of defending Roman interests and territorial integrity. At a time when the tax base was declining and the burden of tax was greater, some of the links between soldiers and civilians in local areas were breaking down, and the army seemed to feed off city states and their territory, while politically ambitious generals and warlords pursued their own ends. Eventually the state had to face the economic cost of reorganizing the professional army when it was defeated or forced to retreat in disorder, and this had further consequences for the tax-paying classes, and also for the army itself, which naturally wished to reassert its privileged position. Throughout the first three centuries ad it was the inevitable outcome of the existence of a professional standing army permanently based in the provinces that the provincial communities made by far the greatest contribution to the support of the military. They also suffered the greatest devastation, since most wars were fought far from the Italian homeland.