Strategist

From the moment he entered his province, Caesar was on the march - every summer and at times in winter as well. In part, this practice simply reflects his thirst for glory, which he could not win by waiting for some enemy to come to him. He needed victories to secure his position at the top of the Republic’s political hierarchy, and to get them he would have to find enemies to conquer. But in doing so, he was also acting in accord with a broad strategic consensus at Rome. Throughout the Republic strategic doctrine tended to be quite simple. Large-scale operations involving the coordination of multiple armies and generals were very unusual, and Roman armies only rarely stood on the defensive when combat was in prospect. Rather, campaigns typically were waged by a single commander operating with a few legions. Generals were expected to cross the frontier, locate the enemy’s forces, meet them in a pitched battle, and by defeating them secure the surrender not only of the army but of the people or state that it had been defending. Often, the simple appearance of Roman forces in an enemy’s territory would be enough to bring out their army to oppose it. If not, or if the enemy refused to surrender after being beaten in the open field, the legions would devastate the enemy’s croplands and pillage its territory. And either in conjunction with these activities or as an alternative to them, a Roman general would besiege the enemy’s strongholds and fortified cities and by reducing them compel the inhabitants to capitulate or face slaughter. A strategic doctrine founded on the offensive grew out of the imperatives of empire. To ensure the quiescence of its subjects, to deter attacks from neighbors, and to cow those over whom Rome might intend to extend its dominion, the Republic needed to cultivate an image of irresistible strength against which resistance was futile. Regular conquests filled the bill. In pursuing the Helvetii, in marching against Ariovistus, in invading the territory of the Belgae, and in undertaking his other campaigns, Caesar was simply following the strategy expected of any Roman general.

Caesar’s success in implementing an aggressive strategy was greatly facilitated by the diplomatic situation in Gaul in the mid-first century BC, which provided ample opportunities for anyone looking for enemies to conquer. As Caesar has one of the Gallic leaders explain in 58, the two principal Gallic tribes had for some years contended for primacy. When one summoned Ariovistus and a powerful force of Germans from across the Rhine, they tipped the balance of power in its favor. However, Ariovistus soon grew more powerful than his erstwhile Gallic allies and brought them into subjugation as well (BG 1.31). Once Caesar had demonstrated his army’s power by defeating the Helvetii and revealed his own readiness to use it to intervene in Gallic affairs outside the Roman province, the Gauls saw in him a new force in the region that they could mobilize for their own ends. And that is precisely what the Gallic tribes under the thumb of Ariovistus now sought to do by seeking Caesar’s protection against the wrongs they alleged they were suffering at Ariovistus’ hands. Caesar, eager for victories and operating under a strategic doctrine that supported the aggressive deployment of Roman military power, was happy to comply with their wishes. He was able to conquer Gaul because it was divided, and from that perspective his campaigns during his early years in Gaul can be viewed as simply a continuation of the long-standing internecine warfare endemic to the region. For Gauls were only too ready to cooperate in helping Caesar conquer not only Ariovistus’ Germans but other Gauls as well. Thus in the following year Caesar enlisted the aid of the friendly Aedui. They were to mount an attack against one of the Belgic tribes in order to divert their forces while Caesar marched against the rest (BG 2.5). Throughout his years in Gaul, Caesar regularly availed himself of the aid of contingents of Gallic troops from friendly tribes as he subdued their neighbors. This strategy only failed when, after several years of Roman occupation, awareness spread among the Gauls that the Romans had come to stay. This realization led most of them, at last, to unite against Caesar in a desperate bid to regain their freedom.

Caesar pursued his conquests with remarkable boldness and speed. The rapidity ( celeritas) with which Caesar formulated his plans of campaign and put them into execution is evident from the very beginning of the Gallic wars. Upon learning of the impending migration of the Helvetii, Caesar rushed from Rome to Gaul to meet this threat, and by covering about 90 miles a day he reached the province in eight days (BG 1.7; Plut. Caes. 17.4). Within the space of about two weeks he had broken down the bridge over the Rhone and constructed a wall across the valley, blocking the Helvetii’s attempt to march through the Roman province. Thereupon he raced back to Italy, gathered his three legions, enrolled two more, then hurried back to Gaul to confront the enemy (BG 1.10). Similarly, when he set out against Ariovistus later that same year, he did so by forced marches, moving day and night, until he had secured a stronghold threatened by the German warleader (BG 1.38). Caesar highlights the swiftness with which he and his army acted over and over throughout the Bellum Gallicum and not just in crises like that in early 53, when all of Gaul had risen in revolt and Caesar had to travel north to his army once again, by forced marches day and night, in order to forestall any attempt on his life (BG 7.9). Hirtus, his continu-ator in the eighth book of the Bellum Gallicum is equally emphatic on this point (e. g. BG 8.3), and it emerges even more strikingly in the early stages of the civil war, when Cicero found the speed of Caesar’s advance through Italy ‘‘unbelievable’’ (Cic. Att. 8.22 [SB 146].1). Indeed, by that point ‘‘Caesarian swiftness’’ had become all but proverbial (e. g. Cic. Att. 16.10 [SB 422].1, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.41.1, 51.2).

Caesar placed this rapidity of action at the service of a willingness to take substantial risks in order to achieve his strategic aims. Again, this characteristic appears at the very beginning of Caesar’s command in Gaul. During his first two years there, he not only attacked the Helvetii who, if Caesar is to be believed, greatly outnumbered his own forces, but then picked a fight with the most powerful figure in central Gaul, Ariovistus, and in the following year marched against an even more potent foe, the Belgic confederation. His defeat of the Belgae induced many of the remaining tribes in Gaul to surrender; those that did not he mopped up piecemeal, so that by the end of 57 Caesar could claim that ‘‘all of Gaul had been pacified,’’ an achievement given official recognition at Rome by the senate’s decree of an unprecedented 15 days of thanksgiving (BG2.35-6). In Caesar’s telling, the campaigns of 58-57 were all forced upon him: the new homeland the Helvetii intended to occupy threatened Roman territory; he could not refuse the Gauls’ plea for succor against the Germans without dishonor to himself and Rome; and the Belgae were already gathering their forces to attack Caesar, leaving him no choice but to defend himself. Yet it is not difficult to see here a bold but very shrewd strategic gamble by Caesar, in which he staked all his hopes of conquering Gaul on swiftly overcoming the two most important centers of opposition, reckoning that everything else would fall into place once these campaigns had been won. This sort of strategic risk-taking is evident throughout the remainder of Caesar’s military career, not only in Gaul but in the civil war that followed, when in January of 49 Caesar gambled that he could overcome his opponents if he struck swiftly with only limited forces before they had time to gather strength.

While Caesar owed much of his success in war to this combination of speed and boldness, at times these qualities could put him in a tight spot. Once Pompey had foiled Caesar’s attempt to end the civil war almost before it began by trapping his opponents in Italy in 49, Caesar swiftly turned west, intending to deal with the threat posed by Pompey’s forces in Spain to his position in Gaul, the source of much of the money and cavalry he needed to wage this war. It was a bold stroke, typical of Caesar’s style of campaigning. He reached that province in June, before the grain harvest was in, and established a camp near the Pompeian forces. However, when a sudden storm turned the Segre River into an impassable torrent and broke down the bridges his troops had previously constructed across it, Caesar found himself unable to bring in the supplies coming from Italy or to gather enough grain from the countryside round about to feed his troops. His enemies quickly took advantage of the situation to further isolate Caesar by attacking his supply train. News of his predicament reached Rome, where Caesar’s destruction was confidently expected. Only his ability to improvise boats to transport his legions across the river, which enabled him to bring his supply train into camp, rescued his army from starvation (BC 1.48-55). In the following year Caesar transported his army from Italy to Greece, where Pompey was gathering his forces. Seeking to force a decisive battle quickly, Caesar attempted to cut Pompey’s army off from its supply base at Dyrrachium. When Pompey countered by moving to protect the city, the conflict developed into a positional struggle, with Caesar attempting to cut Pompey off by building fortifications around his encampment and Pompey countering with fortifications of his own. But Caesar had acted precipitously. Once again, he had moved before grain was ripe in the area, making it difficult for him to collect food for his army. Pompey controlled the sea, so that he and his men had what they needed despite Caesar’s blockade while Caesar’s troops went hungry. A difficult situation became untenable when Pompey launched a surprise attack on a weak point in Caesar’s fortifications, and he was forced to retreat south hoping to find food and regroup. Pompey and his army followed in hot pursuit, expecting to finish Caesar off in short order (BC 3.41-99).

In evaluating Caesar as a strategist, it is instructive to compare his performance to Pompey’s in their struggle against one another. The Gallic campaigns did not require Caesar to do much more than find the enemy’s forces and defeat them, but in waging war against Pompey Caesar found himself contending against a veteran commander with wide experience and, apart from himself, the most successful general of his day. And indeed Pompey comes off very well in this contest. Knowing that his strength lay in the East, Pompey managed a strategic withdrawal from Italy in the face of Caesar’s determined onslaught, embarking his forces despite Caesar’s effort to trap him in Brundesium. And Pompey prevented Caesar from following for almost a year, thus enabling himself to gather an army to meet the one Caesar already had in being. So round one must go to Pompey. It is true, he lost his Spanish legions to Caesar, but they were mere pawns in the larger game; the war would be won or lost in Greece. When Caesar attempted to besiege Pompey at Dyrrachium, Pompey was able not only to resist but to break the siege by a well-timed attack at precisely Caesar’s weakest point. Caesar here had clearly been out-generaled, as he himself recognized (Plut. Caes. 39.6-7). Furthermore, Pompey continued to press his advantage as he pursued Caesar in his retreat. Round two therefore also ought to be scored for Pompey. And even in the final contest, Pompey clearly held the dominant position, since he was able to choose the time and place for battle. In his struggle against Pompey, Caesar was pursuing the only strategy he could, seeking by speed and boldness to overcome Pompey’s superiority in manpower and money. But Pompey proved himself the better strategist, able to check Caesar at every turn until they faced one another at Pharsalus. Yet Caesar possessed one great strength as a general that won him not only this battle but nearly every one he would ever fight.